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Daily Report

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FBIS Duma Election Report 19 Sep

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[FBIS Media Note] This is the first in a weekly series of reports that FBIS will produce on the campaign for the 17 December Russian Duma elections. It is based solely on Russian media reporting.

Key Developments

Yeltsin Comments on Campaign During his nearly 90-minute televised press conference on Russian Public Television (ORT) on 8 September, Russian President Boris Yeltsin touted his role as election "guarantor" (though noting at the same time his partisan preferences), warned against criminal activities and criminals as candidates in the campaign, and predicted that no party—not even Chernomyrdin's bloc—would obtain a significant advantage over its competitors:

- Yeltsin asserted that he is the elections' "guarantor" and must ensure they are conducted on "equal terms" for all, but added that he will "of course" support "to some extent" movements, parties, and blocs that advocate "further democratization," "continuation of reforms at a faster rate," and "social protection for the people."
- He warned that "criminal proceedings" will be launched against parties that use "anticonstitutional slogans in their manifestos, speeches, etc." and expressed "strong reservations" about the possibility that "criminal elements"—both "organized and unorganized"—might win election to the Duma "through bribes and various kinds of activities."
- Yeltsin asserted that no party or bloc has "any significant advantage over the others," saying that recent public opinion polls show that none is currently projected to get more than 5-8 percent of the vote in December and predicted that it will be "very, very difficult for any one to get the edge over the others." Noting that Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin's Russia Is Our Home (NDR) bloc is polling 8 percent, he predicted that NDR might ultimately get 12 percent of the vote, "but not 30 or 40 percent and not a majority." Asked if a poor performance by NDR would lead to a government reshuffle, he said that "Chernomyrdin's work as [government] chairman is not connected in any way" with NDR's election results, adding, however, that "in moral terms," Chernomyrdin "would lose a lot."

Hemorrhaging of Rybkin Bloc Continues Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin's floundering election bloc lost ground again when the My Fatherland movement—whose leaders, General Boris Gromov and economist Stanislav Shatalin, were the second and third candidates on the bloc's federal election list—withdrew from the bloc on 12 September, just days after the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) registered the bloc's list (RIA, 12 September). Two other prominent members—My Fatherland leader Viktor Mishin and popular singer Iosif Kobzon—abandoned Rybkin's bloc the same day. Russian Television (RTV) Chairman Oleg Poptsov confirmed that he had left the bloc as well in an interview broadcast on independent NTV's "Itogi" news program (17 September).

Several of the My Fatherland members issued a statement on 13 September (ITAR-TASS) scoring Rybkin for "political inactivity and indecisiveness" and a "desire" to "remain in the shadows" rather than act as the "leader" of the "constructive opposition" to executive authorities. Rybkin submitted a new list of federal and single-seat candidates on 15 September (ITAR-TASS) after the CEC annulled the original list in light of the My Fatherland pullout. The CEC confirmed the new list on 18 September (ITAR-TASS). Replacing Gromov and Shatalin in the bloc's number two and three spots are Union of Realists head Yuriy Petrov, formerly a top Yeltsin aide, and Duma Deputy Chairman Artur Chilingarov. In the wake of the bloc's latest turmoil, two of Moscow's most popular and influential newspapers, Moskovskiy Komsomolets and Segodnya, speculated that the bloc might not clear the five percent hurdle required to get into the new Duma (14 September)

Borovoy's Party Alleges "Secret" Blacklist The press service of Konstantin Borovoy's Economic Freedom Party told Ekho Moskvy (18 September) that for "more than a month now" officials in state television and radio "information sections" have been acting on a "secret directive" "recommending" that their networks not air reports on the activities of 20 politicians listed in the directive. According to Borovoy's party, the "list" was drawn up by the presidential Administration together with Security Service of the President (SBP) head Aleksandr Korzhakov. The party alleged that Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) deputy leader Aleksandr Lebed is first on the list, Borovoy is third, and Forward, Russia! leader Boris Fedorov is seventh, but Yeltsin antagonists Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Gennadiy Zyuganov are "not on this list." The party claimed the "recommendation" has also been "brought to the attention" of "several" independent television companies and is "at present being partially implemented." The party further alleged that "one of the aims of this operation is the restoration of the network of secret informants in television companies."

Poking fun at Borovoy, Russian Television's (RTV) 18 September "Vesti" news program reported that "our sources evidently failed to notice this directive" and then showed a still photograph of a smiling Borovoy after noting that as "of late" there has been "no real reason" to report on his activities. According to an 18 September INTERFAX report, Public Russian Television's (ORT) public relations office denied receiving any such "list" and labeled as "political fiction" the allegation of plans to reestablish a network of secret informants in television companies.

In the Provinces

A "Model" Single-Seat District Noting that the contest among the parties' and blocs' federal lists is "nearly completely absorbing the attention" of the press, political pundits, and the public, the independent weekly newspaper Obshchaya Gazeta (No. 37, 14-20 September) is urging election watchers to "cast a glance" at the "unknown elections," i.e., the 225 single-seat district races. The paper announced that it had chosen a "model constituency"— Electoral District No. 152 in Samara city—and "plans to keep track of the election campaign in it from the registration of candidates to the announcement of the winner."

Among the leading candidates in this district are well-known hardliner Albert Makashov, running on the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) ticket; former Russian Supreme Soviet committee chairman Vladimir Shorin, who formerly headed the Samara Aviation Institute; local entrepreneur German Shatskiy, running as an independent with the "backing" of the "Russia, A Presidential Republic" party; and Volga Cossacks hetman Boris Gusev, representing the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) led by Yuriy Skokov, Aleksandr Lebed, and Sergey Glazyev. According to Obshchaya Gazeta, NDR is not fielding a candidate in this district and the bloc "does not enjoy particular popularity" in Samara Oblast, despite oblast Governor Konstantin Titov's prominent role in the bloc's leadership. *Regional NDR Members Unhappy* In a wrapup of the recent NDR congress in Moscow, which drew up the bloc's federal list, Vecherniy Novosibirsk (12 September) reported that many NDR members outside of Moscow were miffed at being excluded when the list was put together. Three NDR members from Novosibirsk Oblast—Oleg Gonzharov, Dmitriy Ryabov, and Nikolay Pavlov—told the local press that "decisions on the candidacies for the federal list were made by the NDR executive committee" without any input from "rank and file members" attending the congress. They claimed that members of the congress "were not allowed to present their opinions" on the federal list and were simply "informed" that "everything had already been decided." The newspaper reported that the composition of the federal list was a "big surprise" for many congress members, adding that voting on the federal list "did not turn out to be unanimous by any means" as "some" of the regional delegates, including those representing the oblast, "vexed by the secrecy in compiling the list and by individual candidates," decided "jointly" to vote against the list.

Published Lists of Candidates

Official candidate lists for the following parties and blocs were published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta from 5-19 September. Each entry below lists the party's 12 core federal list candidates in rank order and gives the date the list was published. If the party's list of candidates in the single seat districts was published, the entry notes that date as well. **Prominent Parties** *Communist Party of the Russian Federation* Gennadiy Zyuganov, Svetlana Goryacheva, Amangeldy Tuleyev, Valentin Chikin, Yuriy Maslyukov, Valentin Kuptsov, Anatoliy Ionov, Valeriy Tarasov, Yuriy Ivanov, Aleksey Podberezkin, Nikolay Savelev, Valeriy Vorotnikov. (Federal and single seat lists published 14 September) *Forward, Russia!* Boris Fedorov, Bela Denisenko, Aleksandr Vladislavlev, Aleksandr Traspov, Vadim Boyko, Igor Ustinov, Roman Gavrilov, Aleksandr Zhukov, Andrey Selivanov, Vasiliy Kovalev, Valentin Zavadnikov, Zaur Ganiyev. (Federal list published 6 September, single seat list published 19 September) *YabLoko* Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, Vladimir Lukin, Tatyana Yarytina, Vyacheslav Igrunov, Aleksey Melnikov, Oksana Dmitriyeva, Aleksey Arbatov, Boris Misnik, Viktor Sheynis, Mikhail Yuryev, Ivan Grachev, Sergey Mitrokhin. (Federal and single seat lists published 16 September) *Women of Russia* Alevtina Fedulova, Yekaterina Lakhova, Galina Klimantova, Marina Dobrovolskaya, Fanuza Arslanova, Irina Vybornova, Antonina Zhilina, Lyudmila Zavadskaya, Natalya Malakhatkina, Svetlana Orlova, Galina Parshentseva, Yelena Chepurnykh. (Federal list published 6 September, single seat list published 13 September) **Other Parties** *Beer Lovers' Party* Konstantin Kalachev, Dmitriy Shestakov, Andrey Palchevskiy, Andrey Kunitsyn, Yuriy Pripachkin, Aleksandr Levchenko, Aleksandr Shuvayev, Vyacheslav Krusser, Yuriy Milyukov, Nikolay Vlasov, Maksim Listovskiy, Andrey Artyushkov. Unlike other parties, candidates on this party's list were not numbered. (Federal and single seat lists published 9 September) *Christian Democratic Union-Christians of Russia* Vitaliy Savitskiy, Tatyana Ivanova, Aleksandr Kiselev. This party listed only three candidates on its federal list, the remaining candidates were listed by region. (Federal and single seat lists published 9 September) *Conservative Party* Lev Ubozhko, Anfisa Zhanimova, Emil Renard-Kio, Anatoliy Dudin, Andrey Klimentyev, Maya Kudelya-Odabashyan, Natalya Koroleva, Boris Balchugov, Vladimir Skrypnik, Lora Vulf, Valeriy Kamshilov, Yuriy Denisov. (Federal list published 5 September) *Democratic Alternative* No federal list has been published for this party, but a single-seat list was published on 16 September. Other parties had federal lists published before single-seat lists, suggesting that this party may be fielding candidates only in the district races. *European Liberal-Democratic Party* This party listed only regional candidates on its federal list (published 16 September)

National-Republican Party of Russia Nikolay Lysenko, Nikolay Pavlov, Konstantin Ovchinnikov, Vasiliy Polishchuk, Yevgeniy Sokolov, Irina Pertseva, Sergey Skobelev, Andrey Golubev, Andrey Orlov, Viktor Smirnov, Mikhail Rogozin, Irina Zaytseva. (Federal list published 7 September) *Party of Advocates of Reduced Taxes* Valentin Dyuryagin, Larisa Piyasheva, Mikhail Surov, Dmitriy Lvov, Aleksandr Primak, Vladimir Yegorov, Marina Voronkova, Dmitriy Voloshchuk, Valeriy Dyuryagin, Viktoria Tonopetyants, Sergey Sishnenko, Dmitriy Pavlov. (Federal list published 5 September) *Power to the People!* Nikolay Ryzhkov, Sergey Baburin, Yelena Shuvalova, Valeriy Ganichev, Stanislav Terekhov, Anatoliy Karpov, Vladimir Kartashov, Vladimir Lebedev, Andrey Semenetskiy, Zigmund Stankevich, Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, Georgiy Tikhonov. (Federal and single seat lists published 12 September) *Russian Party* Vladimir Miloserdov, Aleksandr Fedorov, Vladimir Kolesnikov, Valentin Soloukhin, Ivan Malofeyev, Tamara Ponomareva, Mikhail Vlasov, Valeriy Ivanov, Sergey Sapelkin, Mikhail Kuznetsov, Ivan Bych, Rashid Kayumov. (Federal list published 7 September, amendments and additions to the federal list published 13 September) *Union of Communists* Sergey Stepanov, Cheslav Mlynnik, Georgiy Afanasyev, Aleksandr Lapin, Vadim Kuznetsov, Anatoliy Gromov, Mikhail Kukel, Dmitriy Rezvan, Igor Kushnarenko, Vyacheslav Vlasov, Eduard Pakhomov, Galina Bocharova. (Federal list published 5 September)

List of Single-Seat Electoral Districts

The list of the 225 single-seat districts for the 17 December elections was published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta (22 August) and Rossiyskiye Vesti (24 August). It lists each district's name and number; the total number of voters; the district's center; and other cities, towns and rayons in the district.

On a Lighter Note... ***Candidates come out swinging*** **In the wake of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's well-publicized pummeling of two women deputies at a 9 September Duma session, Forward, Russia! leader Boris Fedorov has reportedly "invited" Zhirinovskiy to fight him in a three-round boxing match. According to his party's press release, Fedorov "believes that any profit should be sent to aid the Women of Russia movement" (Radio Rossii, 13 September)**

Candidate Lists for Elections Published (Part I)

954F3359A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Sep 95 p 6

[Federal lists of candidates for State Duma deputies nominated by the Conservative Party, the Communists Union, and the Party of Supporters of Tax Cuts electoral coalitions]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Verified by the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation on 18 August 1995 (decree No. 9/61-P)

Appendix to the Protocol of the Congress of the Conservative Party [Konservativnaya Partiya] Electoral Coalition, 15 August 1995

Federal List of Candidates for State Duma Deputy of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation Running on the Electoral Slate in the Federal Election District, Nominated by the Conservative Party Electoral Coalition

1. **Ubozhko Lev Grigoryevich,** b. 12 March 1933, chairman of the Conservative Party; resides in Moscow.

2. **Zhanimova Anfisa Mikhaylovna,** b. 20 April 1955, psychic; resides in Moscow.

3. **Renard-Kio Emil Emilyevich,** b. 12 July 1938, director, Kio Circus state enterprise; resides in Moscow.

4. **Dudin Anatoliy Yevlampiyevich,** b. 15 January 1957, general director, Social Protection of the Population Voucher Investment Fund; resides in Yemanzhelinka village, Yetkulskiy Rayon, Chelyabinsk Oblast.

5. **Klimentyev Andrey Anatolyevich,** b. 22 August 1954, president, Arox company; resides in Nizhniy Novgorod.

6. **Kudelya-Odabashyan Maya Leonidovna,** b. 3 May 1938, president, Dako corporation; resides in Moscow.

7. **Koroleva Natalya Ivanovna,** b. 21 March 1957, deputy chairman of the Conservative Party; resides in Moscow.

8. **Balchugov Boris Arkadyevich,** b. 1 July 1940, president, OAO [publicly held joint-stock company] Ekobal industrial-financial corporation; resides in Moscow.

9. Skrypnik Vladimir Ilich, b. 7 September 1940, president, AO [joint-stock company] Energofininvest; resides in Moscow.

10. Vulf Lora Samuilovna, b. 2 June 1937, deputy department chief, RF [Russian Federation] Ministry of Social Protection; resides in Moscow.

11. Kamshilov Valeriy Vasilyevich, b. 5 December 1953, chief of staff, Cossack Host of Russia and Abroad; resides in Moscow.

12. Denisov Yuriy Sergeyevich, b. 10 December 1951, deputy chairman of the Conservative Party; resides in Moscow.

Regional Groups of Candidates for Deputies

1. MOSCOW

1. Vragova Svetlana Aleksandrovna, b. 31 March 1953, artistic director, Modern theater; resides in Moscow.

2. Denisov Yuriy Georgiyevich, b. 2 December 1939, deputy chairman of the board, Mezhtopenergobank; resides in Moscow.

3. Arutyunov Mikhail Georgiyevich, b. 7 October 1930, chairman of the human rights commission, Public Chamber Under the RF President; resides in Moscow.

4. Baskin Boris Solomonovich, b. 13 June 1959, president, Russian professional league KITEK; resides in Moscow.

5. Krasilnikov Andrey Nikolayevich, b. 2 May 1953, first secretary of the board, Russian writers trade union; resides in Moscow.

6. Belousov Aleksey Alekseyevich, b. 4 December 1944, temporarily unemployed; resides in Moscow.

7. Minin Boris Alekseyevich, b. 13 June 1936, president, federal certification center; resides in Moscow.

8. Sadokhova Olga Ivanovna, b. 16 May 1962, member of the Conservative Party's secretariat; resides in Moscow.

9. Rybakov Sergey Vladimirovich, b. 20 April 1962, director, Beta company; resides in Moscow.

2. THE URALS (Chelyabinsk Oblast, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Kurgan Oblast, Perm Oblast, Orenburg Oblast, Republic of Bashkortostan)

1. Volkov Sergey Ivanovich, b. 11 November 1939, president, Association of Victims of Unlawful Repressions; resides in Moscow.

2. Nikitin Yuriy Nikolayevich, b. 11 March 1955, director, Yuriy company; resides in Zlatoust, Chelyabinsk Oblast.

3. Umanets Ivan Karpovich, b. 3 May 1942, deputy supreme ataman of the Union of Cossack Hosts of Russia and Abroad; resides in Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast.

4. Chikviladze Georgiy Nikolayevich, b. 23 March 1932, department chief, State Oceanographic Institute, candidate of technical sciences; resides in Moscow.

5. Yemelyanov Vladimir Anatolyevich, b. 28 May 1962, director, Asha branch of the Social Protection of the Population Voucher Investment Fund; resides in Asha, Chelyabinsk Oblast.

6. Butusova Raisa Nikolayevna, b. 23 October 1956, director, Kyshtym branch of the Social Protection of the Population Voucher Investment Fund; resides in Kyshtym, Chelyabinsk Oblast.

7. Valiullin Khasan Samagullovich, b. 19 October 1941, director, AO Brick Plant; resides in Troitsk, Chelyabinsk Oblast.

8. Bryleva Natalya Veniaminovna, b. 24 April 1951, housewife; resides in Kurgan.

9. Lisitsyn Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, b. 30 June 1962, deputy director, Yuzhouralsk Privatization Center; resides in Kurgan.

10. Shipilov Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, b. 2 June 1948, deputy director, Yuzhouralsk Privatization Center; resides in Orenburg.

3. CENTER (Moscow Oblast, Tula Oblast, Ryazan Oblast, Kaluga Oblast, Tver Oblast, Vladimir Oblast, Smolensk Oblast)

1. Zalipayev Boris Fedorovich, b. 11 August 1936, chairman of the council, Legal Enlightenment Association; resides in Moscow.

2. Tishkov Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, b. 24 June 1950, director, Hope municipal enterprise; resides in Lobna, Moscow Oblast.

3. Shcherbakov Petr Vasilyevich, b. 15 April, general director, AO Gorodishchi Finishing Factory; resides in Orekhovo-Zuyevo, Moscow Oblast.

4. Lyustik Aleksandr Leonidovich, b. 15 June 1935, vice president, AO Energofininvest; resides in Khimki, Moscow Oblast.

5. Karulin Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, b. 29 January 1947, independent expert; resides in Moscow.

6. Meshcheryakov Vladimir Vasilyevich, b. 9 July 1946, fold healer; resides in Moscow.

7. Korotenin Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, b. 2 August 1963, general director, Amix-Union company; resides in Moscow.

8. Chernykh Aleksandr Anatolyevich, b. 19 October 1956, president, White Swan foundation for low-income persons; resides in Moskovskiy township, Moscow Oblast.

9. Smirnov Anatoliy Ivanovich, b. 28 February 1937, forensic expert, main health care administration of the Moscow Oblast administration; resides in Vidnoye, Moscow Oblast.

10. Khromchenko Anatoliy Matveyevich, b. 19 July 1938, physician in Zhilevo township hospital; resides in Zhilevo township, Moscow Oblast.

4. NORTHWEST (St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Pskov Oblast, Novgorod Oblast, Republic of Komi, Yaroslavl Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kostroma Oblast)

1. Purbeyev Lev Anzhurovich, b. 12 August 1927, chairman of the Party of Victims of Political Repressions; resides in Moscow.

2. Chichkovskiy Nikolay Yaroslavovich, b. 14 October 1954, director of a legal services establishment, attorney; resides in St. Petersburg.

3. Nesterov Aleksandr Emilyevich, b. 16 July 1955, director, NII [scientific-research institute] for Computers; resides in Moscow.

4. Presnyakov Valentin Vasilyevich, b. 17 November 1945, deputy chairman of the executive committee, RF Flight Personnel Trade Union; resides in Pechora, Republic of Komi.

5. Skrypnik Konstantin Vladimirovich, b. 7 May 1968, general director, AO Deytsiya; resides in Moscow.

6. Ivanov Rudolf Nikolayevich, b. 18 May 1931, general director, RUDI company; resides in Moscow.

7. Garkovenko Vladimir Anatolyevich, b. 28 September 1961, general director, GUMASSO association; resides in Moscow.

8. Senichkin Nikolay Nikolayevich, b. 16 April 1946, pensioner; resides in Vorkuta, Republic of Komi.

9. Zvyagintsev Vladimir [word illegible], b. 21 March 1957, director, Ekobal-Arkhangelsk industrial-trading company; resides in Arkhangelsk.

5. NIZHNIY NOVROGOD OBLAST

1. Klementyev Sergey Anatolyevich, b. 16 January 1958, general director, Rokko company; resides in Nizhniy Novgorod.

2. Kislyakov Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, b. 16 May 1927, general director, AOOT [publicly held joint-stock company] Navashino Oka Shipyard; resides in Navashino, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast.

3. Yastrebov Vladimir Mefodyevich, b. 12 August 1941, Rosgosstrakh insurance agent; resides in Nizhniy Novgorod.

4. Vilkov Dmitriy Gennadyevich, b. 21 September 1952, commercial director, Rokko company; resides in Nizhniy Novgorod.

5. Nikonov Ivan Petrovich, b. 12 July 1939, commercial director, AOOT Navashino Oka Shipyard; resides in Navashino, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast.

6. Kuritsyn Aleksandr Vasilyevich, b. 9 November 1946, chief accountant, AOOT Navashino Oka Shipyard; resides in Navashino, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast.

6. CHERNOZEM REGION (Voronezh Oblast, Belgorod Oblast, Bryansk Oblast, Orel Oblast, Saratov Oblast, Samara Oblast, Kursk Oblast, Tambov Oblast)

1. Baranovskiy Viktor Viktorovich, b. 6 October 1948, chief of the legal department of the Moscow mayoralty; resides in Moscow.

2. Savvateyev Gennadiy Mikhaylovich, b. 15 April 1941, chief of the expert group, sociopolitical movement Tradition and Progress; resides in Moscow.

3. Neveselov Aleksandr Viktorovich, b. 13 October 1958, deputy supreme ataman of the Union of Cossack Hosts of Russia and Abroad; resides in Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast.

4. Stepanov Anatoliy Grigoryevich, b. 27 February 1947, psychiatrist-narcologist in the Staryy Oskol city hospital; resides in Staryy Oskol, Belgorod Oblast.

5. Zhidkov Vitaliy Vladimirovich, b. 21 June 1956, chief specialist (manager), Uralforum enterprise; resides in Balakovo, Saratov Oblast.

6. Yegorov Yevgeniy Andreyevich, b. 4 April 1955, director, AOZT [closely held joint-stock company] Eco-Mtsensk; resides in Mtsensk, Orel Oblast.

7. Pushkov Aleksandr Ivanovich, b. 26 January 1954, attorney in Ostrogozhsk legal services; resides in Alekseyevka, Balgorod Oblast.

7. SOUTH (Rostov Oblast, Krasnodar Kray, Stavropol Kray, Volgograd Oblast)

1. Ratiyev Viktor Nikolayevich, b. 16 September 1954, supreme ataman of the Union of Cossack Hosts of Russia and Abroad; resides in Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast.

2. Lyabakh Vladimir Alekseyevich, b. 12 November 1947, department chief in the Krasnodar Kray legislative assembly apparat; resides in Krasnodar.

3. Kozitsyn Nikolay Ivanovich, b. 6 October 1956, ataman of the Great Don Host; resides in Zernograd, Rostov Oblast.

4. Demyanenko Viktor Leonidovich, b. 1 May 1950, Donetsk District ataman of the Great Don Host; resides in Zverevo, Rostov Oblast.

5. Fisyun Valeriy Vladimirovich, b. 21 May 1955, director, MP [international enterprise] Anapa; resides in Anapa, Krasnodar Kray.

6. Popov Nikolay Ivanovich, b. 12 January 1951, Taganrog District ataman; resides in Matveyev Kurgan township, Rostov Oblast.

7. Shkodin Grigoriy Ilich, b. 14 April 1950, First Don District ataman; resides in Konstantinovka, Rostov Oblast.

8. Zentsov Vasiliy Vladimirovich, b. 22 May 1951, Rostov District ataman of the Great Don Host; resides in Rostov-na-Donu.

9. Omelechko Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, b. 22 June 1960, Salsk District ataman of the Great Don Host; resides in Salsk, Rostov Oblast.

10. Khimichev Ivan Konstantinovich, b. 20 July 1920, Cherkassk District ataman of the Great Don Host; resides in Yegorlykskaya Cossack village, Rostov Oblast.

8. SIBERIA (Kemerovo Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Kray, Altay Kray)

1. Makarenko Olga Vasilyevna, b. 16 February 1955, expert of the RF State Duma; resides in Moscow.

2. Sokol Ilya Isakovich, b. 15 November 1968, general director, AOZT Post-Office Security Company; resides in Moscow.

3. Kurnosov-Frunze Aleksandr Sergeyevich, b. 22 September 1957, chief of the science and graduate studies department, Moscow Law Academy; resides in Moscow.

4. Mirmovich Eduard Grigoryevich, b. 15 March 1940, group chief, Far-Eastern Center for Recovery from Natural Disasters; resides in Khabarovsk.

5. Gordiyenko Vladimir Danilovich, b. 14 July 1938, coordinator in charge of Lions Clubs development, Service [Sluzheniye] Foundation; resides in Moscow.

6. Mukhin Mikhail Pavlovich, b. 4 May 1959, chairman of the central committee of Justice [Spravedlivost] Free Trade Unions of Russia; resides in Moscow.

7. Vasiliy Vladimirovich Turchin, b. 6 March 1962, director, AOZT Berta; resides in Moscow.

8. Mikhail Nikolayevich Gurin, b. 16 February 1936, cultural issues director, Russian Municipal Association; resides in Moscow.

9. THE FAR EAST (Maritime Kray, Khabarovsk Kray, Magadan Oblast, Kamchatka Oblast)

1. Cherepkov Viktor Ivanovich, b. 18 April 1942, temporarily unemployed; resides in Vladivostok.

2. Vladimirov Pavel Vladimirovich, b. 3 September 1944, deputy unit commander for armaments, colonel; resides in Khabarovsk.

3. Barysh Yuriy Porfiryevich, b. 26 May 1944, first vice dean, Far East Academy; resides in Vladivostok.

4. Filatova Irina Nikolayevna, b. 3 November 1959, vice president, Unity international human rights movement; resides in Khabarovsk.

5. Nefedyev Aleksandr Gennadyevich, b. 7 September 1946, president, AO Bioton; resides in Moscow.

6. Pavlov Viktor Pavlovich, b. 6 October 1940, actor, Malyy Theater; resides in Moscow.

7. Kapustin Aleksandr Borisovich, b. 17 November 1957, member of the Conservative Party secretariat; resides in Moscow.

8. Koveshnikov Vyacheslav Viktorovich, b. 24 March 1938, deputy general director, Children's Wonder Park foundation; resides in Moscow.

[Signed] Congress Chairman L.G. Ubozhko

Secretary N.I. Koroleva

Verified by the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation on 18 August 1995 (decree No. 9/62-P)

Appendix to the Protocol of the First Stage of the Fourth Out-Of-Turn Congress of the Communists Union [Soyuz Kommunistov] Electoral Coalition, 12 August 1995

Federal List of Candidates for State Duma Deputy of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

Running on the Electoral Slate in the Federal Election District, Nominated by the Communists Union Electoral Coalition

The beginning of the federal list of candidates includes candidates who are not part of regional groups of candidates for deputy—a total of 12 deputies—in keeping with Part 4 of Article 37 of the federal law "On Elections of Deputies to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation":

1. **Stepanov Sergey Nikolayevich,** b. 7 November 1957, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communists Union party; resides in Yartsevo, Smolensk Oblast.

2. **Mlynnik Cheslav Gennadyevich,** b. 28 July 1960, aide to a deputy of the State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly; resides in St. Petersburg.

3. **Leonardov Georgiy Leonardovich,** b. 24 October 1960, analyst-planner, AOZT Baltika—a sociopolitical design bureau in Kaliningrad, Moscow Oblast; resides in Moscow.

4. **Lapin Aleksandr Aleksandrovich,** b. 29 June 1963, senior instructor, political science department of the Moscow State Instrument-Building and Information Systems Academy; resides in Moscow.

5. **Kuznetsov Vadim Fedorovich,** b. 29 June 1954, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communists Union party; resides in Pushkino, Moscow Oblast.

6. **Gromov Anatoliy Vasilyevich,** b. 23 February 1954, director, asbestos and technical products plant in St. Petersburg; resides in St. Petersburg.

7. **Kukel Mikhail Vsevolodovich,** b. 31 July 1951, instructor, Moscow Imeni Ordzhonikidze Aviation Institute; resides in Moscow.

8. **Rezvan Dmitriy Borisovich.** b. 31 July 1969, administrator of affairs of the Central Committee of the Communists Union party; resides in Moscow.

9. **Kushnarenko Igor Anatolyevich,** b. 14 August 1960, temporarily unemployed; resides in Rostov-na-Donu.

10. **Vlasov Vyacheslav Petrovich,** b. 14 October 1956, security guards chief, Electron concern in Krasnodar; resides in Novotitarovskaya Cossack village, Dinskiy Rayon, Krasnodar Kray.

11. **Pakhomov Eduard Emelyanovich,** b. 12 August 1936, temporarily unemployed; resides in Moscow.

12. **Bocharova Galina Vasilyevna,** b. 23 March 1958, head music teacher, kindergarten No. 26 in Balabanovo, Kaluga Oblast; resides in Balabanovo, Kaluga Oblast.

Regional Groups of Candidates for Deputies

NORTHWEST

(Republic of Karelia, Republic of Komi, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Leningrad Oblast, Novgorod Oblast, Murmansk Oblast, Pskov Oblast, St. Petersburg, and Kaliningrad Oblast)

1. **Zhurkov Aleksandr Nikolayevich,** b. 17 August 1952, deputy general director of a private security company in St. Petersburg; resides in Toksovo township, Vsevolozhskiy Rayon, Leningrad Oblast.

2. **Alekseyev Yevgeniy Pavlovich,** b. 27 December 1953, senior officer, general staff of the Leningrad Military District; resides in St. Petersburg.

3. **Sakharova Olga Stanislavovna,** b. 27 September 1971, student, St. Petersburg Oblast Pedagogical Institute in Tikhvino, Leningrad Oblast.

4. **Sidorov Viktor Viktorovich,** b. 14 April 1951, deputy general director of a private security company in St. Petersburg; resides in St. Petersburg.

5. **Lisenenkov Yuriy Vasilyevich,** b. 2 July 1957, private security guard; resides in St. Petersburg.

6. **Pivovarov Viktor Fedorovich,** b. 13 May 1942, senior inspector, AO Hellefliit in Ledmozero township, Republic of Karelia; resides in Moscow.

CITY OF MOSCOW

1. **Menshikova Yuliya Mikhaylovna,** b. 10 January 1956, teacher in the Moscow secondary school No. 694; resides in Moscow.

2. **Lobanov Aleksey Aleksandrovich,** b. 17 November 1973, technician, chemical department of the Moscow State University; resides in Moscow.

3. **Alafayev Anatoliy Azpetovich,** b. 8 February 1948, department chief, RF Ministry for Nationalities Affairs and Regional Policy; resides in Moscow.

4. **Menshikova Olga Mikhaylovna,** b. 9 July 1954, research associate, NII of Thermal Processes, Moscow; resides in Moscow.

5. **Barbotkin Viktor Dmitriyevich,** b. 3 October 1951, security service employee, NPP [science and production enterprise] Dilemma Limited, Moscow; resides in Moscow.

6. Popov Aleksandr Petrovich, b. 6 June 1949, instructor, Russian Civil Service Academy under the RF President, Moscow; resides in Moscow.

7. Serenko Vladimir Savelyevich, b. 7 May 1937, security guard at the Moscow mayoralty; resides in Moscow.

8. Ispolatov Mikhail Dmitriyevich, b. 7 December 1970, driver, TOO RASKO, Moscow; resides in Moscow.

9. Sakharov Valentin Aleksandrovich, b. 25 October 1946, associate professor, department of history of the Moscow State University; resides in Moscow.

CENTRAL REGION

(Belgorod Oblast, Bryansk Oblast, Vladimir Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kaluga Oblast, Kostroma Oblast, Kursk Oblast, Lipetsk Oblast, Moscow Oblast, Orel Oblast, Ryazan Oblast, Smolensk Oblast, Tambov Oblast, Tver Oblast, Tula Oblast, Yaroslavl Oblast)

1. Illarionova Nina Vasilyevna, b. 18 April 1948, engineer, Physics and Power Engineering Institute in Obninsk, Kaluga Oblast; resides in Obninsk, Kaluga Oblast.

2. Stepanov Nikolay Ivanovich, b. 15 April 1934, director, peasant farm Mikheykovo, Mikheykovo village in Yartsevskiy Rayon, Smolensk Oblast; resides in Mikheykovo village in Yartsevskiy Rayon, Smolensk Oblast.

3. Petrishchev Vyacheslav Nikolayevich, b. 26 October 1950, deputy director, Moscow oblast branch of the Federation of Goods Producers analytical center; resides in Ramenskoy, Moscow Oblast.

4. Silkin Vladimir Vladislavovich, b. 5 December 1953, teacher, secondary school No. 26 of Ramenskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast; resides in Ramenskoye, Moscow Oblast.

5. Gusev Aleksandr Fedotovich, b. 25 September 1946, director, small enterprise Monolith, Yartsevo, Smolensk Oblast; resides in Yartsevo, Smolensk Oblast.

6. Logua Ramaz Akakiyevich, b. 13 August 1947, general director, AOZT Efendi, Moscow; resides in Moscow.

7. Rusakov Aleksey Konstantinovich, b. 24 March 1953, director, Prechistoye partnership, Dukhovshchinskiy Rayon, Smolensk Oblast; resides in Prechistoye village in Dukhovshchinskiy Rayon, Smolensk Oblast.

8. Kotelnikov Vladimir Aleksandrovich, b. 10 August 1968, project director, financial corporation Podmoskovye; resides in Moscow.

9. Gavrilin Nikolay Alekseyevich, b. 24 September 1947, department chief, Tula Oblast Antitrust Committee; resides in Tula.

10. Kolosov Vladimir Mikhaylovich, b. 24 October 1960, executive director, Skopin nonbudget ecological fund, Skopin, Ryazan Oblast; resides in Skopin, Ryazan Oblast.

11. Matyushkin Aleksandr Vasilyevich, b. 25 June 1933, director, NII Elektronika, Moscow; resides in Mytishchi, Moscow Oblast.

12. Tabachkova Valentina Petrovna, b. 28 June 1955, teacher, boarding school in Yartsevo, Smolensk Oblast; resides in Yartsevo, Smolensk Oblast.

13. Vasilenko Aleksandr Makarovich, b. 27 March 1936, director, sole-proprietorship enterprise Nika-V, Vidnoye, Moscow Oblast; Vidnoye, Moscow Oblast.

14. Koledinskiy Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, b. 12 May 1939, dosimetry engineer, Physics and Power Engineering Institute in Obninsk, Kaluga Oblast; resides in Obninsk, Kaluga Oblast.

VOLGA REGION

(Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Buryatia, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Republic of Tyva, Republic of Khakassia, Altay Kray, Krasnoyarsk Kray, Maritime Kray, Khabarovsk Kray, Amur Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast, Kurgan Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Perm Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tyumen Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chita Oblast)

1. Kulyas Valentin Fedorovich, b. 1 March 1943, director, Center for Humanities of the Magadan Oblast administration; resides in Magadan.

2. Bukharov Yevgeniy Yevgenyevich, b. 31 August 1956, leading specialist in the socioeconomic department, Chelyabinsk Oblast Federation of Trade Unions; resides in Chelyabinsk.

3. Polevaya Valentine Ivanovna, b. 28 May 1939, chief of the pricing and contracts department, AOOT SU-21, Novosibirsk; resides in Novosibirsk.

4. Grek Oles Grigoryevich, b. 12 November 1938, construction supervisor, AOOT SMU-1, Sayanogorsk; resides in Mayna township, Sayanogorsk, Republic of Khakassia.

5. **Kazutina Tatyana Sidorovna,** b. 12 March 1947, personnel director, AOOT SU-21, Novosibirsk; resides in Novosibirsk.

6. **Zhdanova Lidiya Mikhaylovna,** b. 13 February 1941, construction engineer, trust No. 30 of the AOOT SU-21, Novosibirsk, resides in Novosibirsk.

7. **Kuzina Nina Ivanovna,** b. 20 January 1940, pensioner; resides in Novosibirsk.

8. **Pivovarova Alisa Mikhaylovna,** b. 15 July 1938, pensioner; resides in Novosibirsk.

9. **Ananyeva Maria Vasilyevna,** b. 25 January 1925, pensioner; resides in Novosibirsk.

10. **Boyko Nikolay Stepanovich,** b. 14 March 1936, worker, Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant; resides in Chelyabinsk.

SOUTHERN REGION

(Republic of Adygey (Adygea), Republic of Dagestan, Ingush Republic, Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Republic of North Ossetia, Chechen Republic, Krasnodar Kray, Stavropol Kray, Rostov Oblast)

1. **Kabanov Vladimir Borisovich,** b. 18 December 1961, editor of the city newspaper KRASNAYA MOLODEZH, Vladikavkaz; resides in Vladikavkaz.

2. **Prishchutov Fedor Vladimirovich,** b. 15 December 1961, worker, Krasnodarvitamin concern, Krasnodar; resides in Krasnodar.

3. **Logvinov Viktor Fedorovich,** b. 24 April 1936, agricultural worker, Golubovka farm in Zernogradskiy Rayon, Rostov Oblast; resides on Golubovka farm in Zernogradskiy Rayon, Rostov Oblast.

4. **Ogarkova Irina Alekseyevna,** b. 24 August 1955, research associate, All-Russia NII of Oil-Bearing Crops, Krasnodar; resides in Krasnodar.

5. **Margiyev Petr Mikhaylovich,** b. 11 March 1938, deputy chairman of the board, Mutual Aid and Reconciliation foundation, Moscow; resides in Moscow.

6. **Chaplygin Viktor Alekseyevich,** b. 15 August 1956, general director, AOZT Adler private security company; resides in Moscow.

7. **Belilovskiy Yevgeniy Leonidovich,** b. 1 July 1940, chief specialist, Armator company, Moscow; resides in Moscow.

8. **Gantemirova Lyudmila Alekseyevna,** b. 11 November 1940, department head, All-Russia By-Correspondence Financial-Economic Institute, Moscow; resides in Moscow.

9. **Sobolev Vitaliy Pavlovich,** b. 11 November 1940, deputy chairman of the board, Mutual Aid and Reconciliation foundation, Moscow; resides in Moscow.

[Signed] Chairman of the Fourth Congress S.N. Stepanov

Secretary G.V. Bocharova

Verified by the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation on 18 August 1995 (decree No. 9/63-P)

Appendix to the Protocol of the Congress of the Party of Supporters of Tax Cuts [Partiya Storonnikov Snizheniya Nalogov] Electoral Coalition, 12 August 1995

Federal List of Candidates for State Duma Deputy of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation Running on the Electoral Slate in the Federal Election District, Nominated by the Party of Supporters of Tax Cuts Electoral Coalition

1. **Dyuryagin Valentin Viktorovich,** b. 30 April 1955, chairman of the Political Council of the Party of Supporters of Tax Cuts; resides in Moscow.

2. **Piyasheva Larisa Ivanovna,** b. 10 June 1947, chief of the banking department of the Committee on Budget, Financial, Foreign Currency, and Credit Regulation, Monetary Emission, Tax Policy, and Customs Regulations of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly; resides in Moscow.

3. **Surov Mikhail Vasilyevich,** b. 21 November 1954, chairman of the Vologda Popular Movement; resides in Volodga.

4. **Lvov Dmitriy Semenovich,** b. 26 July 1926, deputy director, the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences [RAN]; resides in Moscow.

5. **Primak Aleksandr Andreyevich,** b. 9 May 1952, lawyer; resides in Moscow.

6. **Yegorov Vladimir Nikolayevich,** b. 10 January 1949, teacher, Modern Humanities University; resides in Serpukhov.

7. **Voronkova Marina Viktorovna,** b. 3 October 1970, deputy general director for economics, AOZT Frisco Industrial Company; resides in Chelyabinsk.

8. **Voloshchuk Dmitriy Borisovich,** b. 19 December 1966, general director, AOZT Plodimport; resides in Nizhniy Novgorod.

9. Dyuryagin Valeriy Viktorovich, b. 24 February 1961, general director, AOZT Prominvest; resides in Moscow.

10. Tonopetyants Viktoriya Zrafovna, b. 18 March 1974, economist, the Rostov Branch of the Kuban Regional Bank of the RF Vneshtorgbank; resides in Rostov-na-Donu.

11. Sishnenko Sergey Yevgenyevich, b. 12 September 1961, chairman of the Krasnodar regional branch of the Party of Supporters of Tax Cuts; resides in Krasnodar.

12. Pavlov Dmitriy Eduardovich, b. 5 December 1964, financial director, limited liability partnership [TOO] LAD-M; resides in Tambov.

Regional Groups of Candidates for Deputies

"Simply Russia"

(Republic of Adygey, Republic of Altay, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Buryatia, Republic of Dagestan, Ingush Republic, Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Republic of Kalmykia—Khalm Tangch, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Republic of Karelia, Republic of Komi, Republic of Mari-El, Republic of Mordovia, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Republic of North Ossetia, Republic of Tatarstan (Tatarstan), Republic of Tyva, Udmurt Republic, Republic of Khakassia, Chechen Republic, Chuvash Republic—Chavash Respubliki;

Altay Kray, Krasnodar Kray, Krasnoyarsk Kray, Maritime Kray, Stavropol Kray, Khabarovsk Kray;

Amur Oblast, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Astrakhan Oblast, Belgorod Oblast, Bryansk Oblast, Vladimir Oblast, Volgograd Oblast. Voronezh Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast, Kaliningrad Oblast, Kaluga Oblast, Kamchatka Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast, Kirov Oblast, Kostroma Oblast, Kurgan Oblast, Kursk Oblast, Leningrad Oblast, Lipetsk Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast, Novgorod Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Orenburg Oblast, Orel Oblast, Penza Oblast, Perm Oblast, Pskov Oblast, Rostov Oblast, Ryazan Oblast, Samara Oblast, Saratov Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Smolensk Oblast, Tambov Oblast, Tver Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tyumen Oblast, Ulyanovsk Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chita Oblast, Yaroslavl Oblast;

St. Petersburg;

Yevreyskaya Autonomous Oblast;

Aginsk-Buryat Autonomous Okrug, Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, Koryak Autonomous Okrug, Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Taymyr (Dolgan-Nenets) Autonomous Okrug, Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Evenk Autonomous Okrug, Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug).

13. Frolov Vladimir Nikolayevich, b. 18 May 1948, president, Russian Taxes Association; resides in Yekaterinburg.

14. Zabolotnov Arkadiy Vladimirovich, b. 18 April 1948, shop chief, AOOT Osvar; resides in Vyazniki, Vladimir Oblast.

15. Shugayev Vasiliy Pavlovich, b. 30 May 1945, general director, "Siberia" information and advertising publishing center; resides in Novosibirsk.

16. Dyuryagin Vladimir Viktorovich, b. 24 February 1961, chairman of the coordinating council of the Party of Supporters of Tax Cuts; resides in Krasnodar.

17. Kravchenko Olga Nikolayevna, b. 27 July 1962, consultant on social issues to the Vologda Oblast administration; resides in Vologda.

18. Dergunov Aleksandr Vasilyevich, b. 18 March 1958, counsel, legal department of the Lipetsk city administration; resides in Lipetsk.

19. Ivanov Anatoliy Nikanorovich, b. 1938, director, TOO ODeS; resides in Pechora, Republic of Komi.

20. Chernavin Pavel Fedorovich, b. 18 March 1958, vice president, Russian Taxes Association; resides in Yekaterinburg.

21. Petryakova Vera Grigoryevna, b. 11 November 1951, editor-in-chief, KOMMUNAR newspaper; resides in Tula.

22. Turayev Viktor Mikhaylovich, b. 30 September 1946, director, TOO Fides; resides in Rostov-na-Donu.

23. Pchela Vasiliy Nikolayevich, b. 10 October 1948, director, Cascade-Complex installation and set-up company; resides in Kirov.

24. Zubarev Sergey Yevgenyevich, b. 17 November 1951, general director, AOZT Ira; resides in Belgorod.

25. Menshikov Andrey Vitalyevich, b. 18 July 1963, production section chief, TOO Urals Nonferrous Metals Plant; resides in Ufa.

26. Petrov Yuriy Aleksandrovich, b. 7 April 1947, director, TOO IVTs-TORG; resides in Ivanovo.

27. Zuyev Igor Alekseyevich, b. 23 December 1957, director, Vostok sole-proprietorship enterprise; resides in Zubtsov, Tver Oblast.

28. Naperstok, Ilya Yakovlevich, b. 23 February 1948, chairman, City of Engels Union of Entrepreneurs and Goods Producers; resides in Engels, Saratov Oblast.

29. Sergeyev Vladimir Valeryevich, b. 1 January 1963, commercial director, Venets store; resides in Ulyanovsk.

30. Yudin Yaroslav Igorevich, b. 8 June 1969, tourist center director of a limited liability partnership; resides in Yaroslavl.

31. Semenova Iraida Vasilyevna, b. 18 May 1961, DELOVOY MIR correspondent; resides in Novocheboksarsk, Chuvash Republic.

32. Shirmanov Igor Aleksandrovich, b. 11 September 1959, head of the information service, Europe Plus Kurgan television and radio company; resides in Kurgan.

33. Ukolov Vyacheslav Ivanovich, b. 6 July 1961, entrepreneur; resides in Krasnodar.

34. Molodtsov, Viktor Nikolayevich, b. 10 December 1954, entrepreneur; resides in Vologda.

35. Arzumanov Mikhail Rafaelovich, b. 9 August 1953, Express-Service sole-proprietorship enterprise; resides in Lipetsk.

36. Tseytlin Vladimir Yakovlevich, b. 6 June 1940, director, Engineering Expedition sole-proprietorship enterprise; resides in Pechora.

37. Melikhov Mikhail Borisovich, b. 1 January 1948, chairman of the board, Tula Joint-Stock Social Commercial Bank; resides in Tula.

38. Petukhova Lyudmila Vasilyevna, b. 25 December 1946, chief accountant, Cascade-Complex installation and set-up company; resides in Radushnyy, Kirovo-Chepetskiy Rayon, Kirov Oblast.

39. Bochkov Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, b. 24 May 1948, director, AO Nitkon; resides in Engels, Saratov Oblast.

40. Bolonin Oleg Fedorovich, b. 22 July 1938, senior editor, Ivanovo Television and Radio Company; resides in Ivanovo.

41. Tomilin Vasiliy Sergeyevich, b. 25 January 1952, director, AO Vita; resides in Zubtsov, Tver Oblast.

42. Korniyenko Sergey Mikhaylovich, b. 28 June 1963, deputy general director, TOO Argument Plus; resides in Ulyanovsk.

43. Shevtsov Aleksandr Sergeyevich, b. 3 October 1952, general director, Kubanstroy sole-proprietorship enterprise; resides in Krasnodar.

44. Novikova Alvina Grigoryevna, b. 18 February 1938, deputy general director for economics, AOZT Ruspromservis; resides in Vologda.

45. Sokolov Viktor Vladimirovich, b. 21 January 1950, entrepreneur; resides in Lipetsk.

46. Golosnov Aleksandr Pavlovich, b. 2 June 1941, director, AO Pechorstroy; resides in Pechora.

47. Gayev Nikolay Aleksandrovich, b. 27 March 1956, head of the Priupskiy town administration of Tula Oblast's Kireyevskiy Rayon; resides in Priupskiy, Kireyevskiy Rayon, Tula Oblast.

48. Kozerodov Mikhail Vasilyevich, b. 13 October 1959, director, TOO PIKO; resides in Kirov.

49. Travina Tatyana Konstantinovna, b. 9 May 1949, deputy director for personnel and legal issues, Ivanovo Computer Technology and Information Enterprise; resides in Ivanovo.

50. Borovik Sergey Nikolayevich, b. 1 January 1961, director, Agrotekhservis production-commercial enterprise; resides in Sochi.

51. Lipova Yelena Anatolyevna, b. 1 May 1963, teacher, Pioneer House; resides in Pechora.

52. Sergeyev Sergey Fedorovich, b. 16 October 1956, general director, AO Radio Page-T; resides in Tula.

53. Kashin Vladimir Georgiyevich, b. 24 September 1954, director, TOO Deos; resides in Kirov.

54. Ochagov Viktor Mikhaylovich, b. 1 May 1947, secretary, Novorossiysk City Duma; resides in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Kray.

"Muscovy" (Moscow Oblast and Moscow)

55. Pryanchikov Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, b. 5 August 1955, deputy general director, Radio Podmoskovya state radio broadcasting company; resides in Reutovo, Moscow Oblast.

56. Borisova Yevgeniya Vasilyevna, b. 21 February 1948, expert- specialist, department of legislative procedures of the Legal Administration of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly Apparat; resides in Klimovsk, Moscow Oblast.

57. Chibisenkov Leonid Sergeyevich, b. 10 September 1944, editor-in-chief, AOZT Kanon publishing house; resides in Moscow.

58. Chumakov Aleksandr Nikolayevich, b. 2 October 1943, vice president, Ecoresource Moscow regional organization; resides in Moscow.

[Signed] Congress Chairman V.N. Yegorov

Secretary K.B. Churikov

Candidate Lists for Elections Published (Part II)

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[Federal lists of candidates for State Duma deputies nominated by the Forward, Russia! Public Political Movement and the Women of Russia Political Movement electoral coalitions]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Verified by the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation on 18 August 1995 (Decree No. 9/64-P)

Appendix to the Protocol of the Second All-Russia Conference of the Forward, Russia! Public Political Movement Electoral Coalition, 14 August 1995

Federal List of Candidates for State Duma Deputy of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation Running on the Electoral Slate in the Federal Election District, Nominated by the Forward, Russia! Public Political Movement Electoral Coalition

Candidates not included in regional groups of candidates for deputies, in keeping with Part 4, Article 37 of the federal law "On Elections of Deputies to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation":

1. **Fedorov Boris Grigoryevich,** b. 13 February 1958, RF [Russian Federation] State Duma deputy, president, Forward, Russia! Public Political Movement; resides in Moscow.

2. **Denisenko Bela Anatolyevna,** b. 26 January 1941, RF State Duma deputy, chairman of the RF State Duma Health Care Committee; resides in Moscow.

3. **Vladislavlev Aleksandr Pavlovich,** b. 21 May 1936, first vice president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs; resides in Moscow.

4. **Traspov Aleksandr Mikhaylovich,** b. 15 April 1956, RF State Duma deputy, member of the State Duma Committee for Legislation and Judicial-Legal Reform; resides in Stavropol.

5. **Boyko Vadim Anatolyevich,** b. 30 November 1965, RF State Duma deputy, chairman of the Cossack Affairs Subcommittee of the State Duma Committee on Nationalities Affairs; resides in Sochi, Krasnodar Kray.

6. **Ustinov Igor Gavrilovich,** b. 30 December 1935, RF State Duma deputy, member of the State Duma Economic Policy Committee; resides in Nakhodka, Maritime Kray.

7. **Gavrilov Roman Immanuilovich,** b. 24 December 1945, president, Union of North Caucasus Entrepreneurs; resides in Pyatigorsk, Stavropol Kray.

8. **Zhukov Aleksandr Dmitriyevich,** b. 1 June 1956, RF State Duma deputy, chairman of the Subcommittee for Foreign Currency Regulation, Foreign Debt, and Precious Metals and Stones of the State Duma Committee for the Budget, Taxes, Banks, and Finances; resides in Moscow.

9. **Selivanov Andrey Vladimirovich,** b. 9 July 1967, RF State Duma deputy, member of the State Duma Committee for Women's, Family, and Youth Affairs; resides in Krasnoturyinsk, Sverdlovsk Oblast.

10. **Kovalev Vasiliy Nikolayevich,** b. 14 February 1960, RF State Duma deputy, chairman of the Subcommittee on Macroeconomic Policy of the State Duma Economic Policy Committee; resides in Cherepovets, Vologda Oblast.

11. **Zavadnikov Valentin Georgiyevich,** b. 30 April 1963, chief of staff of the Forward, Russia! Public Political Movement; resides in Moscow.

12. **Galiyev Zaur Magomed-Ganiyevich,** b. 29 March 1967, department chief, LUKoil oil company; resides in Kaka village, Akhtynskiy Rayon, Republic of Dagestan.

Candidates From Regions and Groups of Regions:

Sverdlovsk Oblast:

1. **Belenkov Viktor Nikolayevich,** b. 24 July 1952, director, AO [joint-stock company] Stroymaterialy; resides in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast.

2. **Raldugin Vladimir Stepanovich,** b. 15 November 1947, chief of the Criminal Police Department, Sverdlovsk Oblast UVD [Administration of Internal Affairs]; resides in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast.

3. **Gayday Lyudmila Nikolayevna,** b. 9 November 1944, economist, AO SinTZ; resides in Kamensk-Uralskiy, Sverdlovsk Oblast.

4. **Dolinin Aleksandr Arkadyevich,** b. 13 February 1954, chairman of the regional branch of the Forward, Russia! Public Political Movement; resides in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast.

5. **Anisimov Vladimir Nikolayevich,** b. 3 October 1957, deputy director, Irbit Glass Works; resides in Irbit, Sverdlovsk Oblast.

6. **Rukhachev Igor Vladimirovich,** 19 November 1966, director, TOO [limited liability partnership] STIM; resides in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast.

7. **Shlyapin Aleksandr Valentinovich,** b. 12 February 1957, senior instructor, Urals State Technical University; resides in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast.

Tyumen Oblast:

1. **Kharkov Ivan Fedorovich,** b. 18 September 1949, director, Agropromenergo of AOOT [publicly held joint-stock company] Tyumenenergo; resides in Tyumen.

2. **Aksyonova Tamara Vladimirovna,** b. 11 March 1963, general director, cultural-sports establishment for teenagers SAMOS; resides in Tyumen.

Perm Oblast:

1. **Chernykh Aleksey Vasilyevich,** b. 12 March 1958, chairman, Urals Regional Free Trade Unions Committee 'Solidarnost'; resides in Perm.

2. **Mishina Natalya Valeryevna,** b. 4 March 1961, deputy chairman, Russian Trade Unions Association 'Solidarnost'; resides in Perm.

3. **Arkhipenko Tatyana Grigoryevna,** b. 13 January 1954, chairman, Berezniki city committee of 'Solidarnost' trade union; resides in Berezniki, Perm Oblast.

Chelyabinsk Oblast:

1. **Gabitov Gennadiy Abdarakhmanovich,** b. 21 June 1941, head of Kunashakskiy Rayon administration, Chelyabinsk Oblast; resides in the village of Kunashak, Chelyabinsk Oblast.

Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug:

1. **Alekseyev Yevgeniy Ivanovich,** b. 3 December 1952, general director, Trading and Finance Company; resides in Labytnangi, Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug:

1. **Patrakeyeva Mariya Yuryevna,** b. 14 August 1952, deputy general director, AO Promstroy; resides in Nyagan, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug.

Republic of Bashkortostan:

1. **Yamilov Vakil Khasanovich,** b. 7 May 1945, director, Service company; resides in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan.

Volgograd Oblast:

1. **Alatortsev Valeriy Nikolayevich,** b. 28 August 1948, entrepreneur without forming a legal entity; resides in Volgograd.

2. **Kantemirov Valentin Viktorovich,** b. 18 June 1946, chief, Volgograd Oblast Duma Legal Department; resides in Volgograd.

3. **Kormiyets Valentin Vasilyevich,** b. 10 July 1949, director, Volgograd experimental station of the All-Russia Plant-Breeding Institute; resides in Volgograd.

4. **Mikhaylin Nikolay Sergeyevich,** b. 24 August 1941, director, Success company; resides in Volgograd.

Samara Oblast:

1. **Mingalev Vladimir Yuryevich,** b. 11 August 1963, general director, OOO [limited liability company] Alexander of Macedonia and Ellenika; resides in Tolyatti, Samara Oblast.

2. **Glusskaya Irina Mikhaylovna,** b. 23 August 1960, general director, AO Macedonia; resides in Samara.

3. **Shironin Sergey Leonidovich,** b. 6 February 1958, director, New Project enterprises; resides in Samara.

4. **Semenov Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich,** b. 11 December 1958, director, Centaurus construction company; resides in Tolyatti, Samara Oblast.

Stavropol Kray:

1. **Markelov Viktor Alekseyevich,** b. 2 May 1954, president, AO ASSTArch—association of Stavropol licensed architects; resides in Stavropol.

2. **Kulakovskiy Vladimir Viktorovich,** b. 25 March 1952, engineer, capital construction department, military unit 7427; resides in Zheleznovodsk, Stavropol Kray.

3. **Shulev Nikolay Aleksandrovich,** b. 1 December 1950, director, AO Nadezhda; resides in Krasnokumskoye in Georgiyevskiy Rayon, Stavropol Kray.

Republic of Tatarstan:

1. **Kuznetsova Lyubov Pavlovna,** b. 26 May 1951, head of the financial-legal service, Kazan Plant; resides in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan.

2. **Lomovtsev Yevgeniy Sergeyevich,** b. 25 January 1941, department chief, Tatagroprombank; resides in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan.

3. **Soluyanov Yuriy Ivanovich,** b. 25 September 1939, general director, AO Tatarelektromontazh; resides in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan.

4. **Guseva Lutsiya Galiyevna,** b. 10 July 1947, deputy principal, Lyceum No. 41; resides in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan.

5. Ishkuvatov Albert Khatynovich, b. 10 April 1965, editor-in-chief, KRIS newspaper; resides in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan.

6. Gorgoshadze Gulyemna Ziyatdinovna, b. 10 March 1952, director, Isabella manufacturing and commerce company; resides in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan.

"Northern" Group of Regions

(Komi Republic, Vologda Oblast):

1. Savelyev Andrey Feoktistovich, b. 25 February 1960, director, small production enterprise North; resides in Cherepovets, Vologda Oblast.

2. Gluzman Mikhail Borisovich, b. 21 November 1947, chairman of the board, AKB European North bank; resides in Syktyvkar, Komi Republic.

3. Tobolev Vyacheslav Yevgenyevich, b. 3 December 1957, attorney, private law practice; resides in Syktyvkar, Komi Republic.

4. Nikitin Mikhail Dmitriyevich, b. 28 December 1951, chief of the intensive care department, Vologda Oblast Hospital No. 2; resides in Vologda.

Republic of Mordvinia:

1. Bikhtyakhov Yunir Rashitovich, b. 2 July 1961, president, EGO company, resides in Saransk, Republic of Mordvinia.

Murmansk Oblast:

1. Popov Vladimir Gennadyevich, b. 14 October 1953, chief manager, TOO ADS Vesta; resides in Troitsk, Moscow Oblast.

"Central" Group of Regions

(Kaluga Oblast, Ryazan Oblast, Smolensk Oblast, Tver Oblast):

1. Bauman Vladislav Eristovich, b. 2 January 1959, director, Tver Sports Palace; resides in Tver.

2. Zadvoryanskiy Yevgeniy Engelevich, b. 26 July 1958, commercial director, TOO Meta; resides in Smolensk.

3. Ponomarev Bronislav Mikhaylovich, b. 10 December 1946, instructor, Kaluga College of Technology; resides in Kaluga.

4. Venediktov Valeriy Vasilyevich, b. 16 December 1950, executive director, ANTAVA manufacturing joint-stock company; resides in Tver.

5. Bakhlayev Vladimir Afanasyevich, b. 21 February 1963, medical examiner, Smolensk Oblast Forensics Institute; resides in Smolensk.

6. Morozov Vladislav Vladimirovich, b. 3 February 1973, student, Imeni Baumana Moscow State Technical University; resides in Kaluga.

"Southern" Group of Regions

(Ingush Republic, Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Republic of Kalmykia, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Republic of North Ossetia, Belgorod Oblast, Kursk Oblast, Rostov Oblast, Tambov Oblast):

1. Dybushkin Anatoliy Viktorovich, b. 21 June 1951, general director, AO Yug; resides in Rostov-na-Donu.

2. Dronov Valeriy Vasilyevich, b. 10 December 1950, regional branch chairman, Forward, Russia! Public Political Movement; resides in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast.

3. Abelmazov Vladimir Viktorovich, b. 15 March 1957, director, TOO Abba; resides in Belgorod.

4. Fedotov Vyacheslav Nikolayevich, b. 16 November 1962, regional branch chairman, Forward, Russia! Public Political Movement; resides in Tambov.

5. Babkin Gennadiy Germanovich, b. 8 February 1959, air traffic controller, North Caucasus center of the Strela Air Traffic Administration; resides in Aksay, Rostov Oblast.

6. Kumyshev Aslanbek Abdulovich, b. 16 April 1958, regional branch chairman, Forward, Russia! Public Political Movement; resides in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkar Republic.

7. Badmayev Valeriy Antonovich, b. 16 June 1951, director, private agricultural enterprise VELEZ; resides in Elista, Republic of Kalmykia.

8. Fedorov Viktor Andreyevich, b. 23 October 1938, general director; SP [joint venture] Lotus; resides in Kursk.

Bryansk Oblast

1. Simutin Sergey Alekseyevich, b. 29 April 1960, general director, AO Simutin & Co.; resides in Bryansk.

2. Kopylov Vasiliy Mitrofanovich, b. 11 April 1950; deputy chief physician, Bryansk Oblast oncology clinic; resides in Bryansk.

"Kuban" Group of Regions

(Republic of Adygey, Krasnodar Kray):

1. Burakov Vyacheslav Konstantinovich, b. 31 July 1939, general director, SP Kuban-Kansov; resides in Krasnodar.

2. Lednev Valentin Petrovich, b. 29 June 1941, RF State Duma deputy; resides in Maykop, Republic of Adygey.

3. Zinovyev Nikolay Yuryevich, b. 12 September 1968, general director, AO Spetsnab; resides in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Kray.

"Lipetsk-Orel" Group of Regions

(Lipetsk Oblast, Orel Oblast):

1. Biryukov Aleksandr Ivanovich, b. 11 October 1948, chief, Lipetsk Oblast Administration of the Federal Treasury of the RF Ministry of Finance; resides in Lipetsk.

2. Yevgrafov Pavel Leonidovich, b. 27 October 1957, Yelets regional branch chairman, Forward, Russia! Public Political Movement; resides in Yelets, Lipetsk Oblast.

3. Chernov Yevgeniy Afanasyevich, 9 June 1927, editor in chief, TSENTRALNAYA ROSSIYA newspaper; resides in Orel.

Voronezh Oblast:

1. Boldyrev Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, b. 27 June 1968, director, TOO Prime, resides in Voronezh.

2. Fedosov Vasiliy Ignatyevich, b. 3 January 1934, department chairman, Voronezh State University; resides in Voronezh.

3. Lystsov Vyacheslav Vikentyevich, b. 19 September 1964, expert with the office of the RF representative for Voronezh Oblast; resides in Voronezh.

4. Gritsenko Yelizaveta Ivanovna, b. 26 December 1948; deputy department chief, design bureau of Voronezh enterprise Khimavtomatika; resides in Voronezh.

Altay Kray:

1. Kulikov Gennadiy Vasilyevich, b. 18 August 1949; head of the Industrialnyy Rayon administration, city of Barnaul; resides in Barnaul, Altay Kray.

2. Ivantsov Sergey Semenovich, b. 2 September 1954, general director, Ob association of industrial enterprises; resides in Barnaul, Altay Kray.

3. Kuznetsov Vadim Nikolayevich, b. 10 May 1948, chairman, Altay Kray administration licensing chamber; resides in Barnaul, Altay Kray.

"Central-Western" Group of Regions

(Republic of Mari El, Udmurt Republic, Chuvash Republic, Kaliningrad Oblast, Kostroma Oblast, Novgorod Oblast, Pskov Oblast, Yaroslavl Oblast):

1. Koshchin Yuriy Viktorovich, b. 5 November 1962, chairman of the board of Vozrozhdeniye—an oblast public organization of reserve officers; resides in Yaroslavl.

2. Lopatin Aleksandr Konstantinovich, b. 12 June 1953, deputy of the Udmurt Republic State Council, Control Chamber; resides in Izhevsk, Udmurt Republic.

3. Shkalev Igor Ivanovich, b. 14 March 1957, member of the RF Trade and Industry Chamber; resides in Kaliningrad.

4. Spirov Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, b. 10 October 1958, worker, AO DSK; resides in Novgorod.

5. Afanasyev Leonid Vasilyevich, b. 20 August 1940, chairman, free union of AO Avtodiesel employees; resides in Yaroslavl.

6. Sorokin Sergey Semenovich, b. 26 February 1965, systems engineer, AOZT Alter Impex; resides in Cheboksary, Chuvash Republic.

"Siberia" Group of Regions

(Krasnoyarsk Kray, Irkutsk Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast):

1. Klimov Vyacheslav Ivanovich, b. 14 December 1945, general director, Tokem joint-stock company; resides in Kemerovo.

2. Malakhovskiy Yuriy Yevgenyevich, b. 17 September 1932; department chairman, Krasnoyarsk Medical Institute; resides in Krasnoyarsk.

3. Zhuk Vera Grigoryevna, b. 25 August 1945, director, VOT publishing company; resides in Angarsk, Irkutsk Oblast.

4. Myasnikov Valeriy Sergeyevich, 26 July 1961, aide to a RF State Duma deputy; resides in Novokuznetsk, Kemerovo Oblast.

5. Brekhova Tamara Ivanovna, b. 10 July 1944, editor in chief, PANORAMA PLYUS newspaper; resides in Angarsk, Irkutsk Oblast.

Moscow Oblast:

1. Morozov Aleksey Mikhaylovich, b. 20 December 1955, executive director, public foundation Liberal-Democratic Association; resides in Moscow.

2. **Petukhova Alla Yakovlevna,** b. 19 July 1937, aide to a RF State Duma deputy; resides in Moscow.

3. **Ponomarev Vladimir Nikolayevich,** b. 30 June 1945, vice president, Russian Association of Joint Enterprises; resides in Moscow.

4. **Astafyev Viktor Aleksandrovich,** b. 25 May 1938, automation service chief, AO Unkar; resides in Moscow.

5. **Zotov Aleksandr Alekseyevich**, b. 10 September 1960, general director, Rosinvest company; resides in Opalikha village, Krasnogorskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast.

6. **Vasilyev Vladislav Sergeyevich,** b. 30 May 1970, graduate student, Moscow State Forestry University; resides in Kaliningrad, Moscow Oblast.

7. **Khromov Sergey Nikolayevich,** b. 16 December 1962, teacher, educational center Kanikuly; resides in Moscow.

8. **Kuznetsov Arkadiy Aleksandrovich,** b. 3 April 1938, deputy director, DANT company; resides in Shchelkovo, Moscow Oblast.

Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast

1. **Tsurusov Aleksey Afrikanovich,** b. 23 January 1944, director, private enterprise Denis-Tsurusov; resides in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast.

2. **Shmakov Aleksandr Gennadyevich,** b. 17 May 1974, student, Volga-Vyatka Civil Service Academy; resides in Nizhniy Novgorod.

3. **Voronkov Oleg Yuryevich,** b. 28 September 1970, jurist, AO Krasnoye Sormovo; resides in Nizhniy Novgorod.

"Vladimir-Kirov Group" Group of Regions

(Vladimir Oblast, Kirov Oblast):

1. **Mikheyev Anzheloy Mikhaylovich,** b. 25 October 1935, vice governor, Kirov Oblast administration; resides in Kirov.

2. **Akhapkin Gennadiy Ivanovich,** b. 6 October 1945, TOVAR-DENGI-TOVAR newspaper correspondent; resides in Perm.

3. **Kostikov Sergey Nikolayevich,** b. 27 January 1960, executive director AOZT [closely held joint-stock company] ZZTTRI; resides in Moscow.

4. **Vedeneyyev Aleksey Yevgenyevich,** b. 5 August 1971, chairman of the board, Russian Cultural Heritage Foundation; resides in Vladimir.

5. **Samarina Irina Leonidovna,** b. 20 June 1961; general director, OOO Irina; resides in Vostochnyy village, Omutninskiy Rayon, Kirov Oblast.

"North-West" Group of Regions

(Republic of Karelia, Leningrad Oblast, St. Petersburg):

1. **Ivanov Boris Vasilyevich,** b. 30 December 1950, vice president, Medio-Park International Corporation of Northwestern Region Countries; resides in St. Petersburg.

2. **Istomin Yevgeniy Petrovich,** b. 23 July 1953, head of administration, St. Petersburg's Petrodvoretskiy Rayon; resides in St. Petersburg.

3. **Levashov Aleksey Vladimirovich,** b. 13 April 1965, deputy of St. Petersburg City Assembly; resides in Pushkin, Greater St. Petersburg.

4. **Gorbunov Leonid Olegovich,** b. 4 October 1948, president, AOZT Sovkan, Inc.; resides in St. Petersburg.

5. **Ukolov Oleg Vladimirovich,** b. 31 August 1954, general director, AOZT Petroural; resides in St. Petersburg.

6. **Tublin Konstantin Valentinovich,** b. 17 January 1959, director, Lumbuspress publishing house; resides in St. Petersburg.

7. **Yudzhenko Igor Nikolayevich,** b. 11 April 1956, deputy chairman, Leningrad Oblast Legislative Assembly; resides in Lomonosov, Greater St. Petersburg.

8. **Sergeyev Oleg Yelizarovich,** b. 14 June 1944, commission chairman, St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly; resides in St. Petersburg.

9. **Leonid Nikolayevich Petrovich,** b. 21 February 1943, deputy of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly; resides in St. Petersburg.

10. **Mitchin Konstantin Aleksandrovich,** b. 24 October 1938, commercial director, AO Gostinyy Dvor; resides in St. Petersburg.

11. **Shobrin Aleksandr Sergeyevich,** b. 3 December 1951, captain's mate, Baltic Steamship Line; resides in St. Petersburg.

12. **Ignatyev Igor Petrovich,** b. 15 March 1963, aide to a RF State Duma deputy; resides in St. Petersburg.

13. **Pashkovskaya Nadezhda Nikolayevna,** b. 21 August 1951, general director, AOZT Reslan; resides in St. Petersburg.

14. **Filimonov Aleksey Sergeyevich,** b. 8 September 1963, construction company director; resides in Pesochnoye township, Vsevolozhskiy Rayon, Leningrad Oblast.

15. **Zhavoronkov Vladimir Nikolayevich,** b. 24 November 1950, regional branch executive committee chairman, Forward, Russia! Public Political Movement; resides in Petrodvorets, Greater St. Petersburg.

16. **Solovyev Vladimir Ivanovich,** b. 27 July 1946, regional branch executive committee chairman, Forward, Russia! Public Political Movement; resides in St. Petersburg.

17. **Shkatulov Leonid Filippovich,** b. 31 October 1944, regional branch executive committee deputy chairman, Forward, Russia! Public Political Movement; resides in St. Petersburg.

18. **Rusakova Lyudmila Vladimirovna,** b. 12 June 1945, regional branch executive committee administrator of affairs, Forward, Russia! Public Political Movement; resides in St. Petersburg.

19. **Gusarov Andrey Yuryevich,** b. 8 June 1971, president, Russian St. Andrew's Foundation; resides in Vsevolozhsk, Leningrad Oblast.

20. **Kutsyy Igor Aleksandrovich,** b. 26 August 1968, administrator of affairs, St. Petersburg Petrodvoretskiy Rayon administration; resides in St. Petersburg.

Arkhangelsk Oblast:

1. **Rasskazov Vladimir Petrovich,** b. 8 January 1944, aide to a RF State Duma deputy; resides in Moscow.

City of Moscow

1. **Gusev Yuriy Nikolayevich,** b. 25 December 1957, president, Enterprise Development Corporation; resides in Moscow.

2. **Khodzhayev Andrey Zakirovich,** b. 6 February 1940, chairman, Zamoskvorechye territorial self-government council; resides in Moscow.

3. **Adarchenko Yuriy Mikhaylovich,** b. 12 October 1958, executive director, TOO Impulse-Transit; resides in Moscow.

4. **Nesterenko Andrey Nikolayevich,** b. 2 August 1953, leading research associate, Institute for International Economic and Political Studies; resides in Moscow.

5. **Komarov Aleksandr Sergeyevich,** b. 30 September 1946, deputy commander, military unit No. 25580 of the RF Ministry of Defense; resides in Moscow.

6. **Koryev Aleksandr Borisovich,** b. 16 August 1950, expert with the Civic Rights Foundation; resides in Moscow.

7. **Surikov Igor Mikhaylovich, b. 1 June 1930, leading researcher, Institute of General Genetics of the Russian Academy of Sciences [RAN]; resides in Moscow.**

8. **Krylov Mikhail Mikhaylovich,** b. 10 November 1928, rear admiral (ret.); resides in Moscow.

9. **Sokolov Stanislav Aleksandrovich,** b. 2 December 1930, professor, Moscow Technical Communications and Information Systems University; resides in Moscow.

10. **Gubanov Viktor Vasilyevich,** b. 4 May 1948, dean, legal studies college; resides in Moscow.

11. **Zaylullin Anatoliy Rodionovich,** b. 27 February 1961, expert with KB [commercial bank] Russian Credit; resides in Moscow.

12. **Lavrimovich Vyacheslav Valeryevich,** b. 20 October 1954, executive director, Inpro-Res publishing house; resides in Moscow.

13. **Selitskiy Georgiy Mikhaylovich,** b. 21 June 1959, specialist with a Moscow notary public service; resides in Moscow.

14. **Ryzhov Sergey Nikolayevich,** b. 10 November 1957, department chief, AOOT Kosmos Hotel Group; resides in Moscow.

"Far East and East Siberia" Group of Regions

(Republic of Buryatia, Republic of Khakassia, Maritime Kray, Khabarovsk Kray, Kamchatka Oblast, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia):

1. **Oksuzyan Oleg Borisovich,** b. 26 September 1960, consultant, TINKOM investment company; resides in Nakhodka, Maritime Kray.

2. **Sarychev Petr Alekseyevich,** b. 8 August 1943, director, IChP [investment-voucher enterprise] Elektra; resides in Lensk, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).

3. **Popov Vladimir Georgiyevich,** b. 8 November 1946, associate professor, Department of Sociology and Political Science, Khabarovsk State Technical University; resides in Khabarovsk.

"Volga-West Siberia-Tula" Group of Regions

(Kurgan Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Orenburg Oblast, Saratov Oblast, Penza Oblast, Tula Oblast, Ulyanovsk Oblast):

1. Yevtushevskiy Igor Viktorovich, b. 25 September 1965, president, AO Samolet; resides in Saratov.

2. Babadzhan Eduard Georgiyevich, b. 2 October 1965, president, Samolet trade and finance company; resides in Saratov.

3. Luginin Vyacheslav Vladimirovich, b. 2 August 1970, director, TOO Reval; resides in Novosibirsk.

4. Starostin Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, b. 8 February 1945, president, AOZT Murom; resides in Omsk.

5. Golovanov Aleksandr Anatolyevich, b. 24 May 1963, director, TO Veliy; resides in Orenburg.

6. Berestnev Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, b. 18 November 1950, audit commission chairman, AO Novomoskovskbytkhim; resides in Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast.

7. Potapov Andrey Yevgenyevich, b. 24 October 1968, senior investigator, Novomoskovsk procuracy; resides in Novomoskovsk.

8. Pavlenko Aleksey Nikolayevich, b. 17 November 1958, director, Siberia-Altay trading house; resides in Berdsk, Novosibirsk Oblast.

9. Goncharuk Aleksandr Petrovich, b. 12 July 1952, director, Institute for Biosystems and Social Research; resides in Penza.

10. Galkin Ivan Semenovich, b. 4 October 1954, pensioner; resides in Troitskoye village, Orenburg Oblast.

11. Bulatov Aleksey Nikolayevich, b. 17 July 1962, head of Novoorsk township administration, Orenburg Oblast; resides in Novoorsk, Orenburg Oblast.

12. Leonov Gennadiy Vadimovich, b. 1 November 1950, director of municipal sewage system; resides in Omsk.

13. Volodkov Aleksey Aleksandrovich, b. 14 September 1954, head of Gurovo village administration, Muromtsevskiy Rayon, Omsk Oblast; resides in Gurovo village, Muromtsevskiy Rayon, Omsk Oblast.

14. Beklenishchev Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich, b. 28 June 1970, student, Kurgan Machine-Building Institute; resides in Kurgan.

15. Isayev Pavel Nikolayevich, b. 27 October 1968, acting department chairman, Novosibirsk State University; resides in Novosibirsk.

16. Pavlov Vitaliy Yegorovich, b. 8 October 1951, associate professor, Imeni Vavilova Agricultural Academy; resides in Saratov.

17. Naboka Gennadiy Nikolayevich, b. 8 July 1950, deputy director, TOO Apro; resides in Omsk.

18. Loyenko Vitaliy Borisovich, b. 25 December 1966, surgeon, Omsk Oblast hospital; resides in Omsk.

19. Starostin Andrey Aleksandrovich, b. 26 September 1967, director, AOZT Murom; resides in Omsk.

[Signed] V.G. Fedorov, chairman of the second conference of the Forward, Russia! movement

O.B. Oksuzyan, secretary of the second conference of the Forward, Russia! movement

Verified by the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation on 18 August 1995 (Decree No. 9/65-P)

Appendix to the Protocol of the Conference of the Women of Russia Political Movement Electoral Coalition, 28 July 1995

Federal List of Candidates for State Duma Deputy of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation Running on the Electoral Slate in the Federal Election District, Nominated by the Women of Russia Political Movement Electoral Coalition

1. Fedulova Alevtina Vasilyevna, b. 14 April 1940, deputy chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Moscow.

2. Lakhova Yekaterina Filippovna, b. 26 May 1948, chairman of the Women of Russia Political Movement faction in the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Moscow.

3. Klimantova Galina Ivanovna, b. 27 July 1944, chairman of the Committee on Women, Family, and Youth Affairs of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Izhevsk.

4. Dobrovolskaya Marina Karamanovna, b. 9 August 1960, chairman of a subcommittee of the Committee on Defense of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Moscow.

5. Arslanova Famuza Sharafiyevna, b. 13 March 1951, member of the Committee on the Economy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Surgut.

6. Vybornova Irina Yevgenyevna, b. 28 March 1951, member of the Committee on Geopolitical Questions of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Kaliningrad, Moscow Oblast.

7. Zhilina Antonina Aleksandrovna, b. 2 November 1949, member of the Committee on Budget, Taxes, Banks, and Finances of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Volgograd.

8. Zavadskaya Lyudmila Nikolayevna, b. 21 May 1949, chairman of a subcommittee of the Committee on Legislation and Judicial-Legal Reform of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Moscow.

9. Malakhatkina Natalya Dmitriyevna, b. 4 July 1949, chairman of a subcommittee of the Committee on Health Care of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Mytishchi, Moscow Oblast.

10. Orlova Svetlana Yuryevna, b. 23 October 1954, member of the Committee on Budget, Taxes, Banks, and Finances of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Vladivostok.

11. Parshentseva Galina Vasilyevna, b. 18 March 1951, chairman of a subcommittee of the Committee on Security of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Kemerovo.

12. Chepurnykh Yelena Yevgenyevna, b. 30 May 1955, chairman of a subcommittee of the Committee on Women, Family, and Youth Affairs of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Moscow.

"North-1" Regional Group

Arkhangelsk Oblast, Republic of Karelia, Nenets Autonomous Okrug

1. Belogubova Marina Nikolayevna, b. 8 December 1948, deputy chairman of the Arkhangelsk Oblast Government; resides in Arkhangelsk.

2. Domaseva Maria Filippovna, b. 10 January 1944, chairman of the Women's Union of the Republic of Karelia; resides in Petrozavodsk.

3. Korepanova Lyudmila Yuryevna, b. 10 March 1944, ITAR-TASS supernumerary correspondent for Nenets Autonomous Okrug; resides in Naryan-Mar.

"North-2" Regional Group

Murmansk Oblast, Komi Republic, Vologda Oblast

1. Mironova Lyudmila Alekseyevna, b. 28 January 1949, specialist in the educational work department, Northern Fleet general staff; resides in Severomorsk, Murmansk Oblast.

2. Skorobogatova Vera Igorevna, b. 15 March 1961, secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Youth Union; resides in Syktyvkar.

"Northwest" Regional Group

St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast, Novgorod Oblast, Pskov Oblast, Kaliningrad Oblast

1. Osinskaya Galina Alekseyevna, b. 3 August 1943, special correspondent of the Russian state company Russian Video; resides in St. Petersburg.

2. Astapova Olga Dmitriyevna, b. 19 October 1947, president of the Russian Charity Mission (St. Petersburg); resides in St. Petersburg.

3. Zaytseva Yelena Nikolayevna, b. 3 May 1963, artist; resides in Novgorod.

"Center-1" Regional Group

Bryansk Oblast, Vladimir Oblast, Kaluga Oblast, Tver Oblast

1. Skripitsina Raisa Ivanovna, b. 15 March 1942, chairman, subcommittee of the Committee on Women, Family, and Youth Affairs of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Kaluga.

2. Borisova Tatyana Fedorovna, b. 15 January 1953, deputy chief of the public affairs department, Vladimir Oblast administration; resides in Vladimir.

3. Kukushkina Lyubov Yevgenyevna, b. 10 April 1955, deputy chief, Social Protection of the Population Department, Vladimir Oblast administration; resides in Vladimir.

4. Bocharova Olga Mikhaylovna, b. 27 January 1952, chief of the territorial administration of the RF Ministry of Finance Federal Treasury for Vladimir Oblast; resides in Vladimir.

5. Brezanskaya Valentina Dmitriyevna, b. 2 April 1941, Bryansk Oblast deputy head of administration, general director of the Bryansk Oblast Education, Science, and Culture Department; resides in Bryansk.

"Center-2" Regional Group

Ivanovo Oblast, Kostroma Oblast, Orel Oblast

1. Ionova Valentina Viktorovna, b. 2 February 1955, radio programming department director, Ivteleradio company; resides in Ivanovo.

2. Anna Mikhaylovna Starostenko, b. 13 November 1936, department chief, Orel Technical University; resides in Orel.

3. Korzinkina Antonina Ivanovna, b. 26 May 1949, chairman of the Ivanovo Oblast committee of the textile and light industry workers trade union; resides in Ivanovo.

"Center-3" Regional Group

Ryazan Oblast, Smolensk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Yaroslavl Oblast

1. **Lozinskaya Zhanna Mikhaylovna,** b. 3 March 1944, member of the Committee of CIS Affairs and Liaison With Compatriots of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Tula.

2. **Grishina Natalya Nikolayevna,** b. 19 July 1951, chief of the civil acts registrar office, Ryazan Oblast administration; resides in Ryazan.

"Moscow" Regional Group

City of Moscow

1. **Markina Lyudmila Nikolayevna,** b. 24 May 1940, general director, AO Melkombinat No. 3; resides in Moscow.

2. **Abdurakhmanova Elmira Guseynovna,** b. 20 April 1957; department chief, Russian Center for the Prevention and Combating of AIDS; resides in Moscow.

3. **Ayvazova Svetlana Grigoryevna,** b. 1 May 1944, senior researcher, RAN Institute of Comparative Political Science and Problems of Workers Movement; resides in Moscow.

"Moscow Oblast" Regional Group

Moscow Oblast

1. **Martynova Valentina Grigoryevna,** b. 19 May 1942, chairman, subcommittee of the Committee on Health Care of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Pushkino, Moscow Oblast.

2. **Novozhilova Zoya Grigoryevna,** b. 28 March 1943, chief of the international affairs administration of the apparat of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Moscow.

"Volga" Regional Group

Kirov Oblast, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast, Republic of Mari El, Republic of Mordvinia, Chuvash Republic

1. **Shmakova Silva Averkiyevna,** b. 1 April 1953, administration of Affairs of the Novocheboksary city administration, Chuvash Republic; resides in Novocheboksarsk.

2. **Stepanova Lyudmila Ivanovna,** b. 27 February 1947, chief specialist in the Kirov Oblast administration; resides in Kirov.

3. **Blonina Svetlana Aleksandrovna,** b. 22 January 1954, chief, social protection department, Nizhniy Novgorod administration; resides in Nizhniy Novgorod.

4. **Guryanova Valentina Filippovna,** b. 28 April 1941, Republic of Mordvinia deputy minister of health care; resides in Saransk.

"Chernozem-1" Regional Group

Voronezh Oblast, Lipetsk Oblast

1. **Kurlova Valentina Ivanovna,** b. 3 January 1949, chief of the women, family, motherhood, and childhood department, Lipetsk Oblast administration; resides in Lipetsk.

2. **Goncharova Lyudmila Vasilyevna,** b. 24 February 1941, first deputy director, Voronezh Oblast Administration Department of Trade, Public Catering, Consumer Services, and For-Fee Services; resides in Voronezh.

3. **Dorokhina Larisa Mikhaylovna,** b. 13 March 1946, chief comptroller auditor for Voronezh Oblast of the RF Ministry of Finance KRU [Control and Audit Administration]; resides in Voronezh.

4. **Kolesnikova Olga Andreyevna,** b. 30 July 1952, deputy director, Voronezh Oblast Employment Center; resides in Voronezh.

"Chernozem-2" Regional Group

Belgorod Oblast, Kursk Oblast, Tambov Oblast

1. **Okorokova Galina Pavlovna,** b. 24 September 1946, rector, Kursk Institute for Continuing Education; resides in Kursk.

2. **Romanina Larisa Aleksandrovna,** b. 6 September 1951, chairman, Tambov Oblast Administration Social Protection of the Population Committee; resides in Tambov.

3. **Kalashnikova Svetlana Nikolayevna,** b. 3 August 1945, chairman, Belgorod Oblast Duma Social Policy Commission; resides in Shebekino, Belgorod Oblast.

4. **Bugrova Valentina Fedorovna,** b. 26 May 1942, director, Tambov municipal special general-education labor school; resides in Tambov.

"Volga" Regional Group

Astrakhan Oblast, Volgograd Oblast, Penza Oblast, Samara Oblast, Saratov Oblast, Ulyanovsk Oblast, Republic of Kalmykia, Republic of Tatarstan

1. **Chubkova Galina Petrovna,** b. 20 June 1945, chairman, subcommittee of the International Affairs Committee of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Astrakhan.

2. **Bobrova Valentina Mikhaylovna,** b. 30 August 1936, Saratov Oblast Duma deputy; resides in Saratov.

3. Yeroshkina Tatyana Petrovna, b. 8 October 1948, associate professor, Samara State Aerospace University; resides in Samara.

4. Kondaurova Tatyana Ivanovna, b. 1 January 1960, director, Kamyshin Museum of Local Lore, History, and Economy, Volgograd Oblast; resides in Kamyshin, Volgograd Oblast.

"Caucasus-1" Regional Group

Republic of Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Republic of North Ossetia

1. Uyanayeva Aminat Mukhtarovna, b. 5 January 1953, adviser for economic and social policy to the president of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic; resides in Nalchik.

2. Makhmudova Takhibat Alaudinovna, b. 30 May 1953, chairman, Republic of Dagestan Commission on Social Issues, Protection of Motherhood and Childhood; resides in Makhachkala.

3. Ismailova Asya Aleksandrovna, b. 4 August 1952, aide to a deputy of the Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; resides in Moscow.

4. Khetagurova Zara Vladimirovna, b. 7 January 1935, department chief in a medical school in Vladikavkaz; resides in Vladikavkaz.

"Caucasus-2" Regional Group

Republic of Adygea, Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia, Ingush Republic, Chechen Republic

1. Moldovanova Vera Mikhaylovna, b. 27 August 1946, general director, Ine industrial-trading company; resides in Cherkessk.

2. Usacheva Lyubov Alekseyevna, b. 10 July 1950, chairman of the council of the Republic of Adygey Health Care Workers Trade Union; resides in Maykop.

3. Abidova Lelya Vitalyevna, b. 19 September 1958; deputy chief physician, children's hospital; resides in Cherkessk.

"Caucasus-3" Regional Group

Krasnodar Kray, Stavropol Kray, Rostov Oblast

1. Ignatova Anna Yakovlevna, b. 11 September 1946, president, DONTEX company, Shakhty, Rostov Oblast; resides in Shakhty, Rostov Oblast.

2. Korneyeva Maria Dmitriyevna, b. 15 May 1944, editor in chief, STAVROPOL PRAVDA newspaper; resides in Stavropol.

3. Polyanichko Lyudmila Georgiyevna, b. 17 March 1957, deputy chairman, Sochi City Committee of Trade Sector Employees Trade Union; resides in Sochi.

4. Gabitova Tatyana Dmitriyevna, b. 7 August 1951, chairman of the Stavropol Kray State Duma Social Policy Committee; resides in Stavropol.

"Urals-1" Regional Group

Kurgan Oblast, Perm Oblast, Republic of Bashkortostan

1. Nazmetdinova Minrauza Minikhaziyevna, b. 29 December 1940, Republic of Bashkortostan deputy minister of health care; resides in Ufa.

2. Pronina Svetlana Nikolayevna, b. 8 June 1947, chairman, committee of the Republic of Bashkortostan Trade Union of Education and Science Workers.

"Urals-2" Regional Group

Sverdlovsk Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Orenburg Oblast, Komi- Permyak Autonomous Okrug, Udmurt Republic

1. Serebrennikova Klara Georgiyevna, b. 11 June 1947, department chairman, Izhevsk Medical Institute; resides in Izhevsk.

2. Ivanova Aleksandra Georgiyevna, b. 7 July 1946, Orenburg Oblast deputy head of administration for social issues; resides in Orenburg.

3. Gavrilova Galina Andreyevna, b. 11 June 1957, chairman, Chelyabinsk Administration Committee for Social Protection of the Population; resides in Chelyabinsk.

"Siberia-1" Regional Group

Republic of Altay, Altay Kray, Novosibirsk Oblast, Tyumen Oblast, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug

1. Ivanova Lyudmila Anatolyevna, b. 7 October 1949, president, Novosibirsk trading and manufacturing company Market-Commerce; resides in Novosibirsk.

2. Remiyeva Nadezhda Stepanovna, b. 3 October 1945, deputy chairman, Altaybank; resides in Barnaul.

3. Kosheleva Lyubov Nikolayevna, b. 31 August 1948, deputy head, Surgut city administration, Tyumen Oblast; resides in Surgut.

"Siberia-2" Regional Group

Krasnoyarsk Kray, Omsk Oblast, Republic of Khakassia, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Taymyr

(Dolgan-Nenets) Autonomous Okrug, Evenk Autonomous Okrug

1. **Yelizaryeva Lyubov Petrovna,** b. 25 October 1953, legal department chief, Krasnoyarsk Kray Legislative Assembly; resides in Krasnoyarsk.

2. **Eftimovich Lyudmila Yevgenyevna,** b. 4 September 1950, chairman, Tomsk Oblast Administration Committee for Social Policy and Family and Childhood Problems; resides in Tomsk.

3. **Vasilyeva Galina Sofronovna,** b. 12 October 1952, deputy director, private enterprise Mamont, Republic of Sakha; resides in Yakutsk.

4. **Kharitonova Galina Nikolayevna,** b. 4 August 1952, deputy head of Omsk city administration; resides in Omsk.

"Siberia-3" Regional Group

Irkutsk Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast, Chita Oblast, Republic of Buryatia, Republic of Tyva, Aginsk-Buryat Autonomous Okrug, Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug

1. **Akulova Anna Petrovna,** b. 14 April 1957, director, Audit-Business company; resides in Irkutsk.

2. **Samsonova Albina Vasilyevna,** b. 1 September 1946, consultant of the Irkutsk Oblast Administration Control and Work with Territories Department; resides in Irkutsk.

3. **Zaitseva Lyubov Aleksandrovna,** b. 16 April 1949, president, Irkutsk Oblast association Baby Food, Laktovit company director; resides in Angarsk, Irkutsk Oblast.

"Far East" Regional Group

Maritime Kray, Khabarovsk Kray, Amur Oblast, Kamchatka Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Yevreyskaya Autonomous Oblast, Koryak Autonomous Okrug, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug

1. **Sofrina Zoya Fedorovna,** b. 10 August 1954, deputy chairman, Khabarovsk Kray Duma; resides in Khabarovsk.

2. **Shubina Lyubov Fedorovna,** b. 12 May 1952, deputy chairman, Sakhalin Oblast Duma; resides in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

3. **Byrganova Raisa Timofeyevna,** b. 8 July 1940, chief, Information and Analysis Department, Amur Oblast administration; resides in Blagoveshchensk.

[Signed] Conference chairman A.V. Fedulova

Conference Secretary M.V. Gordeyeva

CIS Border Commanders Hold Meeting in Bishkek

Kyrgyz President Praises Cooperation

LD1909204195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1823 GMT 19 Sep 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Askar Akayev has praised cooperation between CIS border troops saying it can serve as an example for CIS cooperation in economic and political areas.

In an opening speech to the meeting of the council of CIS border troop commanders-in-chief in Bishkek on Tuesday, he described cooperation in CIS border protection as being successful and fruitful. He called for tighter border security which would help create free economic zones and implement the CIS economic and customs unions.

Akayev described border troops as a vanguard of CIS security and stability saying all crises started off from border conflicts.

He listed more important issues to be put on the meeting's agenda including a package of papers on the prevention of illegal immigration and on rules of entry and exit in and from CIS countries.

Two other draft agreements deal with the status of united regional command headquarters and coordination councils of the CIS border troops and the use of border troops in the event of border conflicts.

An integrated plan for defusing the border conflict in Tajikistan and other issues are also to be discussed.

One other draft agreement to be considered is on cooperation in training border guard officers. The building of sports facilities for allied border troops as well as the timing and venue of the next meeting are also to be discussed.

Meeting Hailed as Success

LD1909193695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1804 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BISHKEK, Sept 19 (Interfax) — Anarbek Bakayev, head of the Kyrgyz State Committee on National Security, gave a positive assessment of the results of a CIS border troops commanders meeting held in Bishkek Tuesday.

He said that during the meeting the sides discussed 22 issues and signed "a large number of documents." The main issue was the implementation of a complex plan to ensure stability on the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, he said.

Aleksey Kozhevnikov, deputy head of the Russian Federal Border Service, told a news conference that the sides proposed that CIS leaders discuss "additional measures to settle the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border" at the upcoming summit in Sochi.

He stated that Federal Border Service Director Andrey Nikolayev intends to propose the reinforcement of the border troops' units on the Tajik-Afghan border with units from Central Asian states.

According to Bakayev, representatives of border troops from all CIS countries, except for Moldova and Uzbekistan, attended the Bishkek meeting.

All documents presented for discussion were signed, albeit not without difficulties, he said.

Representatives of Turkmen, Ukrainian and Azerbaijani delegations expressed certain reservations on several but signed all the proposed documents, said Bakayev.

Participants of the meeting who spoke at the news conference pointed out the need to sign an agreement on cooperation in possible conflicts on CIS outer borders. The agreement must regulate the degree and form of each country's participation in the case of such conflicts.

CIS Plans To Unify Entry Rules For Foreigners

LD2009100995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0913 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Andrey Urban]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW September 20 (Itar-Tass) — Consular services of CIS countries plan to unify the entry rules for foreign citizens, as well as the order of their stay, transit and exit from the Commonwealth of Independent States, according to a senior Russian Foreign ministry official.

Vasiliy Vinogradov, director of the Foreign Ministry consular department, told his counterparts from CIS states at a meeting in Moscow Wednesday, that it is also planned to create a single centre which will control the entry and exit of foreign citizens to and from the CIS states.

The proposals of the consular services will be submitted for approval to the CIS Council of Foreign ministers which is to meet in Moscow in early October.

Reportage on CIS Journalists' Forum in Moscow

'Roundtable' Organization Created

LD1909180695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1746 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By Tamara Ivanova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 19 (Itar-Tass) — The chiefs of journalist unions from Russia, Ukraine, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and Armenia signed an agreement on Tuesday about the creation of a "round table" organisation uniting journalist unions chiefs from members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Chief of the Ukrainian Journalist Union Yevhen Verbilo was elected head of the new organisation. Each year, a representative of another CIS member will be holding a rotating presidency of the panel.

The task of the "round table", which will act under the auspices of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, will be to develop and strengthen the informational space and the internationally recognised rules, as well as to protect it from unconscientiously prepared and information [passage as received].

"Round table" participants will also work on the free spread of information through the frontiers of the CIS countries. In addition, the organisation will work out legislative bills concerning the mass media.

The idea of creating such an organisation was launched at a conference of the CIS journalist unions last April. However, the Confederation of Journalist Unions was not fully supportive of it.

The Confederation appeared in 1991 in place of the Union of Journalists of the former USSR. In its leader Eduard Sagalayev's opinion, the "round table" is an alternative to the Confederation, and their co-existence will lead to inevitable conflict.

However, speaker of the Federation Council Vladimir Shumeyko, who was among the participants of the "round table" meeting, voiced an opinion that the more organisations would be busy solving problems faced by journalists nation-wide and on an international scale, the more positive results would be obtained.

The Confederation could interact with the executive branch, whereas the "round table" might confine its activities to working out standard legislation concerning the mass media for all CIS countries.

The next session of the "round table" is scheduled for January 1996 in Ukraine. It will deal with issues of economic infrastructure of the mass media market and the material and technical base of newspapers and magazines.

Shumeyko Stresses 'Information Space'

LD1909164195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0959 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 19 September (ITAR-TASS) — A single information space is vital if the CIS countries are to move closer together, chairman of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly and speaker of the Russian Federation Council said today. He was speaking at a forum of the head of CIS journalists' unions, who gathered at the parliamentary center in Moscow to discuss the need for free and wide-ranging exchange of information irrespective of borders, the joint fight for the press's survival in a market economy, and stronger legal safeguards for the media.

Vladimir Shumeyko said parliament wholeheartedly supported journalists who understand their vast responsibility to their fellow citizens for a more stable society and further democratic reform. In his opinion, "the all-embracing reason for all the difficulties experienced in the former Soviet republics is the economy". If this can be put right, then "all the other problems will go of their own accord". For this reason, the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly has focused most of its efforts in this direction, working on model legislation.

The head of the assembly council said in particular that the first part of a model civil code, which would have an enormous impact on everyday life, has already been ratified by a number of parliaments and work is underway on its second part. According to Vladimir Shumeyko, "whatever the politicians say, we can only restore economic ties and integration in general by bringing our legislation closer together." Both the ideology and the basic practices have to converge, he stressed.

But convergence of legislation on the mass media is the most complex matter of all, Vladimir Shumeyko thinks. It is being hindered by the press's lack of economic freedom, in particular. In Shumeyko's opinion, the state should exempt the media from paying tax for an interim period because not every newspaper "is an earner." Nonetheless, Shumeyko said, deputies have still not legislated on this because many of them are concerned not about the plight of the media but about the opportunities it provides them in their struggle for power.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 20 Sep

LD2009105095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0502 GMT 20 Sep 95

["Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 20 (Itar-Tass) — The majority of today's newspaper carry brief reports about recent developments in Chechnya, Bosnia and Herzegovina and a meeting between the Russian President with Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and Director of the Federal Security service Mikhail Barsukov which took place in Sochi.

"ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI" says that Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev is scheduled to arrive in Sochi today to report to the Russian President about the results of his trip to Central Asian republics. In another article entitled "Strong local governments will cut managing personnel" the newspaper carries an interview with Deputy Minister for Affairs of Nationalities and Regional Politics Aleksandr Kotenkov. Kotetnkov said that "it would be naive to suggest that the law on local governments which came into effect on September 1 would make a revolution among the managing personnel, but in a couple of decades heads of city and regional administrations would be quite different people elected by the population rather than appointed "from above." In another article the newspaper carries a report about the situation in Kalmykia and comments on the results of an inspection conducted in Kalmykia by Control department of the President's administration.

"IZVESTIYA" publishes an article by its observer Irina Savvateyeva, entitled "The government intends to do away with incompetence of managers and theft at enterprises". Enterprises are angry because the state delays payments of its debts, while the state, in turn, is angry because enterprises do not pay taxes to the state budget which lacks 23,5 trillion roubles by August 1. Despite measures taken against the worst tax dodgers, the government has failed to resolve the problem at a one stroke. Chubays, for instance, has failed to rescind an existing rule under which enterprises are entitled to reserve 30 per cent of its funds for paying wages and other emergency expenditures. However, the government has not abandoned its plans and by the end of the year the "wretched" system is expected to be liquidated. However, a strong battle is going on, tax dodgers have been fighting for all they are worth and it is not clear yet who will take the upper hand," the newspaper said.

"ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI" published an interview with President of the Central Design Bureau "Lazurit" Nikolay Kwasha, who until recently has been a "top secret man". For many years the design bureau had been orientated to defence-related industries only — and designed nuclear submarines of the "Barracuda" series which surpassed similar U.S.-made submarines. The newspaper comments on the fate of the "Barracuda" submarine and another unique project — to lay out a city on the ocean floor fit for thousands of people to live in.

Serb Minister Buha Begins 'Unconventional' Visit

MK1909124395 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 1

[Report by Vladimir Abarinov: "Serbian Republic Minister Arrives in Moscow Without Invitation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Aleks Buha, foreign minister of the self-proclaimed Serbian Republic in Bosnia, arrived in Moscow yesterday. The Contact Group countries do not maintain direct contact with the Bosnian Serbs — talks with these states on the latter's behalf are conducted by Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who heads the joint Serb delegation. Interest in the unconventional visit was stimulated by statements by Buha himself, who said before his trip in an interview with ITAR-TASS that he planned to seek arms deliveries from Russia, especially mobile air defense systems. [Russian Foreign Minister] Andrey Kozyrev would not meet with the visitor, however, and left for Tashkent [Uzbekistan] in the morning. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, for his part, directed his steps to [the Black Sea resort of] Sochi to meet with the president.

Your SEGODNYA correspondent managed to learn from knowledgeable sources in the Russian Foreign Ministry that no one expected Buha in Moscow and that he undertook the trip at his own initiative or, rather, at the recommendation of Sergey Glotov, State Duma deputy, who was visiting Belgrade as head of a parliamentary delegation. Upon arriving in Russia, the minister changed the objective of his visit: It turns out that he came here to open a Bosnian Serb cultural center. A request for a meeting was sent to the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry only after Buha had already arrived in the Russian capital.

Nonetheless, it was decided on Smolenskaya Square [seat of the Russian Foreign Ministry] that Buha should be received because he is a member of the joint Serb delegation. "Not only are talks with a delegation member not prohibited, but that goes without saying," a Russian diplomat who met with Buha at a recent meeting of the Contact Group in Geneva told your SEGODNYA correspondent. The diplomat held an extremely skeptical view of the Bosnian Serb minister's hope of obtaining arms in Moscow. When asked what message will be sent to the Serb side through Buha, he said that Moscow had enough channels to send such a message.

According to the Russian diplomat, information about the numerous casualties among civilians allegedly caused by NATO air strikes has so far not been confirmed. At the same time, he admitted that considerable damage has been inflicted on Bosnian Serb military targets. SEGODNYA's interviewee emphasized that a list of targets at which fire was to be directed had been handed to the Serb side in advance so that it would have time to evacuate the civilian population.

Appeals for Military Aid

LD2009101195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0901 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 20 Sep (ITAR-TASS) — Bosnian Serb Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha, who is in Moscow, met Yuriy Baturin, the Russian president's national security aide, on 19 September and asked him to plead with Boris Yeltsin to grant the Serbs military aid. The ITAR-TASS correspondent learned this from Yuriy Baturin. Apparently Buha was roused to make this request by the Russian Federation president saying at a news conference on 8 September that if the NATO forces' bombing raids on Serb positions continue, Russia will, in addition to humanitarian aid, also undertake "stronger measures" in defense of the Serbs.

Acknowledging the confidentiality of his request, Buha denied in an interview with the "Versions" program shown on 19 September that he was appealing for military support, at any rate to the Russian Foreign Ministry.

"I was only informing my Russian friends that the Bosnian Serbs are now fighting five Armies," he said. But before flying to Moscow, Buha was not concealing the true aim of his trip — to obtain Russian support, including providing the Serbs with weapons.

Meets Ivanov on Bosnian Situation

LD1909185195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1824 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By Valeriy Sevryukov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 19 (ITAR-TASS) — State structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the present situation in the republic in view of offensive operations of armed units of the Muslim-Croatian federation in western Bosnia and prospects for the development of peace process were the main topics of the exchange of opinion on Tuesday between First Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Foreign Minister of the Bosnian Serb Republic Aleksa Buha. Their conversation lasted for two hours.

The Russian President's envoy to former Yugoslavia, Aleksandr Zotov, who took part in the meeting said in an exclusive interview to ITAR-TASS that the exchange of opinion was devoted to "stepping up the peace process and achieving mutually-acceptable arrangements of the sides involved in the conflict". He said the participants in the exchange of opinion discussed the possibility of creating the framework for settlement which "even if not fully meeting the demands of Bosnian Serbs would be based on fairness and give them the chance to survive".

Zotov said the question of Russian arms supplies to Bosnian Serbs had not been raised at the meeting.

During the negotiations Buha expressed concern over the tendency of solving the Yugoslav crisis at the expense of Bosnian Serbs, Zotov said. The Bosnian Serb Foreign Minister said the state structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the composition of the Muslim-Croatian federation and the Serb Republic should be formed under the principles of equality and equal possibilities of the sides. The question of territorial delimitation should take into account the principle of Serbs continuing to hold a compact viable territory included in the Bosnian state as a full-fledged member.

Buha arrived in Moscow on a working visit on Monday and will stay in Moscow till Friday, September 22. He will possibly meet representatives of a number of factions of the Russian State Duma.

Zotov Says Military Aid Not Discussed

LD1909201795 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1919 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — Russia's First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Presidential Envoy for Former Yugoslavia Aleksandr Zotov met with Bosnian Serb Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha in Moscow Tuesday. "Russia's military aid to Bosnian Serbs was not discussed," Zotov told INTERFAX upon the end of the meeting.

Zotov quoted Buha as saying: "I am a foreign minister and cannot deal with arms by definition. I am interested in political interaction in the context of the search for ways of peace settlement of the Bosnian issue."

According to Zotov, the conversation focused on this very issue.

"Buha's main argument was that the principle of justice with respect to Bosnia's territorial division and that of equal rights as a foundation of the constitutional system should be laid in the basis of the Bosnian settlement," he said.

Zotov added that Buha had said there were "no normal conditions for talks in the context of the ongoing Moslem-Croatian onslaught, given the lack of an agreement on ceasing hostilities around Sarajevo and throughout Bosnia."

For his part, Zotov told Buha that "we have been active promoters of the peace settlement."

"Russia supports peace in the Balkans, which is possible only if mutually acceptable solutions are found to let all nations of Bosnia live comfortably enough in the Bosnian state and simultaneously manage their affairs so that new sparkles do not appear between them," he underlined.

Zotov said Ivanov will leave for Zagreb and possibly Sarajevo Wednesday.

Buha Not Planning To Visit Arms Exporter

LD1909162995 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1524 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — Bosnian Serb Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha, who arrived in Moscow on Monday, said he had no plans to visit Russia's leading arms exporting company, a company spokesman said on Tuesday.

The Rosvooruzheniye company "wasn't planning any negotiations with Buha on supplying the (Bosnian) Serb Republic with any kind of armaments," the spokesman told INTERFAX.

Spokesman Calls UN Demand on Bosnia 'Inadequate'

LD1909125895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1245 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By Valeriy Sevryukov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 19 (ITAR-TASS) — Russia is going to continue its efforts at the U.N. to stop a new spiral of hostilities launched by Muslim and Croat troops, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin said here today.

He quoted an earlier statement by the U.N. Security Council chairman which demanded immediate cessation of military offensives by the warring parties in central Bosnia.

"We believe that this statement is a step in the right direction, but it is quite inadequate, considering the scale of the Muslim-Croat offensive, the threat of a new humanitarian catastrophe and the likelihood of failure of the agreements which had been recently reached in Geneva by representatives of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia," Demurin said.

Further UN Measures Sought

LD1909190395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1804 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — Russia is determined to take further steps in the U.N. Security Council to put an end to the latest outburst of combat operations in Bosnia initiated by the Muslim-Croat troops, the Russian Foreign Ministry's spokesman Mikhail Demurin announced during a briefing in Moscow Tuesday.

He said Moscow viewed as a "step in the right direction" the Security Council chairman's Monday statement which demanded that all the sides which had carried out offensive operations in Central Bosnia immediately end them and demonstrate respect for the rights of the local civilian population.

Demurin said, however, that the Security Council chairman's demarche was "absolutely insufficient, given the scale of the Muslim-Croat offensive, the threat of a new humanitarian catastrophe, caused by the mass exodus of the Serb population, and the possible foiling of the agreements recently reached in Geneva by representatives of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia."

Presidential Envoy Fears More NATO Strikes in Bosnia

LD1909185595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1804 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — Moscow fears that NATO will continue air strikes on Bosnian Serbs this autumn. "The NATO sword of Damocles will be hanging above their heads under this or that pretext," Russian Presidential Envoy to former Yugoslavia Aleksandr Zotov told INTERFAX Tuesday.

Zotov made this statement commenting on NATO's decision to extend the moratorium on air strikes on Bosnian Serbs for another 72 hours in response to the ongoing withdrawal of heavy arms from around Sarajevo.

If NATO strikes continue, Moslems and Croats will seize more land in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zotov said.

"This means de facto that Bosnia will be re-divided even before the map of its territorial division is completed," he emphasized.

Zotov admitted that the withdrawal of arms had lead to a "relatively normal situation" around Sarajevo.

This can be only welcomed, because the issue under question is the lives of many people, he added.

"But on the other hand, this step does not settle all other problems, because a large-scale offensive on the ground is under way, attempts are being made to shove the Serbs out by force. In this context, the need to stop hostilities in the whole Bosnia arises," Zotov said.

Zotov recalled that NATO had decided to pause air strikes, because the Bosnian Serb leadership agreed to pull out the bulk of heavy arms from 20 kilometers around Sarajevo.

"If this had not been done, the air strikes would have automatically resumed. No authorization by the U.N. security Council would be required, it would be enough with the establishment of facts by the U.N. military commanders in former Yugoslavia and a decision by the NATO southern flank command," he underlined.

Zotov stated that Moscow was "very worried about how the U.N. mechanism and the U.N.-NATO link were used while making the decision on a military operation against one of the warring sides."

"There are two aspects of enormous potential danger which come outside the framework of the events in Bosnia," he added.

"The first aspect is connected with international decision-making, especially on the use of force, which allows the peacekeeping operation authorized by the U.N. security Council to transform into an actual intervention," he said.

The other aspect deals with European security, Zotov said.

"We all speculate about the architecture of European security and the principles of its construction. Meanwhile, a change in the balance of forces is going on as a result of a very narrow plot and the use of the most modern kinds of weapons. As a result of this, civilians die and suffer, the refugee issue is deteriorating. This state of affairs, specifically in Europe, leads to very worrying thoughts," Zotov concluded.

Podkolzin: 'Premature' To Assess U.S. Bosnia Proposal

LD1909121095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1036 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — The Commander of the Russian Airborne Force Colonel-General Yevgeniy Podkolzin finds it premature to assess the US peace plan for Bosnia which provides for the replacement of the UN peace-keeping force with NATO troops in six months and the deployment of an additional Russian contingent in a 20 kilometer zone around Sarajevo.

"The proposals must be approved by the UN Security Council and all sides to the conflict: Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and Croats," the general said in an interview with INTERFAX in Moscow Tuesday.

He said that the countries involved in settling the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia should also discuss Russian proposals. Podkolzin stressed that President Boris Yeltsin spoke for the immediate convocation of an international conference for settling the conflict attended by Russia, the USA, Britain, France, Germany as well as the conflicting sides.

According to Podkolzin, a group of Russian officers led by his deputy General Nikolay Staskov is now inspecting Russian blue helmets in Bosnia. The officers also plan to meet the Duma members who have also arrived in the Balkans.

Podkolzin described the current surroundings of Russian peacekeepers in ex-Yugoslavia as normal. "The paratroopers are not shelled or blocked by the conflicting sides," the general said.

According to the commander, paratroopers are being trained in Ryazan for the rotation of the Russian peace-keeping continent and for sending additional blue helmets, if necessary.

Two battalions of Russian peacekeepers are staying in ex-Yugoslavia: one consisting of about 1000 servicemen in Klissa, East Slavonia, and another of about 500 paratroopers in the Sarajevo area.

Duma Delegations Visit Bosnian 'Conflict Zone'

Claim NATO Raids Killed 800

LD1909125795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1235 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 19 (ITAR-TASS) — The NATO military bloc has turned into a participant of the armed conflict in the Balkans. This conclusion was drawn by the members of the Russian State Duma, who have just returned from the conflict zone, where they stayed from September 13-18. They arranged a press conference at the State Duma today.

Journalists were addressed by representatives of different Duma factions and committees, including delegation leader Sergey Glotov, MPs Konstantin Zatulin, Vitaliy Sevastyanov, Vitaliy Zhuravlev, and military expert Colonel-General Leonid Mayorov, Assistant of the State Duma Speaker.

The members of the Russian parliamentary delegation noted that the air strikes were dealt both at military and civilian targets. They adduced proofs to back up their assertions. The MPs said that more than 800 people were killed and 2,000 wounded in the Bosnian Serb Republic in September as a result of NATO air raids and the Croatian-Moslem offensive.

The delegation members drew attention to the ambiguity of the U.N. peace-making contingent in the conflict zone. In their opinion, the "blue helmets" are not discharging the duty assigned to them. "We have arrived at the conclusion that no peace-makers, except the two Russian battalions, were ready to discharge their duties," Zatulin noted. He said that the Russian MPs "have seen no traces of the implementation of the law on humanitarian aid to the Serbs, signed by the Russian President". Such aid, he said, was coming only from Greece.

Zatulin repeated his previous attacks on Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, noting that the "Russian Foreign Ministry was putting on a show in the Balkans", and that "statements by the Russian minister are not taken in earnest on the international arena. Undercurrents are always sought in them". Zatulin claimed that "every statement by the Russian president and premier only tended to aggravate the situation in the Balkans". However, he was unable to adduce any proofs.

The MPs described the current U.N. stand in the Balkans conflict as an attempt to "create a mono-polar structure of the world". They went on record for immediate Russian military aid to the Bosnian Serbs, primarily by supplying them with the latest means to defend the sky over Bosnia. They stressed the need to increase Russia's pressure on the Western countries, whom the MPs blamed for their "one-sided approach to the settlement of the conflict in the Balkans".

At the same time, the MPs did not back the idea of some of their State Duma colleagues, who called for Russia's withdrawal from the U.N. Security Council.

Delegation Meets Zoran Lilic

LD2009072895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0706 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Ivan Ivanov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BELGRADE, September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Yugoslavia expects that, after the signing of an agreement on a withdrawal by Bosnian Serbs of their heavy weapons from Sarajevo and implementation by the Serb side of its obligations, NATO aviation will completely stop its air raids and the international community will exert influence on Croats and Moslems to stop their offensive on Serbs in western Bosnia, President of the Union Republic of Yugoslavia

Zoran Lilic said at a meeting with a delegation of the State Duma (Russian parliament lower house) on Tuesday evening.

The delegation is headed by Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the State Duma International Affairs Committee.

The delegation replaced their colleagues who were in former Yugoslavia between September 13 and 18 and who established a kind of "rota on the Balkans" of Russian deputies, aimed at the earliest achievement of peace in the region and preparation for a visit by State Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin to be held on October 1-3.

Lilic praised, at the meeting with Russian legislators, energetic statements by the Russian president, the State Duma as well as Russian government bodies for an equal attitude by the world community to all sides in the Balkan crisis — Serbs, Croats and Moslems.

He stressed that, despite a desire by some sides in the conflict to draw also Yugoslavia into it, the republic will refrain from this, since the war will overstep the borders of the Balkans in that case.

"There is no military solution to the crisis. Therefore, our country exerts huge efforts and conducts political negotiations which are the only road to peace," the Yugoslav president said.

Apart from the meeting with Lilic, the Duma delegation held talks with the leadership of the Yugoslav and Serbian parliaments on Tuesday, at which delegates pointed to the need for a just settlement of the Balkan crisis and expressed Russia's desire to consistantly advocate the earliest lifting of unjust international sanctions from former Yugoslavia.

They also stressed that the latest large-scale offensive by Croatian and Moslem troops in the west of the Bosnian Serb Republic has not brought closer peace and must be immediately stopped.

Following the talks in Belgrade, the delegation will discuss on Thursday prospects for a peaceful settlement with the leadership of the Serb Republic in Pale, the capital of Bosnian Serbs.

Daily Reviews Visit

MK1909145895 Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 1

[Report by Yelena Martynova from Pale, Belgrade: "Russian Deputies and the 'Serb Issue'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first group of Russian parliamentarians has completed its working visit to the Balkans. Their arrival here was "provoked" by NATO forces: The Duma decided that it was necessary to see with its own eyes what was being eliminated by bombs and missiles launched from Mirages and Phantoms and how. In the course of four days, Sergey Glotov, Konstantin Zatulin, Vitaliy Sevastyanov, Vitaliy Zhuravlev, and Colonel General Mayorov, an aide to the Duma chairman, acting as a military expert, have held meetings with leaders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia and officials from the Bosnian Serb Republic; visited areas of air strikes and military operations; and collected "material evidence" — fragments of bombs and missiles fired upon the territory controlled by the Bosnian Serbs.

If, however, someone, echoing some Western politicians, says: "Take it easy, guys — this is all because of the upcoming election," I will reply: What about you then? You can gain more popularity as well. Come here and work. Everything is fine with us here — the sun is shining, planes are humming overhead. "They are trying to scare us," our Serbian guide notes indifferently. So we keep trotting on. Only a couple of kilometers across a mountain — smooth like a newborn's head — are left before we can see with our own eyes a demolished radar station. The plane is somewhere above. Maybe it is indeed just trying to scare us, but what if it is a bit nervous today? I only want to say that the deputies have no extra lives to spare, and the sorry lot of a group of U.S. diplomats has once again proven to the whole world that a war does not recognize diplomatic or other immunities.

Konstantin Zatulin found a fragment with a "return address" — where it was made and how to use it. Sergey Glotov is dragging to the car a bomb fragment weighing some 15 kilograms. Who needs all this, after all? I think many people do, although I wish everyone did; because if we allow the right of the strong to dominate over international law (there is no talk of conscience and ethics — these concepts have long been out of use in world politics), the chances that humankind will enter the 21st century will grow ever slimmer.

I cannot say that all of the deputies are unanimous in their attitude toward the events that have taken place in this region lately — except for the air strikes. They posed rather tough questions to Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, and Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of its parliament. They had serious and comprehensive discussions with Tomic, head of the Serbian Skupshchina [parliament], and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milutinovic, member of the official joint delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, created for the Geneva talks.

The stances of the sides, the balance of efforts made by open and secret diplomacy (the latter being very active in the Balkans), and differences within the leadership of the Serb Republic itself — everything should be taken into consideration in order to work out a definitive position. Nobody intends to have Russia recklessly involved in an adventure. Russia, however, needs a consistent and independent foreign policy.

The Sarajevo airfield was opened — after five months of blockade — precisely on the day our delegation visited it. The Serbs had kept it closed because they had rather justifiable doubts that the aid received by the "neighbors" also included military supplies. Now, they were forced by NATO to open it, although the doubts are still there. (The Muslims keep giving assurances that the Serbs have funny fantasies but, for some reason, are categorically against the presence of our observers: Only the French have been admitted there.) Voislav Maksimovic, the mayor of Serbian Sarajevo, gave assurances that a Russian plane was the first to land there on 16 September. It brought aid to those who suffered from the air strikes, in accordance with the Russian president's edict. The Serbs say, however, that the French battalion gives the lion's share to the Muslims, and the Serbs only get what is left. The deputies' task is also to check this and to arrange a humanitarian bridge.

Shielded by NATO aviation, the joint forces of the Muslim-Croat federation and neighboring Croatia have already occupied six Serbian cities and a considerable area in Western Bosnia and are in the immediate vicinity of Banja Luka. People say Willy Claes is very angry: "Nobody let them use our strikes for their offensive." Nobody, however, forbade them to do so, either. So, General Mladic indeed had some reasons to be stubborn. At the moment, however, he is in the hospital in Belgrade, and Karadzic ordered that the heavy guns be taken away. It should be noted that it is not the first time that strange things have happened in Bosnia while Mladic was away. On the other side, NATO bombs kill no fewer people than enemy offensives.

Our deputies have no doubts in this respect: People need help. Clothes and medicines are indeed in short supply. Moral support is of still greater importance. As Minister Buha said, let the parcels be empty, but write "Aid from Russia" on them. The deputies left for Bulgaria for a meeting with their colleagues from the Bulgarian parliament to persuade them to take part in establishing a humanitarian corridor. Parcels from Russia will not be empty.

Meanwhile, another group of deputies arrived in Yugoslavia on 18 September: The parliamentarians remain on duty in Yugoslavia and the Serb Republic.

Daily Sees 'Glimmer of Light' in Bosnia Crisis

MM1909134295 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 3

[Report by Mikhail Pogorelyy: "Start of Peace or Another Truce?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A certain glimmer of light has begun to appear in the Bosnia crisis — the hope that there will be a settlement, provided, of course, that the participants in the settlement process don't change the rules during the game. The Bosnian Serbs are as of now continuing to withdraw their heavy arms to a point at least 20 km from downtown Sarajevo in accordance with NATO demands. The bloc's armed forces, in turn, are refraining from carrying out air strikes or artillery shelling of areas occupied by the Serbs. NATO command has announced a 72-hour extension of the cease-fire, given that the Serbs are clearly carrying out the demands of the ultimatum served on them.

The only thing that could upset this pretty fragile truce is the conduct of Bosnian Government forces. In alliance with the Croats, they have clearly decided to exploit the weakening of their Serb compatriots combat potential and are continuing to seize territory controlled by the latter. In the last two weeks — under cover of the NATO strikes — the Muslims have taken five Serb cities, thereby increasing to 45 percent the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Sarajevo government control. There has been no outcry even, let alone action, to stop this practice from Brussels or Washington, although the NATO secretary general did, with the launch of combat operations against the Bosnian Serbs, warn "everyone" against the temptation to exploit the results of the bombing to their own ends. As is clear, this statement was addressed more to the press and the public at large than to the direct participants in the conflict. Clearly, no one intends to stop the Muslims before they occupy the 51 percent of Bosnia specified in the American settlement plan, nor likewise raise the question of the violation of the rights of peaceful (Serb) citizens during this expansion.

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott described the results of his visit to Moscow at the end of last week in pretty vague terms. Nor were any specific details on the outcome of the talks given by Andrey Kozyrev. But in Washington Pentagon chief William Perry confidently confirmed that a scenario whereby UN peacekeeping forces in former Yugoslavia would be completely replaced by NATO contingents — with an invitation for the Russian troops to join the alliance's forces — is under lively discussion in the world's capitals. This is not, incidentally, the only feasible option. But the conference on former Yugoslavia in Moscow proposed by President Yeltsin could be the most suitable place for discussion of them.

Ivanov: Holbrooke Mission Result of Russian Efforts

MM1909151895 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 7

[Report by Leonid Timofeyev: "Too Soon To Draw Up the Peace Map"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Geneva — U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke did not arrive in Geneva until Friday evening with the result that the session of the international Contact Group on the Bosnian settlement was postponed twice — initially for 24 hours, then for a few hours more. In that time Holbrooke made some progress in ending NATO's air strikes against the Serb positions.

Admittedly, as Russian Federation First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told Russian journalists, Holbrooke's mission is the concrete practical result of the work carried out by Russia just beforehand. Be that as it may, the participants in the Contact Group looked to the near future and, according to our diplomat, outlined the possible format of an international conference on the Yugoslav settlement. They decided that it should not be postponed long term because the situation demands prompt decisions.

At the same time, the Geneva meeting considered it premature to sketch out the map showing the territorial demarcations between the two formations on Bosnian territory. They talked a little about the normalization of relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia but considered the problem of Eastern Slavonia "very complex" and decided to consult further with the sides.

Humanitarian Aid Shipment Arrives in Belgrade

LD1909165795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1647 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By Ivan Ivanov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BELGRADE, September 19 (ITAR-TASS) — A Russian transport aircraft with a crago of humanitarian aid touched down on Tuesday [19 September] at Surcin airport in Belgrade. The humanitarian aid is meant for Krajina Serbs who fled to Yugoslavia from Krajina whose western part was seized by the Croatian Army in early August. This time food products and necessities were delivered to Yugoslavia from the administration of the Nizhny Novgorod region.

The Il-76 airliner which has the carrying capacity of 40 tonnes brought to Yugoslavia 15 tonnes of humanitarian cargoes. More than a dozen of functionaries of the Nizhniy Novgorod administration and "representatives of the public" arrived in Belgrade by the same flight. They wished to enjoy their stay in Belgrade and also to turn over the humanitarian cargo to the Serb side in a ceremony.

Representatives of the Yugoslav humanitarian organisation who met the arrivals and who, in principle, highly appreciate Russia's aid to Serb refugees believe that over three-hour long flight of a heavy transport aircraft must have cost to the Russian Emergencies Ministry much more than the goods that filled only half the plane's cargo compartments.

ITAR-TASS learnt that in addition to canned fish and meat, condensed and dry milk and toiletries, the cargo also included several hundred aluminium spoons, forks, knives, tea-kettles, plates and a number of winter heats [as received]. But then the cargo did not include medicines, tents and other necessities refugees need so much.

Representatives of the Russian embassy in Belgrade expressed perlexity to ITAR-TASS over the contents of this batch of humanitarian aid.

Chernomyrdin, Lukashenka Open Moscow Talks

LD1909110895 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1025 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 19 Sep (ITAR-TASS) — The main issue under discussion at the talks between Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Belarus President Lukashenka, who is in Moscow today for a brief visit, is the implementation of the second stage of the agreement on creating a single customs space between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The talks began today in the government mansion on Sparrow Hills. These details were given to the ITAR-TASS correspondent by Viktor Konnov, the Russian prime minister's press secretary. Talks are also being held between Russian and Belarusian delegations. Talks will continue in an expanded format after the completion of the meeting between Chernomyrdin and Lukashenka.

Viktor Konnov told an ITAR-TASS correspondent that it is expected that the Russian side and their Belarusian colleagues will discuss Russian fuel supplies to Belarus during the winter season. According to Konnov, bilateral military cooperation will not be discussed at the talks.

Further Economic Integration Sought

LD1909171795 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1600 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President of Belarus Alyaksandr Lukashenka arrived in Moscow today on a one-day working visit for talks with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Our special correspondent, Leonid Anop has just this minute contacted the "Postfaktum" program. Over to him:

[Anop] [passage omitted] In Moscow Alyaksandr Lukashenka had a meeting with Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin, the Russian head of government, both on a one-to-one basis and also with members of the Belarusian delegation. To briefly sum up today, one can say that Lukashenka and Chernomyrdin focused on issues to further deepen the integration of the two states in the economic sphere, and also practical measures to carry out the second stage of the customs union between Belarus and Russia.

I would now like to give you as much detail as I can of the talks between the leaders. Viktor Chernomyrdin, speaking at a news conference for journalists from Russia and Belarus on the outcome of the talks, said that Russia needs industrial products from the Republic of Belarus, and so the Russian Government is firmly in favor of deepening economic relations between Russia and Belarus, and here, as we see, our interests coincide. I have in mind the interests of our states. Chernomyrdin thinks that producers of goods should be at the center — their problems, their troubles. They should have a real opportunity to work, a real opportunity to earn good money, and a real opportunity to sell their goods. Then many problems will disappear.

What is more, as our president, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, said, Belarusian factories were once built for the needs of two economies — Russian and Belarusian. Factories, enterprises, famous factories, flagships of our economy were jointly built in the former USSR. Today they should work for Russia and Belarus, for the Russian and Belarusian peoples. Mr. Lukashenka also stressed that both military and political questions were discussed at the talks. Mutual understanding from the Russian and Belarusian sides was found on all issues.

Incidentally, tomorrow the Belarusian delegation is flying to Sochi for a meeting between the president of Belarus and the president of the Russian Federation. It is intended that the talks between Alyaksandr Lukashenka and Boris Yeltsin will again deal with problems of further integration of the two states. That is all from Moscow for today. [passage omitted]

Agree To Abolish Export Duties

LD1909192995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1809 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 19 (ITAR-TASS) — Russia and Belarus agreed on a policy of abolition of export duties to stimulate their exporters during the talks on Tuesday between Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka who arrived in Moscow on a short working visit.

They discussed this issue within the framework of consultations on conducting a coordinated export and customs policy by Russia and Belarus as members of the tripartite Agreement on the Customs Union signed between them and Kazakhstan.

At a short news conference after the talks Viktor Chernomyrdin and Alyaksandr Lukashenka stressed that they had assigned a working group which was set up on Tuesday to take measures on the implementation of the second stage of the Agreement on the Customs Union.

The group is headed by Russian Vice-Premier Aleksey Bolshakov and Belarusian Vice-Premier Mikhail Myasnikovich.

"Besides, we have come to the same opinion with the Belarusian president that it is necessary to bring prices for energy resources up to the world level, otherwise the power engineering which is the foundation of the economy, will not develop," the Russian premier noted.

Alyaksandr Lukashenka said that the process of freeing prices should be carried on "without stopping the operation of enterprises".

Russia showed interest in buying "BelAZ" heavy trucks. Both sides also discussed the possibility of using military and civil airports on the territory of Belarus, the internal political situation in the two states and the situation in former Yugoslavia.

Despite the fact that in the course of the meeting both sides focused on economic issues, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka stressed that the "problems of military cooperation discussed at the talks were linked to the settlement of economic issues in bilateral relations."

Political Issues

Moscow Militia Frees Kidnapped U.S. Businessman

MK2009114795 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 14

[Crime Department report: "U.S. Hostage Released. An American Managed To Save $40,000"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last Friday [15 September] officers of the Moscow Regional Organized Crime Administration [RUOP], together with the U.S. Embassy's security service, liberated a kidnapped U.S. businessman. The bandits who were holding the businessman were arrested by the militia.

According to information received by your KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent at the RUOP, on Thursday [14 September] the regional administration was informed by the U.S. Embassy of the abduction of a U.S. citizen, who represents a major New York-based company in Moscow. According to the embassy, the businessman was kidnapped back on 12 September. The price put on his release amounted to $40,000. The bandits promised to kill the entrepreneur should the money not be forthcoming.

RUOP officers suggested that the Americans accept the criminals' demands. On Friday morning the extortionists called again and demanded that the money be handed over to them at the Radisson Slavyanskaya Hotel on Berezhkovskaya Quay. At 1430, when the package with dollars was passing hands, the two extortionists were detained. They were an unemployed resident of Khimki, a town outside Moscow, and a manager of the LN limited company, who came to Moscow from Yakutia. A short time later, the New York businessman, who was held at an apartment on Korovinskoye Highway, was freed. According to operatives, he did not look bad (at least no traces of torture were found on him).

The U.S. Embassy would not disclose the details of the goings-on, citing the fact that the released businessman himself gave no explanations. Meanwhile, your KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent learned that the captive and the kidnappers had a financial disagreement.

Lukashenka, Kozyrev Arrive for Talks With Yeltsin

LD2009104895 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1002 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Irina Shchegoleva]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sochi, 20 Sep (ITAR-TASS) — Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka arrived in Sochi today for a meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who is on holiday there. Well-informed sources have told an ITAR-TASS correspondent that the meeting between the two leaders is planned for 21 September.

Forty-five minutes after the arrival of the Belarusian leader, a plane touched down in [Sochi's] Adler Airport bringing Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev from Dushanbe for a meeting with the Russian president. The foreign minister ended his visit to Tajikistan today.

The head of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not answer questions from journalists at the airport. The ITAR-TASS correspondent has learned from well-informed sources that the situation in Bosnia, Russia's relations with CIS countries, and other international problems will be discussed at the working meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Andrey Kozyrev.

Yeltsin, Grachev Discuss Defense Issues, Chechnya

LD1909141395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1324 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By unidentified ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 19 Sep (ITAR-TASS) — President of Russia Boris Yeltsin met with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev in Sochi today. As the press service of the head of state reported, "during the conversation opinions were exchanged on the widest possible range of issues concerning the activities of the Defense Ministry and the Russian armed forces. In particular, the situation in the Chechen Republic was discussed in detail."

One of the chief problems touched on during the conversation was the discussion of Russia's actions to settle the Yugoslav crisis.

The president and defense minister exchanged opinions on the progress of reform in Russia's armed forces.

The meeting was also attended by Colonel General Anatoliy Kvashnin, commander of the North Caucasus Military District.

Chernomyrdin To Discuss Oil Problems in Komi

LD2009065795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0610 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian cabinet head Viktor Chernomyrdin flew on Wednesday to the Komi Republic (north-east of European Russia) and the Nenets autonomous area (north-western Siberia) on a two-day visit. The premier will inspect the state of affairs in the oil and gas complex of the region.

Chernomyrdin also plans to familiarise himself with the local wood-processing industry. For this purpose, he will visit several major enterprises, including the Syktyvkar timber industrial complex.

The programme of the working visit provides for holding a meeting with industrial managers and administration heads at the Government House of the Komi Republic on September 20. The cabinet head will visit Usinsk, the city of oilmen, the next day.

The premier will familiarise himself there with problems of the oil and gas complex and will hold a meeting on this issue with administrative heads from the Arkhangelsk region, the Komi Republic, the Nenets autonomous area as well as the managers of the Komi-Arktic Oil, Komineft, Severgazprom and Komienergo firms.

Chernomyrdin plans to return to Moscow late on Thursday evening. The premier instructed first vice-premier Oleg Soskovets to perform his duties during the above tour.

Filatov, Shumeyko on Conformity of Legislation

LD2009124595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1033 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — A draft presidential decree has been prepared to form a body at the State-Legal Department of the presidential administration for the juridical examination of legislative acts issued in constituent members of the Russian Federation and the verification of their correspondence to the federal legislation, head of the presidential administration Sergey Filatov told a meeting of heads of regional legislative power bodies in Moscow Wednesday.

According to Filatov, the new body will interact with Russian regions in law-making. A reason for the new decree is that some republics' constitutions run counter to federal laws, for instance in their interpretation of the notion of "sovereignty".

Sergey Filatov's opinion was shared by Speaker of the Federation Council Vladimir Shumeyko. He stressed that legislative acts of the republics of Tuva, Tatarstan and Yakutia have "considerable deviations from the Russian Constitution." "All constitutions and charters of constituent members of the Russian Federation must be brought in line with federal legislation," he stressed.

Shumeyko considers inadmissible the provision of the Tuva Constitution which provides for the possibility to separate from the Russian Federation. "The integrity of the federal state cannot be violated," he said.

Zhirinovskiy Denies Organizing No-Confidence Vote

LD2009123195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1029 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 20 Sep (ITAR-TASS) — The LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] faction has not been organizing a collection of signatures in the State Duma on taking a vote of no confidence in the Russian Government. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Duma LDPR faction, announced this today at a news conference in the lower chamber of the Federal Assembly. He flatly denied the reports that had appeared in the media.

At the same time, Zhirinovskiy said that if other groups of deputies were to take an initiative of the sort, then his faction would discuss the possibility of adding the liberal democrats' signatures to the demand for a debate in the Duma on no confidence in the government.

The LDPR leader also said that he was sceptical about Russia's Communist Party attempt to begin impeachment proceedings against the head of state when presidential elections were so close.

Kovalev Interviewed on Yeltsin, Chechnya, Bosnia

AU1909154495 Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG in German 16-17 Sep 95 p 10

[Interview with Russian human rights expert Sergey Kovalev by Barbara Kerneck in Moscow; date not given: "'They Prefer Me To Resign'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kerneck] The human rights commission assigned to President Boris Yeltsin has been dissolved. Have you been discharged? What do you do now?

[Kovalev] The dissolution of the commission is not yet official. A ruling to this effect has been prepared but not yet adopted. The presidential office is obviously hesitating to make the final decision. Still, I have already lost my office in Moscow. They would probably prefer me to resign voluntarily from this job.

[Kerneck] No wonder, really, after you called the president a "criminal" in a statement to the Constitutional Court because of his order to invade Chechnya.

[Kovalev] Not quite. What I said there was: "I would like to ask you to excuse my use of a metaphor, but, to a certain extent, the president has committed a constitutional crime." I understand that deviating from the constitutional principles is not a crime in the definition of the Criminal Code. Yet, we do not have an appropriate term for this specific violation of the law. If the president feels offended by what I said he can sue me.

[Kerneck] Most conflicts among Russian politicians are today not settled in the courtroom but with the fists. Yeltsin is a very fit tennis player.

[Kovalev, laughing] And I was into boxing when I was young.

[Kerneck] There is much speculation again in the West about Russia these days. The reason is the strong language President Yeltsin used in connection with the NATO bombing of positions of Bosnian Serbs in and around Sarajevo. What is your comment on that?

[Kovalev] NATO actions have become an act of revenge and are covering the new attacks of two allied sides in the conflict — the Bosnian and Croatian side. It is not up to the international community to act as a judge and executor of the punishment at the same time.

[Kerneck] What is your assessment of the partition plans for the former Yugoslavia that are currently being negotiated?

[Kovalev] The partition of such an long-suffering region, be it according to ethnic, religious, or other principles, cannot lead to a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Today, a mono-ethnic or mono-religious state is anachronistic and will hardly be able to prove stable in the long run. In this respect one can accuse the international community of adding fuel to the flames.

[Kerneck] At the same time, the majority of the Russian Parliament, the Duma, has called for the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo against the Serbs. This would not exactly help to end the war, either.

[Kovalev] These resolutions of the State Duma are stupid and unfair. I voted against them. The decision to lift the arms embargo only against one of two hostile sides will, by its very nature, not help to bring about peace. I have no doubts that it was the Serbian side, in particular, that raised the war in Bosnia to such a level and is responsible for its great destructive power. Neither do I doubt that the Serbian side has committed very severe and numerous human rights violations. Still, consequently all parties to the conflict have violated human rights.

[Kerneck] In the past few months you committed yourself particularly to the cause of Chechnya. What conclusions have you drawn from the position that you have just mentioned in connection with Bosnia regarding the future status of Chechnya?

[Kovalev] I consider it to be a severe mistake of the Russian side to expect an advance concession for political negotiations, namely a declaration that Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation. It is the status of Chechnya that would have to be the very result of such political negotiations.

The Chechen side is making the same mistake the other way round. I am almost sure that the overwhelming majority of Chechens no longer want to stay within the borders of Russia. Yet, the fulfillment of this wish creates numerous difficulties: How can one legitimately adopt such a resolution? How can one draw borders in concrete terms? How can one guarantee that no part of the population will be discriminated against once independence is granted?

[Kerneck] In areas with a population with a strong ethnic mix, such as in the Caucasus, there will always be difficulties regarding the peoples' right to self-determination.

[Kovalev] The two UN principles of the peoples' right to self-determination and the inviolability of borders of existing states are irreconcilable. In order to make them applicable one would have had at least to define the cases in which one is applicable and in which cases the other. And one would have had to define what a people really is, a people that can be granted the right to self-determination.

As a former member on the UN Security Council, the Soviet Union bears a considerable part of the blame for this. Such vague formulations were, of course, in the interest of the Soviet Union in its support for so-called national liberation movements.

[Kerneck] Was this also an expression of the Russian psyche, which you have often described as "sick"?

[Kovalev] I am afraid that this condition is not a simple neurosis but a serious organic defect of the brain.

[Kerneck] Can you describe one of the symptoms?

[Kovalev] Well, there is the traditional Russian xenophobia. We still believe that it is patriotic to boast of how great everything is in our country. We think that one must always watch out when dealing with foreigners, because they always come here with bad intentions.

The most recent political events in our country suggest that the condition has deteriorated. In official talks we are told again to be careful in our dealings with foreigners. If you had wanted to visit me in my office in the president's administration then I would have had to apply for it at least 24 hours ahead, while for a Russian I could have solicited the permit by telephone within half an hour.

[Kerneck] What will the next Duma look like considering these developments?

[Kovalev] I am afraid it will be worse than the current one.

Federal Security Service Undergoes Restructuring

LD1909181495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1755 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By Olga Semyonova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 19 (ITAR-TASS) — After the appointment of Colonel-General Mikhail Barsukov head of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation on July 24 this year, a regular reorganisation of the service began with the establishment of a number of new structures.

This is exactly what accounts for personnel changes which followed a meeting of the Collegium of the Federal Security Service held last week, a spokesman for the Federal Security Service told CRIME-TASS today.

"There are no grounds, for instance, to consider the resignation of Lieutenant-General Igor Mezhakov, Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service, to be of a political character," a high-ranking officer of this special service noted, probably implying the report published in the Moskovskiy Komsomolets newspaper which links Mezhakov's resignation to his family ties with First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets. Mezhakov and Soskovets married two sisters.

"No comments," representatives for the Public Relations Centre replied to all questions. However, Deputy Head of the Public Relations Centre of the Federal Security Service Aleksandr Zdanovich still found it necessary to explain the reluctance of his colleagues to talk about the decisions adopted by the Collegium. "The information about the personnel of the special service are not subject to spreading as it is a state secret," he pointed out.

Incidentally, in keeping with the manning table of the service, one of the deputies director was to be discharged as a result of the July appointments there was one more deputy director of the service than it is envisaged in the Regulations for the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.

Dismissed together with Igor Mezhakov also were Head of the Department for fighting against terrorism Anatoliy Semyonov and Head of the Department of the Federal security service in the Stavropol territory Major-General Romanov.

It is logical to suppose that Anatoliy Semyonov was relieved of his post as his department will become part of a new structure being set up in the Federal Security Service — the Anti-terrorist centre.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin by his decree of September 15, 1995 already appointed First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service Viktor Zorin head of the Anti-terrorist centre.

By the way, at one time Viktor Zorin and Anatoliy Semyonov worked in somewhat "competing organizations". Zorin headed the Counterintelligence department while Semyonov was deputy head of the Military counterintelligence department in the Security Ministry of the Russian Federation.

Now Viktor Zorin is facing a rather difficult task to establish an absolutely new structure with a larger and more complex concept on the basis of several subdivisions of the Federal Security Service.

As for the resignation of Major-General Romanov, all commentators are of the same opinion that his discharge is a kind of a late "punishment" for the Budennovsk tragedy.

Informed sources from the president's structures say a new institution will soon be set up in the Federal Security Service — a group of advisers to the director. A number of former officers of the special services with a previous broad experience and good analytical abilities have been invited to work in this group.

Continuing FSB 'Purge' Viewed

MM2009132195 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Sep 95 p 1

[Report by Afanasiy Brynochka: "Mikhail Barsukov Has Begun a Purge at the Lubyanka"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As expected, Mikhail Barsukov, new boss of the Federal Security Service [FSB], took an unhurried look around and then began a purge of his illustrious department. The first heads to roll were those of Igor Mezhakov, the FSB's deputy director for crisis situations, (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA warned of his impending fate on 22 August when it pointed out that when Barsukov was presented at a closed collegium of the FSB at the "Barenka" sanatorium Yeltsin harshly criticized Mezhakov — who, incidentally, is rumored to be Soskovets' brother in law) as well as counterterrorism directorate chief Semenov. Romanov, chief of the FSB's Stavropol directorate, was deemed "surplus to requirements" in the wake of Budennovsk and has been dismissed from his post.

We predict that a change in the leadership of the military, economic, counter-intelligence, and certain other smaller subunits cannot be ruled out either. Probably some of the old cadres who were hounded out under Stepashin as well as some of "Barsukov's boys" from the Main Protection Directorate will gradually start to return to the Lubyanka. What we are seeing is Barsukov trying to prevent even the slightest leaks of information from the Lubyanka so that rubrics like "News from the FSB" will soon virtually disappear from the newspapers and Stepashin's numerous tours of the country accompanied by his wife, his garrulousness, and the interviews by the aircraft steps will soon become examples of how a Russian Cheka man should not operate.

Cabinet Ratifies IBRD Loan Agreement

MM2009103195 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 15 Sep 95 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "In the Corridors of Power" rubric: "Agreements. Loan Granted To Stabilize the Economy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The latest Russian Federation Government session has approved the text of the Agreement Between the Russian Federation and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) on a Second Recovery Loan of $600 Million. The capital will be appropriated to finance import purchases with a view to supporting the Russian program for macroeconomic stabilization and structural changes. The agreement was signed in Washington 7 July 1995. The loan will be repaid from federal budget funds.

Military & Nuclear Issues

Commission Introduces Defense Conversion Program

LD1909180495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1745 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By Oleg Velichkoin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 19 (ITAR-TASS) — A total of 18.6 trillion roubles is earmarked for the Russian defence conversion programme for 1995-97, Russian Deputy Economics Minister Yakov Urinson said at a meeting of the governmental operational affairs commission today.

He introduced to the commission a draft conversion programme which was generated by the Economics Ministry jointly with executive bodies in charge of conversion.

The federal budget projects 7.3 trillion roubles for funding the programme, Urinson said.

Under the programme, 6.3 trillion is to go to the programme as a conversion loan and another five trillion is to come from extrabudgetary sources.

The draft 1996 budget projects a special conversion funding section.

The governmental commission decided to recommend to the parliament to approve this section.

The parliament cut the conversion section when it debated the 1995 budget last year.

Urinson said analysis of the 1993-95 conversion programme had indicated that the present system for state control of defence sector conversion proved effective in creation of modern productions.

Cost effectiveness of converted productions was three-five roubles per one budgetary rouble lent to the conversion programme.

Defence enterprises which were converted in 1992-94 had set up civilian productions which turned out a four trillion rouble worth of goods and created some 650,000 new jobs.

Urinson said a conversion fund was to be set up as a new mechanism to ensure the progress and adequate funding of the conversion programme.

The fund is to be generated from a total of extrabudgetary and budgetary resources to be accummulated on a special deposit.

Promising conversion projects will be selected on a competitive basis, with regard for availability of markets for products to be produced under those projects.

The governmental commission approved in principle the state-sponsored conversion programme.

Armed Forces Unable To Pay Utilities Debts

LD1909165595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1644 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 19 (ITAR-TASS) — The Armed Forces of Russia are not in a position to pay off their debts for public utilities, Major-General Vladimir Osadchy, representative of the Russian Defense Ministry, told ITAR-TASS here today.

According to him, the military budget drawn up by lawmakers for 1995, envisages expenses for public utilities and other maintenance needs amounting to only

1.3 trillion roubles instead of 5.5 trillion roubles which are really needed.

The debts of the "Plesetsk" State test range of the strategic missile forces totalling 17 billion roubles for which power engineers cut off electric energy supply, is only one of the fragments of a large picture of non-payments by the Russian army and the Navy.

The military in near-by and remote garrisons from the Russian capital who have nothing to do with forming the military budget, he said, are compelled to be among financial violators and bear this burden. Such a situation is observed in the Sakhalin island, in the Chita region, in the Far East and Siberia, and in the central European part of Russia.

After the issue of the appropriate resolution by the government of the Russian Federation in July this year, military objects were excluded from the preferential list, general Osadchy noted.

In line with this document, regional power services have the right to cease electric energy supply if the indebtedness is not liquidated within a month.

However, the Defense Ministry of Russia has no such a possibility because the payment for expenses for public utilities is brought to the point of non-payments by legislators.

With the coming cold weather when power engineers are preparing for a winter and buying fuel, claims to military consumers of public utilities are growing sharply.

It is not ruled out that already at the end of September or in October the number of de-energised defence objects will increase considerably.

According to Major-General Vladimir Osadchy, the Defense Ministry has the sole hope that the government of the Russian Federation will consider proposals made by the ministry as soon as possible and restore the lost privileges in payments for provided services.

However, he believes, this will not save the situation. What is needed are legislative measures and an economically substantiated and scientifically and technically examined military budget which will save ministries and departments unnecessary troubles and ease social tension in garrisons.

Plesetsk Power Supply Again Threatened

LD1909120995 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 19 Sep 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Power workers from Arkhangel intend to restrict the power supply to the Plesetsk Cosmodrome again because of outstanding payments. Several days ago the military managed to prevent such an attempt by introducing armed control over the power sub-station. However, Vladimir Samodov, the general director of the Arkhenergo joint stock company, warned the Plesetsk command that he is not going to retreat.

Footage of Early ABM Tests Shown

MM2009144795 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Sep 95

[From the "Sunday" program: Video report on antimissile defense by Aleksandr Galkin, identified by caption]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Galkin to camera] The ABM Treaty between the United States of America and the Soviet Union was signed in 1972. Essentially, the treaty did not permit nationwide antimissile defense but restricted it to a limited area of utmost importance from the viewpoint of each country.

Naturally, the party and government leaders of the USSR saw themselves as the biggest asset, and therefore an antimissile belt incorporating giant long-range radars was built around the capital. The rest of the country's territory was open to missile attack.

The Americans decided to protect their ICBM launch area located in the north. They deemed it more important to retain their means of retaliation.

[Galkin over computer graphics and archive footage captioned "fragment from a secret film on tests of our country's first antimissile defense systems"] Traditionally, antimissile defense was based on powerful systems of electronic detection and high-speed effective-engagement missiles. The first tests took place in the Soviet Union at the very beginning of the sixties. You are able to see for the first time footage marked "classified" and kept locked away for three decades. The tests were carried out in Kamchatka and in the steppe zone of the USSR.

The ABM Treaty was adhered to without attempts to abandon it for approximately 10 years. Until, that is, U.S. President Ronald Reagan decided to revise it and place the entire U.S. territory under an antimissile umbrella. In order to convince the public of the expediency of his Strategic Defense Initiative, arguments ranging from branding the USSR as the "evil empire" to a threat from aggressive extraterrestrials were used. However, the idea was never fully translated into reality, despite the expenditure of colossal sums of money on scientific and technical development. Inevitably, our scientists had to join this race, and they even came up with a number of original solutions, although the economic situation in the country did not point to their successful implementation. Subsequently changes set in in the Soviet Union which led to the end of the Cold War. The question of antimissile systems have not arisen in recent years except at expert level.

This was the situation until the beginning of August this year, when the U.S. Congress, without any prompting from the Defense Department, doubled funding for antimissile defense work.

[Russian Academy of Natural Sciences Academician Rimiliy Avramenko, chief designer of the Scientific Research Insitute for Radio Instrument-Making, identified by caption] I am familiar with our president's reaction to this step. His reaction was fairly unequivocal. Our country is getting ready to respond to this challenge thrown down by the U.S. legislators. This is the first time since 1972, when the International Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, as the most important strategic systems, was signed between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, that this treaty has officially been called into question, and it is possible, indeed I am convinced, that our country will have to pay considerable attention to the development of this sphere of defense technology.

[Galkin] Today the Americans no longer cite the Russians and extraterrestrials as their main opponents. According to their own words, they most fear third countries with unstable regimes which moreover possess nuclear-capable missiles. In the opinion of U.S. military experts, around 15 countries have such an arsenal. Using retaliatory weapons against them is senseless since an attack against U.S. territory or the territory of its allies could be launched by a group of terrorists from a medium-sized dry-cargo barge. This viewpoint has been expressed in the past. Russia at the time proposed building joint global antimissile defenses in order to protect the whole planet from potential nuclear terrorists. It was proposed that this system be based on plasma weapons developed in Russia which are several orders of magnitude cheaper than the U.S. Star Wars Initiative and several times simpler to control. The idea, developed under the leadership of Academician Rimiliy Avramenko — incidentally he was the chief designer of the radars used in traditional antimissile defense systems — consists of creating a plasma cloud or zone in front of a missile, a warhead, or an aircraft by means of ground sources of microwave radiation. Any flying object entering such a cloud is sent into a high-speed spin which leads to its complete destruction. Using this weapon, it is impossible to miss the target. The plasma is created in great quantities and the speed of its creation in any part of space is equal to the speed of light. This is simply unattainable for traditional strike weapons.

According to the U.S. military-industrial complex journal 21ST CENTURY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY [video shows a clip of THE NEW YORK TIMES] Boris Yeltsin proposed to Bill Clinton in Vancouver a joint experiment entitled "Trust" on Kwajalein Island in the Pacific. There was no response. Instead came the U.S. Congress decision to allocate $40 billion to U.S. developers of antimissile defense systems over the next 10 years.

[Galkin to camera] It transpires from highly informed sources that the question of funding work on plasma weapons and other antimissile defense systems is soon to be submitted for discussion in the State Duma. [video consists mainly of computer graphics and archive film, Avramenko being interviewed against backdrop of unidentified installation]

Nuclear Submarines Seen as 'Floating Chernobyls'

AU1909143495

[FBIS Editorial Report] Munich ARD Television Network in German at 1915 GMT on 18 September carries in its "Report" program an 11-minute video report by Klaus Weidmann describing the dangerous state of the Russian nuclear submarine fleet.

The report begins with clips of recent Russian naval maneuvers in the North Sea, whose objective it is to destroy a nuclear submarine.

Weidmann points out that there is a danger not only from active nuclear submarines, but also from submarines whose missiles have been removed and which have since been patched up and from old and deactivated boats. "Meanwhile, Russia is sitting on 96 deactivated nuclear submarines with more than 140 nuclear reactors, which need to be disposed of," he says.

Some of these submarines are in the Russian city of Severodvinsk, a prohibited military area. Weidmann says that since foreigners do not have access to Severodvinsk the film that is subequently shown was made by a Russian team on behalf of ARD. The Soviet Union's submarine fleet was built in Severodvinsk, he notes, and now it is supposed to be scrapped there in the vicinity of apartment houses. Work has been suspended, however, although these submarines are "swimming time bombs" with highly radioactive nuclear reactors, fuel elements, and waste. Permission to film one of these reactor blocs was given, but only for 10 minutes because of "elevated radioactivity," which is allegedly not dangerous.

Weidmann claims that there are defective reactors in this shipyard that continue to be active and could get out of control. Admiral Oleg A. Yerofeyev, commander of the Russian North Sea Fleet, says, "You cannot imagine how dangerous it is to store these reactors on the old, discarded, and unmanned submarines. These submarines are in a critical state. They could sink anytime. With things as they are, this could result in an environmental disaster." To prevent this, "we have special personnel and services. We supply the ships with electricity, we pump compressed air into them. We are also prepared for an extreme situation, for drainage, and towing. In this context, there are many other problems that we have to deal with."

A member of the Severodvinsk Ecological Institute points out that in a very cold winter problems with the compressed air supply for the submarines will arise. The pipes could freeze and burst and the submarines could sink.

Weidmann says that nobody knows what to do with the nuclear waste and, as an example, a rusty ship filled with nuclear waste from the submarines is shown. Admiral Yerofeyev admits that the situation is critical and that "60 percent of the deposits for radioactive liquid waste and 50 percent of those for solid waste are full." The report notes that this is an understatement. The waste from the shipyard is even dumped at an unguarded deposit in the wood a few kilometers from Severodvinsk. Solid nuclear waste from the submarines is deposited five meters under the asphalt. The radiation can be measured on the surface.

The reporter quotes from an internal document of the State Committee for Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety: "In the North Sea and Pacific Fleet, more than 30,000 burned-out fuel elements have accumulated. The storage reserves for fuel elements have been virtually exhausted in the navy. The technical state of the intermediate deposit is not in line with the regulations. Radiation safety is absolutely insufficient."

Weidmann reports on highly dangerous intermediate deposits in the Murmansk region. Secretly obtained film clips of Murmansk military port show that it is nothing but a scrap yard. Warships and even diesel submarines are lying at the bottom of the sea. A rusty ship, one of the intermediate deposits for highly radioactive fuel elements from the submarines, is shown. Not experts, but badly trained sailors are responsible for safety on board. They have to crank the fuel elements by hand to the storage rooms.

The reporter states that there is only one intermediate land deposit for fuel elements for the whole of the Russian North Sea Fleet. It is in the prohibited military area of Zapadnaya Litsa, a few kilometers from the Norwegian border. The television team managed to obtain photos from this area for the first time, he says. They show highly radioactive fuel elements, probably from the sixties, which are still being stored in the open air today. Their protective coat is crumbling. Several accidents that happened in the eighties and were hushed up are mentioned. The radioactive contamination of one house is still considerable. The old fuel elements are now stored together with the new fuel elements in three provisional basins, which are also full. The last train with fuel elements left Zapadnaya Litsa two years ago. Aleksey Yablokov, Yeltsin's adviser for environmental safety states in an interview: "With the four available trains, the removal of the fuel elements that are there on the shore would take us more than 100 years." Weidmann points out that some of the submarines even have a defective reactor core that might explode. Yablokov admits that explosions in the submarines are possible "if the situation gets out of control. We regard our nuclear submarines as floating Chernobyls." In answer to a question from the reporter, Yablokov says that there are "about 10 nuclear submarines that have such problems."

Weidmann concludes by saying that since nobody wants to pay for the disposal of the nuclear waste, even the deactivated nuclear submarines from the Soviet era are still a nuclear danger, also for the West.

Federal Assembly

Faction Demands Yeltsin Suspend PFP Participation

LD1909193395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1804 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — The State Duma faction Russia's Women called on Russian President Boris Yeltsin "to raise the issue of Russia's withdrawal from the Partnership for Peace [PFP] program" in the wake of the aggravated situation in the Balkans, according to their open letter to Yeltsin.

According to the document, "NATO is virtually usurping the powers of the U.N., OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and other institutions created for coordination of the positions of both European and other states and the implementation of their common will."

Faction leader Yekaterina Lakhova said the NATO operations in the Balkans were "caused by its own geopolitical interests rather than the peacekeeping task of the U.N., on the behalf of which the troops of the North Atlantic alliance are acting."

Admitting "a series of gross mistakes committed by Russia's diplomacy," the faction said it would be expedient to convoke a meeting of the U.N. Security Council "on the level of heads of state." The faction also demanded the OSCE initiate actions to settle the crisis in the Balkans and hold a series of consultations on this issue with CIS states.

"Russia's Women faction believes that it is expedient to raise the issue of amending the U.N. charter to grant its peacekeeping forces additional powers, which would enable it to refuse NATO's services in peace-imposing operations which are far from unselfish," the faction underlined in its letter to Yeltsin.

Regional Affairs

Reportage on Chechen Terrorism, Negotiations, Politics

Lobov Uninjured in Car Bomb Attack

LD2009072095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0712 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Oleg Lobov, the presidential representative in Chechnya, survived an attempt on his life Wednesday, while a senior Russian official in the rebel republic was contused.

Lobov, Salambek Khadzhiyev, the Chechen national revival government head, and Nikolay Fedosov, deputy head of the territorial department of the federal executive bodies in the rebel republic, were going in a convoy of cars from the Severnyy Airport to Groznyy when a car parked on the road exploded.

Fedosov sustained a light contusion and his bodyguard was wounded by a splinter. Nobody else was injured, TASS learned from the press centre of the territorial department.

Fedosov is responsible for arranging the work of Russian representatives in Chechnya.

Explosion Caused by Bomb on Bridge

LD2009115395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1120 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYy, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — The bridge blast near Groznyy at 8:45 Wednesday was caused by a bomb laid on the bridge and not by a mined car parked there, witnesses told INTERFAX.

This information was confirmed to INTERFAX by the staff of the Russian Security Council.

The blast occurred at the moment when government cars carrying Secretary of the Russian Security Council and Plenipotentiary Representative of the Russian President in Chechnya Oleg Lobov, Premier of the Chechen National Revival Government Salambek Khadzhiyev and head of the National Accord Committee Umar Avturkhanov passed by the bridge.

An INTERFAX correspondent reported from the incident zone that the bridge, located several kilometers away from the Severnyy airport, was almost totally ruined by the blast. Concrete spans near the bridge basement were completely ruined.

The incident zone is cordoned off by reinforced units of interior troops. A team of investigators is working there.

Official bodies have so far abstained from estimating the incident as an attempt upon Lobov's life. At the same time, well-informed sources told INTERFAX that "the cars' route was fixed, and an accidental blast is almost fully excluded."

Lobov telephoned the Security Council's staff to say that none of his travelling companions were seriously injured. He requested that the families of high-ranking officials from the Security Council, who accompanied Lobov, be immediately informed of this. Deputy head of the Territorial Department of Federal Executive Power Bodies in Chechnya Nikolay Fedotov received a contusion, and one of bodyguards received a bomb fragment wound.

Bridge Blown By Remote Control

LD2009142495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1317 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — A remote control device was used to explode the bridge in Groznyy over which Oleg Lobov's car passed Wednesday morning.

Competent military sources told INTERFAX that two explosive devices and two remote-control panels had been found near the bridge.

A total of about 200 kilograms of explosives had been planted under the bridge.

Tank Explosion Adds to Terrorism

LD2009123095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1158 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — The second act of terrorism was staged in Chechnya Wednesday four hours after an attempt on the life of presidential envoy in the rebel republic Oleg Lobov.

An oil tank was exploded at the oil processing plant in Groznyy at 13:00 hours Moscow time (09.00 GMT) causing a fire, according to Russian military commander in Chechnya Anatoliy Romanov.

"These are all links of the same chain", he told a press conference Wednesday adding that the acts of terrorism were "thoroughly planned actions in response to our steps to restore peace, the social sphere and economy in Chechnya".

Romanov said that a meeting of the special observer commission was cancelled Wednesday because of the acts of terrorism.

An explosive remote-control device was set off when Lobov together with Moscow-backed Chechen leaders Salambek Khadzhiyev and Umar Avturkhanov, as well as Nikolay Fedosov, deputy head of the territorial department of the federal executive bodies in the rebel republic, were going in a convoy of cars from the Severnyy airport to Groznyy.

Fedosov sustained a light contusion and his bodyguard was wounded by a splinter in the eye. Other officials were not injured.

The command of the Russian federal troops in Chechnya admitted that the explosion could have been aimed against Lobov, but refused to make final conclusions.

Its spokesman told TASS that Khadzhiyev's jeep and Avturkhanov's car are well-known in Chechnya, while Lobov and Fedosov were going in similar Volga sedan cars.

"The militants have good reconnaisance in Groznyy", the spokesman admitted.

Fedosov's driver exchanged number plates with Lobov's car a day before which could be the reason for mistaking his car for Lobov's.

The spokesman said the exchange of number plates is often done for security reasons and that Chechen militants are well aware of that.

He added that the explosion was not a very strong one and that militants have more powerful charges.

But Romanov said at a press conferenmce that two sections of the bridge over the Neftyanka river where the explosion took place were ruined.

Security of Negotiators To Be Reviewed

LD2009143795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1401 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — There must be a review of security measures around peace negotiators in Groznyy following a bomb attack on Secretary of the Russian Security Council and Presidential Envoy Oleg Lobov Wednesday [20 September] morning, a senior ministerial official told INTERFAX.

Several people sustained minor injuries in a bomb explosion on a city bridge at 08:45 as the motorcade accompanying Lobov, Prime Minister of the National Revival Government Salambek Khadzhiev and Head of the National Accord Committee Umar Avturkhanov was passing by.

Several high-ranking Russian officials who know Lobov very well told INTERFAX that he never cared much about his personal security. They described him as being a man of self-possession, courage and composure.

A representative of the federal security service, FSB, did not rule out that the latest attack was caused by Moscow's tough statements during peace talks with rebel negotiators in Groznyy. In his view, the bomb attack was a show of intimidation and muscle-flexing.

The Russian military command in Chechnya said on Tuesday that troop withdrawals would be completed only after the rebels handed in weapons. If not, federal troops plan to carry out disarmament unilaterally.

The FSB representative spoke of a renewed flare-up of tension at and around the peace talks in Groznyy. He said security services had taken whatever measures were necessary to protect members of the negotiating teams, but in a situation such as it was now in Chechnya, there was one chance in a thousand that something of the sort might happen.

Lobov Concerned by Militant Provocations

LD1909191095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1843 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By Sergey Ostanin and Valentin Pavlov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, September 19 (ITAR-TASS) — Oleg Lobov, Secretary of the Russian Security Council and Plenipotentiary representative of the Russian President in the Chechen Republic, shares the concern expressed in the September 19 Statement of the command of the joint group of federal forces over the continued provocative actions of the Dudayev militants that lead to the frustration of the military accords. Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council Vladimir Rubanov said this to ITAR-TASS in Groznyy on Tuesday. Rubanov assessed the document as "highly proper" and said that the statement was coordinated with Lobov's stand.

Rubanov said the statement "does not dramatise the situation connected with fulfilling part of the military accords." He said the concern of the command of the joint group of federal forces over the fact that the surrender of arms in Chechnya proceeds slowly is based on the demands of the agreement as well as on the arrangements that were coordinated with cochairmen of the special observer commission Anatoliy Romanov and Aslan Maskhadov.

Today's statement of the command points out that the federal troops in Chechnya came under fire from different kinds of arms 408 times from September 1 to September 18. Twenty-six servicemen were killed and 153 wounded. It should be noted that the Chechen side stated more than once that it is fully in control of actions of its field commanders and is capable of influencing the disarmament process.

Under the agreement the Russian side demanded that the first stage of the disarmament of illegal armed formations be implemented by the Chechen side by September 27. The implementation of the second stage of diasarmament with direct control of the special observer commission and OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission will proceed from September 30, the statement says. At the third stage, arms will be bought from the population on separate occasions after the disarmament of illegal armed formations and home guards.

The Russian side warned that units for protecting populated localities will not be set up in the localities where bodies of the Chechen Interior Ministry were formed. Units that were elected and endorsed in populated localities to fulfill the agreement will be dissolved later, when law enforcement bodies are formed.

If the military accords are violated and the schedule of disarmament is not met, the Russian side reserves the right to disarm illegal armed formations and home guards with the use of force, the statement says.

The troop withdrawal from the territory of the Chechen Republic will be completed in accordance with the agreement after the complete disarmament of illegal armed formations and home guards.

The Russian side proposed to review the schedule for the disarmament of illegal armed formations for individual regions and suggested that the disarmament of such formations in the territory controlled by the Chechen side be monitored by members of the special observer commission from the Chechen side. The disarmament of ilegal armed formations in the territory controlled by the Russian side should be carried out under the control of members of the special observer commission from the Russian side.

'Disarm By Force' Statement Viewed

LD1909172695 Moscow NTV in Russian
1500 GMT 19 Sep 95

[Video report by correspondent Pavel Lobkov from Groznyy; from the "Segodnya" program; passages contained within quotation marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Chechen and Russian delegations met this rainy morning only to break up half an hour later. There had not been a session of the joint monitoring commission for five days, and today all contradictions seemed to be revealed to the limit.

[Unidentified Russian troop spokesman] "A real session of the commission did not take place today. The command of the federal troops has drawn the following conclusions: The Chechen side is not implementing the following points in the agreement. Despite repeated statements by the Chechen side that they are in full control of the actions of their field commanders and can influence the disarmament process, the federal troops are continuing to come under fire daily."

[Lobkov] Exactly 15 minutes later the Chechen side seemed to have already prepared their reaction. They organized their own news conference and also in an official statement accused the Russian side of firing on Chechen villages.

[Chechen delegation head Khozh-Akhmed Yarikhanov] "The delegation of Ichkeria [Chechnya] again had to demand that the Russian side strictly implement the agreement reached on the package of military issues and renounce attempts to revise separate points in the agreement. If this is not done the Chechen side retains the right to implement the agreement in a unilateral way."

[Lobkov] The Russian and Chechen delegations' mutual accusations are not without foundation. Our film crew witnessed both Russian and Chechen attacks. This is a Russian column of military trucks that, when we were present, came under fire from behind a hill on the edge of Groznyy. [video shows the trucks under fire]

However, in the past such firing was not a reason to break off the talks. It has become one now.

A Russian statement — if by 20 September, and that is tomorrow, heavy weaponry is not handed in and the Chechen side has not handed in the quantity of weapons envisaged by the Russian side, that is 25-30,000 units per detachment of fighters, then the Russian army retains the right to disarm by force. This will mean war.

As proof of crime by the Russian army, a crate containing burned human bones was brought into the courtyard of the Chechen mission. The Chechens found it in one of the Groznyy guard posts. The Russian statement says that self-defense detachments will be created only in those places where there are no law and order bodies. The militia of Khadzhiyev's government constitute these bodies. The Chechens today saw this as an infringement on the resolution of political issues as true bodies of law and order, in their view, can only be created after elections. Nevertheless, the Chechen side does not think that the talks have been broken off completely.

[Aslan Maskhadov, Dudayev's chief of staff and a member of the Chechen delegation] "I do not think that the talks have finished, that the agreement cannot be implemented. We will implement it."

[Lobkov] Today has left a strange impression. The demarches of both sides came on one day and were tense as never before. Both sides accused one another of breaking off the talks but nevertheless, the talks are obviously to continue tomorrow.

Pavel Lobkov, Aleksey Chervyakov, and Vladimir Dovgal from the talks in Groznyy. [video shows the delegations outside the talks, Groznyy street scenes]

Maskhadov Questions Surrender Amount

LD1909162895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1524 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen co-chairman of the joint commission supervising observance of the military accord, rejected the Russian demand that illegal militias should surrender 25,000 to 30,000 guns.

Maskhadov told INTERFAX in Groznyy that these demands are incompatible with the military accord which does not mention the amount of weaponry to be surrendered.

"If I had 30,000 guns I could go as far as the English Channel," he said.

According to Maskhadov he "as a Soviet, Russian officer, wanted the Russian army to save face and so did not say that a maximum of 6,000 men had fought the Russian army with assault rifles, grenade launchers and machine-guns alone, having no air force or heavy weapons."

Maskhadov also rejected the demand that heavy weaponry be surrendered before September 20. He explained that this cannot happen before the Chechen part of the joint commission is sure that Moscow does intend to implement the military accord.

The problems in implementing the accord are largely attributable to the absence of a political settlement and lack of progress on the issue of who is in power in Chechnya, Maskhadov thinks.

Maskhadov described the achievements reached by the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission in Chechnya as meagre.

Maskhadov Warns of War Resumption

AU1909122295 Paris AFP in English 1125 GMT 19 Sep 95

[Report by Nikolay Topouria]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy, Russia, Sept 19 (AFP) — A new round of peace talks in Russia's troubled republic of Chechnya failed to take place Tuesday [19 September] when the commander of Russian troops did not show up.

There was no official explanation for General Anatoly Romanov's absence from the planned talks, which came as both sides traded accusations of breaking a six-week-old ceasefire and demilitarisation process.

"I would not be surprised if war broke out tomorrow," Chechen military commander Aslan Maskhadov told reporters.

He said Russian bombing and artillery attacks had killed 32 people, including three children, and wounded 50 in the past four days. "There are more deaths than during the war," he said.

The Russian delegation meanwhile issued a statement to the Chechen rebel negotiators and to the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is mediating the talks, saying the rebels were not respecting the July 30 military accord.

"From the September 1st to 18th, 408 shooting attacks were made on Russian positions, including 180 in Groznyy, killing 26 soldiers and wounding 153," the declaration said.

An army spokesman said this week that guerrilla attacks have recently "become more aggressive."

Neither set of figures could be confirmed independently, although both sides frequently exagerate their losses. AFP correspondents have witnessed heavy bombardments of Chechen-held villages during the ceasefire period.

Both sides also accuse each other of failing to comply with the demilitarisation part of July 30 accord which stipulates that most Russian troops pull out and Chechen guerrillas disarm.

According to Russian officials, forces loyal to independence leader Dzhokhar Dudayev have between 25,000 to 30,000 weapons and another 10,000 to 15,000 are in the hands of other Chechen factions.

The Russians have been frustrated by disarmament sessions in which Chechens hand over almost entirely worn out weapons, even antiques, and few of the deadly rocket propelled grenade launchers that have been used so effectively against the heavy Russian forces.

However, Dudayev's fighters are estimated by the Russians to number no more than 7,000 and groups of guerrillas are rarely seen by AFP correspondents fighting with more than an average of one weapon per man.

On Monday, Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered his government to step up its efforts to find a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Chechnya, presidential envoy Oleg Lobov said.

Lobov, who is also secretary to the powerful Russian Security Council, arrived in the Chechen capital Monday with the message that Yeltsin wanted to secure a lasting peace and rebuild infrastructure in the breakaway southern Russian republic. He was to spend a week in Chechnya.

Yeltsin "ordered the Russian government to step up its work to rebuild Chechen industry and search for a peaceful solution to the conflict," Lobov said.

Russian troops marched into the secessionist republic in December to put down a three-year-old independence movement, sparking a conflict which has left between 15,000 and 30,000 dead.

Russia has made it clear that talks on a political settlement — seen as the only real solution to ending the deep-rooted conflict — cannot proceed until the military accord, signed July 30, has been respected.

Statement Cites Withdrawal Terms

LD1909121395 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1036 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — Russian federal troops will be fully withdrawn from Chechnya only after a complete disarmament of Chechen units, says a statement of the federal troops command handed to Co-Chairman of the Special Observer Commission Aslan Maskhadov and head of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] observer mission in Chechnya Sandor Mescaros Tuesday.

If the Chechen side does not abide by the disarmament schedule, federal troops will ensure the disarmament on their own, says the document.

Under previous agreements, heavy material should be brought to the Shali training center and disarmament points in Achkhoy-Martan and Chapayevo before September 20.

According to Russian military information, the Chechen side is to lay down about 45,000 fire arms, including 25,000-30,000 items that belong to Dudayev units and 10,000-15,000 from volunteer troops.

Military Denounces Criminal Nominations

LD1909121895 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1036 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — The command of federal troops in Chechnya has denounced the nomination of criminals, wanted by the federal authorities, as heads of Chechen settlements.

For instance, Aslanbek Abdulkhadzhiyev, who participated in the terrorist act in the Stavropol town of Budennovsk in mid-June, has been nominated commandant of the Chechen Shali region, says a statement by the troops command handed to Co-Chairman of the Special Observer Commission Aslan Maskhadov and head of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] observer mission in Chechnya Sandor Mescaros Tuesday. The same commandant's office employs former division head of the Chechen State Security Department Abu Movsayev, another participant in the aforesaid terrorist act.

Abdulkhadzhiyev and Movsayev, same as the other participants in the attack at Budennovsk, are wanted by the federal authorities. The Chechen side should be helping the federal authorities with their search and extradition to law-enforcement bodies in strict correspondence with bilateral agreements, says the statement.

'Muslim Battalions' Imperil Peace

MM1909153395 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 3

[Report by Vladimir Gavrilenko and Anatoliy Stasovskiy: "Is There a Fifth Ace in Dudayev's

Pack? In Chechnya There Are Armed Formations Under No One's Control Which Are Capable of Exerting a Considerable Influence on the Situation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As readers will know, a roundtable conference of all Chechnya's sociopolitical parties and movements with the participation of the Russian side will very soon be held in Groznyy. This will essentially afford a view of Chechnya's immediate future. For Chechen representatives this is the start of a major event — the division of Dudayev's legacy. By all accounts, this division will be difficult — for both Chechens and Russians. The situation in the republic remains not just alarming but confused. The involvement of Ruslan Khasbulatov and Doku Zavgayev in the peacemaking at the Russian president's bidding has not only not clarified the situation but has, on the contrary, made it even more opaque.

Suffice it to say that on the eve of their visit to Groznyy Khasbulatov and Zavgayev have not met with each other or agreed their political stances, as many people in both Russia and Chechnya would have wanted. A countermove has also been made by Salambek Khadzhiyev. Sensing that he was losing ground in the republic, he has announced his support for Chechnya's independence.

Despite his clearly being a long way from Groznyy and even further away from Moscow, Dzhokhar Dudayev not only closely observes the development of events but also exerts an active influence on them. The main thing for him is how to spin things out as long as possible. In the immediate term — until the parliamentary elections in Russia and, if he can, until the presidential elections. The plan is not marked by originality. Dudayev is hoping for an alignment in the new Russian parliament which might have a different attitude toward the Chechen problem. And then there will be a new president.... Dudayev's logic is "wait and see."

The situation is also far from clear for the federal authorities. "Descending" to a strong-arm solution of the problem would mean undermining their own prestige in the runup to the elections. Embarking on unduly obvious concessions to the Dudayev side, which would be unpopular in Russia, would also mean losing votes.

In this unbalanced situation only one way of doing things has been found to date, namely, the desire to restore the local population's loyalty toward the federal authorities by injecting money into the country's devastated economy. On returning to Moscow the Russian president's official representative in Groznyy, Oleg Lobov, bluntly stated that the disarmament process will proceed hand-in-hand with the improvement in the economic and political situation and that "it is actually harmful to make a tragedy out of the fact that is proceeding slowly."

Armed attacks on federal troops, which are not just constant but are becoming increasingly aggressive, continue to provide an unfavorable backdrop to the development of political events. Shootouts in Groznyy and the Bamut sector have reached a particularly dangerous pitch in recent days. Three servicemen were killed and more than 10 wounded during the weekend.

A Chechen guerrilla field commander turned up among the correspondents and photojournalists at Doku Zavgayev's recent news conference at the Russian-American press center. He also drew the attention of the news conference participants. The Chechen said that he feels no special love toward Dudayev but took up arms to defend his home. Now, when combat operations are no longer being conducted, the guerrilla commander pins greater hopes on the peace negotiations. He is naturally supported in this not only by his detachment but by a certain segment of the population. Many people are sick and tired of the war. Who, then, in this situation is shooting?

The answer is a small number of "hard-line" Dudayev supporters who simply have no other way of escaping the consequences of their criminal past. But most of all we have a third force here which is increasingly being spoken about. These are the armed formations known as the "Muslim battalions," which are under no one's control. No one knows precisely as yet how many of them there are, but it is clear that the guerrillas in them are distinguished by their ability, discipline, and special ruthlessness. Many of them, according to available information, are not natives of Chechnya. This, plus the religious factor, fuels their intransigence. They constitute an imposing force and a serious adversary in conditions of guerrilla warfare in the mountains. This is certainly well understood by Dudayev too. Despite the fact they are under no one's control, he will be able to reach agreement with the Muslims more quickly than with anyone else, given the opportunity. Is this an ace in the pack? Be that as it may, it could spoil the game of any participant at the roundtable discussion, including the Russian side.

Shelling of Chechen Villages Alleged

LD1909190995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1804 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — The Russian troops "continued to shell Chechen villages from Grad launchers, tanks and artillery systems," the Dudayev government's Minister for the Press and Information Movladi Udugov told INTERFAX Tuesday.

He said the villages of Bamut, Yandi, Orekhovo, Stary Achkhoy, Zonakh and Bashin-Kale had come under fire. Over the past few days, said Udugov, 32 civilians have died and more than 50 were wounded as a result of air strikes and fire attacks.

Meanwhile, the command of the joint federal grouping in Chechnya has denied reports from Dudayev's side about the use of aviation against the militants or about air strikes on populated areas.

The joint federal grouping's spokesman Ivan Yesyutin told INTERFAX that "aircraft have not been used lately even for delivering return strikes on the militants' positions." He also said that the federal units "only retaliate when their check points and bases come under fire."

He stated that the timetable for the disarmament of the illegal armed formations, presented in the joint federal grouping's statement, circulated on Tuesday, "corresponded to the disarmament schedule, drafted by Dudayev's side, and cannot be changed."

Chances of New Budennovsk Pondered

MM1809191095 Moscow PRAVDA-5 in Russian 15-22 Sep 95 p 3

[Article by Vladislav Borisov: "Could the Budennovsk Tragedy Happen Again in... Moscow? If There Is No Danger of That, Why Are the Moscow Police on the Alert Day and Night?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Officially the troops have left the capital, leaving the protection of law and order to the internal affairs organs. But you get a sense that the "smoke of war" has not dispersed. At some of the traffic police posts at the entrance to the city you see armored personnel carriers.... The news from Chechnya is not comforting either. On so-called "independence" day, the rebel Dudayevite flag suddenly appeared above the presidential palace in Groznyy, but not a word from the local authorities!

Sure the gunmen are surrendering weapons, but what kind of weapons — dating from the "times of Ochakov and the conquest of Crimea." Every day you hear sad news on the radio and television: A Russian border guard or soldier from the federal or internal forces has been killed. Bandits are holding five border guards hostage somewhere on the border with Dagestan. Are they still alive?

It is a kind of Trotskiy-era situation: Neither war nor peace!

We must face up to the truth — the thunder of war is still rumbling in the mountains of the North Caucasus. Russian diplomacy is trying to muffle it: We are on the point of making peace with Chechnya! Our Russian "Chicherins" [G.V. Chicherin was a Soviet statesman and diplomat] are obsessed with peace at any price, while the Dudayevites are conducting "reconnaissance though talks," reinforcing it with nighttime raids by gunmen on federal forces' positions.

The echo of the firefights in the mountain gorges even carries to Moscow. It has gone quiet, frightened by the tragic events in Budennovsk: It was no idle threat by Dudayev to take the war outside Chechnya. But what if Chechen terror were to start in Moscow too? They are fanatics, after all. What will they do next?

Although martial law has not been declared in the capital, military fatigues have been a common sight for a long time. Even now special militia officers, cradling their stubby assault rifles, are flagging down foreign-made cars belonging to people of "Caucasian nationality," checking documents and baggage. The capital's streets are patrolled by police Mercedes, always ready to swoop down.

They say that some young and inexperienced traffic police forgot their training and panicked: "Chechen gunmen in armored personnel carriers in Moscow!" The police, the FSB [Federal Security Service], and the forces were all ears: What? Where? When? It turned out to be a false alarm, due to the tense situation, the heat, and the nerve-racking impact of the newspaper, television, and radio horror stories. Rumors, rumors — each more absurd than the last! Apparently, a bomb planted by gunmen at a subway station was found and disarmed: It was allegedly in an ordinary shopping bag. They do not apparently announce constantly on the subway for nothing: "Esteemed passengers! When leaving the train do not forget your belongings!" There was a rumor that the water in the public water supply had been poisoned and it was dangerous to buy bread — poison had been sprinkled in the flour. Terrorists were seen in Konkovo, then in Strogino....

"It all comes from the ALBTM agency," Police Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Menshikh, deputy chief of the Moscow Main Internal Affairs Administration Public Order Administration, told me.

"But what is ALBTM?" I asked in surprise.

"It is a little bird that told me!" he laughed. "As for the operational situation in Moscow — don't believe the rumors! — it is calm. We have merely tightened things up. There would be an immediate announcement of any attempted terrorist act."

Is it really all peace and quiet?" I asked the lieutenant colonel somewhat skeptically. "Might not the Dudayevite thug Shamil Basayev or some other similar bandit take a desperate step and carry out a terrorist act in Moscow? After all, there is the Kurchatov Institute with its nuclear reactors, the water-supply canal.... In fact, it could cause a disaster, bigger than Chernobyl!"

"Security has been stepped up at all highly important facilities in Moscow," Nikolay Viktorovich reassured me. "Not even a mouse could get through! Our officers are on the alert. Main Internal Affairs Administration officers feel a greater responsibility following the events in Budennovsk. They are human beings and are also affected by the deaths of their compatriots, who include colleagues of ours — Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] personnel."

Indeed, the Dudayevite thugs' attack on the peaceful Stavropol Oblast town shocked and continues to concern the country. The thing that everyone feared has begun: From, the southern outskirts of the former USSR, where interethnic conflicts were raging, the war actually spilled over into Russian oblasts.

According to the latest data, the sad list of inhabitants of Budennovsk, police, and servicemen who died during the attack on this city by gunmen headed by Shamil Basayev now contains 123 people. Another 25 bodies were found after the bandits had been ejected to Chechnya. Nor do we know the fates of the hostages at the moment. Dozens were killed, and hundreds of people who the Dudayevites used as a "human wall" were psychologically traumatized and physically injured.

"How could it happen?" "Who is responsible?" — State Duma deputies have been unable to get full answers to these anxious questions. The Russian supreme executive authorities, who began the military actions to bring constitutional order to the rebellious republic, were at pains to ensure that the "Chechen problem" should bother Russian civilians as little as possible: There will be little bloodshed, they said, and the illegal Dudayev regime will soon be overthrown.

But there was a great deal of bloodshed and we certainly paid the price! Now the Russian Government has a new preoccupation: Whom to blame for the protracted bloodbath, a repetition of the wretched Afghan experience? Slowly but surely the war in the Caucasus has become, as it were... the internal affair of the army, MVD, and FSB.

The introduction of troops into Chechnya was ill-prepared and an analyst's miscalculation. From both the military and the political viewpoint. This is now a recognized fact. What to do now, what "organizational conclusions" to draw? How right or how wrong was the State Duma to demand radical personnel changes in the power departments? Parliament's reaction in this case was no more than a distillation of Russians' emotional response to the terrible tragedy in Budennovsk.

To be frank, tragedy has engulfed the whole of Russia. Nobody is interested in the fact that the MVD has no money and the FSB is short of professionals and has been debilitated by a serious of reorganizations, that the army is badly prepared militarily and morally too: What is it fighting for? No one cares where one department's area of responsibility ends and another department's begins. If you think about it, the ordinary Russian has never linked the question of his personal safety to the person of Viktor Yerin, Sergey Stepashin, or Pavel Grachev. Far, far more important to him is..."his own" precinct inspector of police—he is closer to home, he is someone he can understand better.

But when the entire country sees bandits terrorizing effectively an entire city, when hundreds of people simultaneously become pawns in political games, helpless hostages in gunmen's paws, then any Russian is entitled to ask: What if it were to happen to me, to my family tomorrow? Is there a force in the country capable of defending us, protecting us against violence? Even without sociological data from the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion on Social and Economic Questions, it is easy to calculate the loss of confidence in the organs of law and order, the lethargic FSB, the demoralized army, and a government and president indifferent to the people's woes. Indeed, war is undoing with your teeth a political knot which has not yielded to diplomacy!

Even to a Russian who is not conversant with political and military matters will see that the war against the Dudayev regime is dragging on indefinitely, despite the "Kozyrevites'" diplomatic subterfuge. The rebellious general needs the pseudonegotiations with the Russian side in order to regroup: His routed gunmen will appear somewhere else, fully armed again. According to current data, around 600 of them are concentrated in Groznyy. The war continues. And who knows what further carnage will follow hapless Budennovsk?

But legally the war in Chechnya (and it is a war!) is not taking place at all, it is as if it did not exist. There is the juridically vague formula: "military operation to restore constitutional order." The army's role is seen as being secondary and the MVD troops are doing their usual job in the republic — establishing order, the risk being no greater than that run by a policeman breaking up a drunken fight.

The army, internal troops, and MVD special units are fighting, as it were, at their own expense: According to our sources, often the cash is not found for them to pay their people. But if the war in Chechnya had proper status, would the state then find the money for professional contract soldiers, for modern equipment, communications facilities, and reliable border blocks? Would the mushrooming ranks of officials simply tighten the belt further and not go to the West again "for experience"?

Do they at "the top" not see that if we are talking about citizens' safety it is criminal to economize, and it is doubly criminal to conceal the true size of the threat and play it down, making short-term political capital.

The best option, of course, is to resolve the Chechen problem at the negotiating table. But while you are seeking peaceful ways of eliminating the conflict you need to provide the power structures with everything they need: As professionals they must always be ready for the worst, including — God forbid — new Budennovsks. In this context, the resignations of Viktor Yerin and Sergey Stepashin (the president would not "give up" loyal Grachev) are a secondary matter that does not determine the readiness of the state itself and its leadership to do its constitutional duty to Russian citizens and protect their right to live.

We must stop "ignoring" the war in Chechnya! All the declarations about the withdrawal of forces are more like a secret order for their regrouping. How many more upheavals do we need after Budennovsk to see this? If we do not see it the war will continue to escalate and will spill over deep into Russia, where new seats of tension may appear, ultimately leading to the fragmentation of a once great country into "principalities" headed by their own Dudayevs.

Stanislav Govorukhin, the well-known movie director and politician, deputy in the Russian Federation State Duma, and chairman of the parliamentary commission to investigate the causes and circumstances of the crisis in the Chechen Republic, told me the following: "We should have expected the Dudayevites not to confine themselves to threats. Gunmen who have been pushed out of Chechnya are obviously going to transfer their actions to Russian territory."

[Borisov] "And Moscow too?"

[Govorukhin] "Probably not. The rich, settled Chechen diaspora, making a colossal amount of money, cannot afford this kind of 'discomfort.' It is Dudayev's 'fifth column.'"

[Borisov] "So Muscovites, if you will excuse my putting Moscow first, can rest easy?"

"Who knows, who knows..." the director said, puffing on his pipe.

He was very pessimistic and was very abusive about certain media, actually describing the newspapers as "murderers, shooting Russian soldiers in the back with their disinformation about the Chechen war and paid out of Dudayev's pocket."

The fact that the Chechen gunmen are scared to have a go at Moscow is little consolation. Since we did not succeed in achieving victory with little bloodshed, we should admit that Russians cannot be protected with half-measures, the Russian "Gulliver" must break the fetter binding him and achieve his full "constitutional" stature. While the Russian Federation Government ponders such a decisive act in order to end the bloodshed in Chechnya and contribute to the establishment of legal constitutional order, the Moscow police are maintaining their vigilance "just in case." Who knows what the fanatical Shamil Basayev, with the martyr's green headband around his crazy head, still has up his sleeve?

"Don't worry. We will not allow Muscovites to come to any harm," Police Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Menshikh confidently stated.

That we would like to believe. Let us believe it.

Restoration Financed by Russian Fund

LD1909192595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1917 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, September 19 (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian State Population Employment Fund will finance part of restoration measures in Chechnya and will allocate 1,000 billion roubles to the government commission for the restoration of the economy and social sphere in the Chechen Republic. The commission is led by Russian First Deputy Premier Oleg Soskovets. The funding of restoration in Chechnya was announced at a news conference in Groznyy on Tuesday by Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council Vladimir Rubanov. He said funds will be spent not only on the solution of problems of population employment but also on paying compensation for the lost property and housing to families that suffered from the hostilities in Chechnya.

It is planned that the spent sums will be restored to the fund. Altogether it is planned to spend 5,000 billion roubles for the needs of Chechnya. Later it will be necessary to draw on the federal budget for funds for the restoration work in Chechnya, Rubanov said.

The Russian State Population Employment Fund was set up in June 1993. Under the Fund's regulations, part of the sums of mandatory insurance contributions by employers goes to the federal part of the State Fund.

Demonstration Near U.S. Consulate in St. Petersburg

LD1809184995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1739 GMT 18 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ST. PETERSBURG, Sept 18 (INTERFAX) — The Russian Communist Party, Russian Communist Working Party, Movement for Democracy, Social Progress and Justice held an anti-U.S. rally in protest of the NATO strikes against Bosnia Serbs in front of the U.S. consulate in St.Petersburg Monday. The demonstrators carried placards saying "U.S. and NATO Have Unleashed War in Bosnia" and "U.S. is Satan's Brood."

At the end of the rally, the demonstrators handed over a statement saying the events in former Yugoslavia brought "the world to the brink of a new world war."

No War Games Planned Near Abkhazian Border

LD2009090895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0848 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Irina Shchegoleva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SOCHI, September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — No large-scale war games of border troops will be held at the Abkhazian section of the Russian-Georgian border in the near future, Fayid Bakhteyev, head of the headquarters of the Sochi border detachment, said in an interview with ITAR-TASS here on Wednesday.

Abkhazian sources alleged earlier that a large-scale exercise of border troops would be held at the given section of the border between September 21 and 23.

The alleged aim was to improve actions of border-guards to blockade Abkhazia if combat operations resume there. "Personnel of the border detachment are engaged in planned training," Bakhteyev noted. "Besides, training sessions are conducted with the young conscripts who recently reinforced our detachment."

Tambov Oblast Agency Will Control All Land Deals

MM2009080995 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Sep 95 p 2

[Unattributed report under "Own Correspondent's Teletype" rubric: "Tambov: Not a Single Inch of Land Without the Agency"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tambov Oblast Administration Head Oleg Betin has published the directive "On Regularizing Deals Involving Land in the Ownership, Possession, and Use of Legal and Physical Persons."

As of 25 September, land will be repartitioned under the control of the newly created Tambov Oblast State Agency for Land Valuation. Any land deals will be invalid without its ruling.

Dismissal of Amur Governor Rumored Imminent

MM1909192095 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 2

[Report by Nikolay Belyy: "It Is Easy To Go Over to the Opposition But Hard To Return. Another Change of Power, the Fifth in Four Years, Looms Over Amur Oblast"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Blagoveshchensk — The figure of the Amur governor is once again the center of attention. Local observers maintain that an edict has already been prepared to release Vladimir Dyachenko, the present head of Amur Oblast Administration, from his post. It is said that Viktor Chernomyrdin has proposed that A. Belonogov, chairman of Amur Oblast Assembly, occupy the seat of the governor of the gold-bearing Amur district.

The representative organ of power has neither confirmed nor denied this fact, refusing to comment on the latest stalemate in which the two branches of power in a region remote from Moscow have ended up. Nor has the Oblast Administration shed any light, saying only that Governor Dyachenko has safely completed his summer vacation and embarked on his work.

Meanwhile, local observers consider the rumors of a new governor in Amur to be not without foundation. Here they refer to Dyachenko's well-known political gaffe. The point is that the Amur governor, seemingly out of political naivete, agreed to join the leading organs of "New Russia" — the opposition party of Vladimir Polevanov, the disgraced former vice premier of Russia and former "head" of the Amur executive. ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI wrote that Polevanov's successor in Blagoveshchensk put himself in a delicate position. To work on the president's team and to be in party opposition to him was a manifest attempt to sit on the fence.

It is said that Vladimir Nikolayevich preferred a real governor's chair to a mythical party one and renounced "New Russia." But Moscow's and the local elite's credit of trust had been undermined. The ungainly political zigzags of the Oblast Administration head gave rise to a wave of suppositions and expectations. At all events, the names of candidates for the seat of the fifth Amur governor in the post-Soviet period are already being mentioned in the oblast press and in the local corridors of power. They include the aforementioned Belonogov, chairman of the Oblast Assembly; A. Surat, head of the "Moskt" Company; G. Nikandrov, the president's representative in Amur Oblast; Yu. Lyashko, mayor of Blagoveshchensk; and B. Yusfin, president of "Bamkredit," an influential bank in Siberia and the Far East.

The first two candidacies are hardly realistic: Boris Yeltsin has already personally released each of them from the post of head of the executive. He dismissed Belonogov as chairman of Amur Oblast Soviet Executive Committee for supporting the 1991 putsch. He dismissed Surat as oblast governor for his loyalty to the 1993-model putschists. The majority of local analysts rate highly the chances of Yusfin and Lyashko — people of concrete action and politicians of the center who belong to no party.

Another question remains open, however: Will the change of power in Amur be another appointment, or will it take place, as in some parts of Russia, by means of an election? But a presidential ruling is needed for the second option.

Kuzbass Assembly Seeks To Restore Oblast Soviet

MM1909082595 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Sep 95 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "PRAVDA Own Information Bureau": "For the Power of the Soviets"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A session of the Kuzbass Legislative Assembly has adopted the Kemerovo Oblast Charter. It envisages the restoration of the Soviet of People's Deputies and the election by that organ of the head of the region's executive.

Economic Issues

Soviet-Era Article Against Hard Currency Dropped

LD2009125095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1228 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Larisa Kislinskaya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Four years after the Russians were officially allowed to possess hard currency, Russian authorities dropped the Soviet-era article which envisaged up to a death penalty for hard currency operations.

In Soviet years unauthorised possession of hard currency was viewed as a most grave crime and few people were authorised to have it.

When President Boris Yeltsin launched reforms in Russia, the citizens were allowed to exchange roubles for hard currency although the criminal punishment for that was not officially dropped.

Now, according to a top Moscow police official, the article 88 was replaced by article 162 which envisages criminal punishment mostly for illegal deals with precious metals and stones.

Oleg Kapur, head of the Investigation department of Moscow police, told a briefing Wednesday that criminal punishment is envisaged only for buying and selling hard currency to and from unregistered peddlers and for paying for goods and services in hard currency. A violator can face a one-year suspended sentence.

Kapur said some 1,000 such cases have been investigated in 1995. He did not say how many people got a suspended sentence.

Hard currency cash payments are banned in Russia. Roubles are the only legal tender.

Decree Allowing Electricity Disconnects Viewed

MM1909095395 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 Sep 95 p 1

[Special report by Konstantin Baskayev of POSTFACTUM: "Power Workers Can Now Disconnect Anyone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Several dozen officers armed with gas pistols and serving at the Plesetsk cosmodrome (Arkhangelsk Oblast) went on "alert duty" on Friday at the transformer substation through which electricity reaches Plesetsk. They are guarding this "strategic establishment" against the employees of "Arkhenergo" who have promised to disconnect electricity because of debts. ITAR-TASS was informed of this by telephone from Plesetsk. Previously Plesetsk was one of the so-called "first category establishments," which should not be disconnected in any circumstances. But as of this month, Plesetsk has been transferred to the "second category," which is something the power workers want to exploit.

Since the publication of the government decree "on some measures to stabilize tariffs for electricity" which gives the "YeES Rossii" Russian joint-stock company the right to disconnect electricity even for so-called "undisconnectable enterprises," the situation with regard to the supply of electricity to consumers can be described by the phrase: "I shall punish you or pardon you as I please."

The debts to the power workers have exceeded the sum of 23 trillion rubles [R] (not counting Irkutskenergo and Yakutenergo) and, in turn, the power workers owe about R20 trillion. Ivan Bokhmat, first deputy chief of the "YeES Rossii" Russian joint-stock company department for subscription payments and the organization of the effective operation of power supplies to subsidiary joint-stock companies, notes that for power workers disconnecting even a persistent nonpayer is an extreme measure that they are reluctant to undertake. The process of paying the debt can be extended. "We do not gamble on the knife-switch," I. Bokhmat stresses.

The concept of "undisconnectable enterprises" was introduced by an earlier government decision. These enterprises include organizations of the Defense Ministry, the State Committee for defense sectors of industry, the Internal Affairs Ministry, the Ministry of Communications, the State Committee for Higher Education, and plants and combines with a continuous production cycle. Preferential lists were compiled in the regions. Understandably the enterprise directors used all their clout to get on this list. As a result they completely stopped paying for power.

The new decree drastically reduces the number of these enterprises. Industrial enterprises with a continuous production cycle and defense enterprises of strategic importance, budget-funded enterprises, and socioconsumer organizations have not been removed from it. On the other hand even for the organizations remaining on the list "the supply of electricity and heat stops 30 days after the day on which it should be paid for" — this change is introduced by the government decree.

The urgency of the need for payment for power is further stressed by the fact that the tariff includes the following components: investment, expenditure on the running and capital repair of equipment, the creation of fuel stocks for the fall and winter peak power consumption, and actual expenditure on the generation of power and heat. The proportion of the investment share in the tariffs is 70 percent.

Ivan Bokhmat, the spokesman for the "YeES Rossii" Russian joint-stock company, stresses that the tariff policy has been sent to the regions and the adoption of each new price for a kilowatt-hour of power is up to the regional power commission.

It is interesting that few enterprise leaders are venturing to object to the power workers. Thus, Anatoliy Koltsov, deputy general director for the economy at the "Hammer and Sickle" plant, refusing to cite the sum of his enterprise's debt to "Mosenergo," noted that it is three months in arrears for power. And the payment which is being made is mainly under mutual offsetting terms. "We must not heat up the atmosphere," A. Koltsov believes. "The enterprises will sort things out between themselves. We have boosted production 60 percent in two months and have begun to pay our debts and we will achieve nothing good through harsh measures." The "Hammer and Sickle" plant's debts were formed because of a shortage of working capital as a result of which the enterprise leadership had to choose whether to buy materials for production or to pay for electricity and halt the plant.

In the opinion of Valeriy Zolotukhin, leader of the Institute of Strategic Management systems analysis group, the state regulation of tariffs has come down to approving the tariffs worked out by the power workers. The method of calculating the tariffs gives total freedom for the tyranny of the "YeES Rossii" Russian joint-stock company and regional joint-stock companies in the matter. According to V. Zolotukhin tariffs vary by a factor of 11 according to the region.

The publication of the decree whereby power workers have received the right to disconnect power on principle for any consumer is a far from market-based measure. As, indeed, is failure to pay for a commodity that has already been consumed.

Military-Energy Restructure 'Will Benefit Everyone'

MM2009110395 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI (Saturday Edition) in Russian 16 Sep 95 p 5

[Article by Andrey Kolesnikov: "Military-Industrial Complex Under Heel of Fuel and Energy Complex? Military-Industrial Complex Being Restructured and Converted for Needs of Fuel and Energy Complex"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two very important events have occurred in the lives of two of Russia's three biggest lobby groups. First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets announced his intention at a recent Commission for Current Issues session to complete the restructuring of the military-industrial complex and in an entirely market-oriented spirit — by cutting production facilities and

R&D. Anything that cannot get funding will, clearly, be declared bankrupt, recapitalized, and converted. A couple of weeks later the same Soskovets stated in Tyumen that the state would increase its support for developments linked to the development of the fuel and energy complex — specifically, by developing production of oil and gas equipment in the converted industry. In other words, the military-industrial complex will undergo major conversion and be placed at the service of the competitive, export-oriented fuel and energy complex, which the state needs to replenish its budget.

What is this? A victory for the fuel lobby over the military-industrial complex lobby? A reorientation of state policy? The second theory is more likely.

It seems as though the state has decided by itself that it cannot and will not finance anything that it is physically unable to finance. It has taken years to understand this. Clearly, almost all the significant figures in the current Cabinet of Ministers have concluded that the problem of capital investment in industry can be resolved through competitive market approaches. It is impossible to satisfy all lobbyists, including those who are ideological allies. Because, when you help everyone indiscriminately or support only the weak or those making a great fuss, the strong become weaker. As a result, the economy of the entire country suffers.

The government now considers it possible to bring some clarity to the question of relations with the main sectoral groups. Overnight, all former means of lobbying that had been aimed at extorting money out of the budget in a direct and vulgar fashion have lost all sense. Hard-line lobbyists will have to requalify as building superintendents, while the more flexible among them will have to accept the new ground rules laid down by the government and look for new ways and means to conduct their lobbying.

Paradoxically, everyone gains from these decisions — both the fuel and energy complex and the military-industrial complex. A more or less comprehensible picture is taking shape in the military-industrial complex regarding whom the state will finance and whom it will not. Military-industrial complex capacity will be busy, although it will be working for the oil and gas sector. In this context the resolution of the affair involving the "Rybinskiye Motory" Joint-Stock Company in favor of "Gazprom" turns out to be politically transparent — it is an example of the reorientation of a pure defense enterprise to meet the needs of the fuel and energy complex.

There is a valid view that everything that is happening is profoundly wrong, that the old structural imbalances will simply be replaced by new ones. That is partly true. But we are talking about very specific economic realities which it would be stupid to ignore.

Incidentally, the problem of national industrial pride is being resolved at the same time — the oil sector will have a chance over time to considerably reduce its imports of equipment and make do almost exclusively with import substitutes produced by converted Russian production facilities. So it is high time that the high-profile political lament of "Russian commodity producers" about the former greatness of our national industry was ended.

The struggle between the two lobbies has resulted in a draw. A draw that will benefit everyone, including the state.

'Rosneft' Oil Company Announces Restructuring

MK1909124495 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 16 Sep 95 p 9

[Unattributed report: "'Rosneft' Continues To Grow Slimmer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a high-level "Rosneft" representative, the Moscow Oil Refinery and the "Mosnefteprodukt" distribution enterprise will be excluded from the list of enterprises constituting this company, which is being created on the basis of the state enterprise of the same name. The shares of these Moscow enterprises, owned by the federal government and managed by "Rosneft," will be transferred to the State Property Committee of Russia. In the future, the refinery's shares will be placed in trust management with the "Mostatnafta" financial-industrial group. Its creation, initiated by the Moscow City Government and the Government of Tatarstan and approved by the Russian president, has until now been delayed to prevent Moscow from owning oil-refining capacities that it could contribute to this financial-industrial group. Following the withdrawal of the capital's enterprises from "Rosneft," the Moscow City Government has assumed the entire responsibility for the steady supply of oil products to the city.

Miners' Conference Mulls Coal Industry Restructure

MK1909141895 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 16 Sep 95 p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Yegorenko: "Yuriy Shafranik: We'd Better Count on the Worst"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A conference of the chiefs of Kuzbass coal associations held in Kemerovo revealed a complete unanimity of views between Fuel and Energy

Minister Yuriy Shafranik and the oblast's coal industry chiefs on the restructuring of the Russian coal industry. The unanimity manifested itself first of all in the crucial issue of whether or not the coal industry will be state-controlled. The debate showed that there are no differences on the issue: The coal industry should be state-run as long as possible. Without subsidies from the federal budget, coal miners will be unable to survive, and this is now clear even to the trade unions, which formerly adhered to more radical views.

According to Yuriy Shafranik, it is necessary to draw up a clear, mobile, and fairly tight ("army-style," as the minister put it) vertical hierarchy from a mine or a strip-mine to state agencies. Even the tightest possible discipline will not obstruct miners' work if at the same time they are paid good wages, Shafranik said.

In response, the "coal generals" offered their idea of the most effective model for managing the industry. In their opinion, it is necessary to define more clearly the legal status of both individual coal enterprises and the entire system of coal production management. The current status of the "Rosugol" company, which was invariably referred to as a "bureaucratic office" during the conference, no longer suits anyone. To all appearances, it was the lack of a legally formalized status that prevented "Rosugol" from attracting investment to a single project last year. The process of converting coal enterprises into joint-stock companies has not been completed, and now it is not quite clear what they are — state-run or joint-stock entities. In effect, the coal industry has been turned into a holding company of sorts. But it is necessary to formalize this mechanism and to improve it so that it will become flexible and effective. According to coal enterprise directors, the redistribution of the 60 percent block of shares in coal enterprises that are still state-owned should proceed as follows: 24 percent should be kept in state ownership for another 5-7 years; the same percentage should be invested in the authorized capital of "Rosugol," which will thus be transformed into a joint-stock company; another 48 percent should be sold at auctions and investment tenders; while the remaining 4 percent of shares should be turned over to physical persons (managers). This pattern, which is to be approved by an upcoming presidential edict, should help coordinate the interests in the industry — first of all, those of "Rosugol," which, upon becoming a joint-stock company, will be able to supervise fully all coal enterprises' finances, not just how they spend budget funds, as is the case now.

According to the minister, who agreed with the draft's authors, this pattern, leaving nearly half of the coal enterprises in state ownership, will make it possible to create a formidable leading group in the center. The other half of the block of shares will make it possible to give relative freedom to the coal miners. What is important, Yuriy Shafranik noted, is who will be given priority with regard to coal industry reform and who will speak more convincingly before the president and the government, because there have been "impulses by certain groups of people in the Moscow leadership who want to be involved in distributing funds." As for the Kuzbass's local problems, on which Shafranik was briefed during the meeting, these, in his words, are attributable to the very serious economic crisis the country is currently going through. "It is not our whim that we want to shut down lots of Kuzbass mines," the fuel and energy minister said. "There is no other choice. After 1 January, with a new parliament and a new budget, everything may turn out to be much worse. We'd better count on the worst." At the same time, Shafranik called on coal miners to join forces to seek a revision of railroad tariff policies and the establishment of stable fixed quotas for the transportation of Kuzbass coal across the country and abroad and to fight against coal imports from Poland and Kazakhstan, which are crowding out Kuzbass coal from promising sales markets.

'Rybinskiye Motory' Bid Prepared Despite Protests

MK1909125595 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 16 Sep 95 p 2

[Report by Svetlana Lolayeva: "Sergey Burkov Has Accused Government of Selling Off 'Tasty Morsels.' 'Rybinskiye Motory' Is Becoming a Means of Political Struggle"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The opposition simply could not refrain from taking advantage of such a burning question as the situation surrounding the "Rybinskiye Motory" joint-stock company to expose the present cabinet. Sergey Burkov and Sergey Glazyev presented the position of "Rybinskiye Motory" joint-stock company Director General Valeriy Shelgunov. Mr. Shelgunov did the job assigned to him, recounting in detail all the ins and outs of the confrontation with the Federal Agency for Insolvency, and his efforts to lead the enterprise out of crisis. After that, Yelena Mizulina, a Federation Council member, related her selfless struggle to restore justice at "Rybinskiye Motory." She said that the General Prosecutor's Office lodged a protest on the illegal order by Petr Mostovoy, director of the Federal Directorate for Insolvency, to remove Mr. Shelgunov from office and to announce investment tenders. In his rejoinder, Mr. Mostovoy, said Yelena Mizulina, argued that he had acted on Viktor Chernomyrdin's instructions. Then Mrs. Mizulina involved upper house speaker Vladimir Shumeyko in the matter, who told her yesterday that everything the "Rybinskiye Motory" management and the oblast administration had insisted upon had been done.

Sergey Glazyev said that he did not share Mrs. Mizulina's optimism. In his view, the "Rybinskiye Motory" story repeats a well-worn scenario, whereby the State Committee on the Administration of State Property handles state-owned shareholdings to the benefit of foreign companies, acting through their experts on this committee and in Mr. Chubays's circle. Thus, in Sergey Glazyev's view, the chain looks as follows: Mostovoy — Vyakhirev (the main contender to acquire 37 percent of "Rybinskiye Motory" — "Gazprom" shareholdings) — Chernomyrdin — "General Electric." According to Mr. Glazyev's information, Mr. Mostovoy persists in preparing the shareholdings for sale despite all the protests by the General Prosecutor's Office and rulings by the Arbitrage Court.

Sergey Burkov recalled that "Rybinskiye Motory," a pillar of the national machine-building industry, is a strategic enterprise, although the decision on the tender of state-owned shareholdings was made before the list of enterprises designated for early tenders appeared. As he put it, "the government is in a hurry to sell off the tasty morsels," and, therefore, the state's interests and the fate of the enterprise and its staff are receding into the background. "It has already become impossible to fight this government by legal means," Mr. Burkov concluded. Sergey Glazyev said that "before there were crime kingpins [vory v zakone], while now we have a government that is outside the law." Petr Mostovoy thinks, however, that at issue is not a behind-the-scenes deal, but a "legal agreement" that is being speculated upon owing to the harshening electoral struggle.

Novosibirsk Oblast Cost of Living Rises

954F3432B Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian 8 Sep 95 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Living Is Becoming More Expensive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The minimum subsistence budget for the population of Novosibirsk Oblast amounted as of 1 September 1995 on average per person in the population to 269,700 rubles [R]; for men aged 16-59, it was R310,700; for women aged 16-54, it was R283,100; for pensioners, it was R192,900; for children under the age of seven, it was R209,600; for juveniles between the ages of seven and 15, it was R311,100.

The minimum consumer budget as of 1 September 1995 for the population of Novosibirsk Oblast amounted to R896,400; for city residents it was R959,000, and for rural residents it was R719,200, reports the office of labor and employment of the population of the oblast administration.

Article Views, Lists Federal Extrabudgetary Funds

MM1509131695 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences Boris Logutenko followed by list of "Main Federal Extrabudgetary Funds:" "Country's 'Shadow' Budget. And Look How Fat It Has Gotten"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The revenue from extrabudgetary funds this year will exceed 90 trillion rubles [R] which is nearly 63 percent of the federal budget revenue. These enormous sums have been removed from the authorities' control. And two draft laws — "on state extrabudgetary funds" and "on federal targeted budget funds" submitted by the Government to the Duma have failed to win the deputies' approval. To all appearances, the problem of these funds' existence will be aggravated again during the discussion of the 1996 budget.

Problems with funds arose with their formation. Because what has formed in the country in fact in terms of its volumes of financial turnover is a parallel budget system virtually uncontrolled either by the legislative or by the executive branch.

Very large financial sums accumulate in the funds which are often and in some funds generally used "for the wrong purpose." Finally it is now that the time is coming to fulfill the decisions to put in order the functioning of this second budget sphere adopted by the Duma in 1994. Let us recall that the law on the budget for 1995 provided for the elimination of extrabudgetary sectorial funds or their consolidation into the federal budget.

Over the years of the sovereign Russia, a total of about 50 state funds of federal significance of all kinds (not to mention funds in the components of the Russian Federation — budgetary, extrabudgetary, sectorial, intersectorial, and special have formed.

Of these, seven are targeted budget funds: the road and ecological funds, the fund for the reproduction of the mineral and raw material base, for the social development of the tax police organs, for the development of the tax service, for the development of the customs system, and for the struggle against crime. Their financial funds are formed from special taxes or from payments from a part of several taxes or payments from part of revenue (for instance from fines and sanctions, additional levies, and so forth in the funds for the development of the tax service and police and the customs system).

In terms of the volumes of their financial resources the most important funds are the so-called social extrabudgetary funds. There are four of them: the pension fund, the state fund for the employment of the population, the federal fund for compulsory medical insurance, and the republican (federal) fund for social support for the population. Without being formally state funds they should execute state plans: pay the pensions and insurance stipulated by law and help the sick and unemployed.... They exist through compulsory tax payments and not, for instance, voluntary donations and subscriptions. The latter are the business of private funds with similar names which peacefully coexist with the state systems for public care and charitable institutions.

The assets of these social funds consist of 40 kopeks from each ruble of wages which totals 30-50 percent of the total tax at enterprises. Here the revenue of the funds is linked to the most reliable tax source — the wages fund.

And finally there are over three dozen sectorial, intersectorial, and special funds. These are the children of the numerous ministries and departments. How are they formed and used? The secret is well kept at any rate for the federal executive branch.

In all the sectorial and intersectorial funds in 1994 had accumulated R16 trillion of which the "Gazprom" Russian joint-stock company's fund accounts for R10 trillion and the fund of the metallurgical industry and single energy grid accounts for R2 trillion. For the sake of comparison: In 1995 the social insurance fund had R9 trillion and the employment fund R5 trillion.

Let us note that the revenue section of the federal budget in 1994 was R175.16 trillion. Total revenue of all funds in 19895 is assessed at R90.5 trillion or 63 percent of the federal budget revenue.

Let us recall that payments into sectorial, intersectorial, and special funds are included as part of the prime cost of output which, together with the unclear use to which this money is put, is an attempt for payers to avoid the taxes on profit.

Money for all funds is collected by their own collectors. Evidently so that no one knows anything they do not need to know. Would it not be cheaper through the tax service?

Understandably the funds' money represents not only cheap but in fact free credit resources. They are distributed through a network of commercial banks.

An analysis of the revenue base just of the budgets of the employment and social insurance funds for 1995 has made it possible to reveal an additional R3 trillion and a further R700 billion through the reduction of irrational expenditure (this is in excess of the federal appropriations for health needs).

Expenditure on the maintenance of the apparatus of four budget funds will be R1.5 trillion in 1995 while the maintenance of the apparatus of the employment service alone is in excess of expenditure on the maintenance of the apparatus of the entire Federal Assembly, government, and president.

Some 80 percent of the employment fund's assets are spent and the remainder "circulates" or is in the accounts of commercial banks.

The government proposals in the form of these two draft laws and their adoption by the Duma could become an example of fruitful professional cooperation which would fundamentally assist the introduction of elementary order in the "shadow" budget sphere.

It is a good thing there was no plan to consolidate the four extrabudgetary funds in the federal budget. It was planned to extend tax legislation to them in full—the collection of payments and control at least by the Ministry of Finances. The government (that is the Ministry of Finances) has also suggested that the funds' money pass not through the less reliable commercial banks but through departments of the Russian Federation Central Bank. And where there are no branches of this bank through the Federal Treasury system.

But it is these proposals, which deprive the commercial banks of money from the treasury, which have met with fierce resistance from lower chamber factions. The Ministry of Finances was obliged to make a compromise, suggesting that at least control be introduced over the funds' money either by the Comptroller's Office or the tax service.

Main Federal Extrabudgetary Funds

1. Russian Federation Pension Fund (Russian Federation Supreme Soviet 27 December 1991 decree no. 2122-1).

2. Russian Federation Social Insurance Fund (Russian Federation president's 7 August 1992 edict no. 822 and Russian Federation president's 28 September 1993 edict no. 1503).

3. Russian Federation State Fund for Employment for the Population (Russian Federation Supreme Soviet 8 June 1993 decree no. 5132-1).

4. Republican (federal) fund for the social support of the population (Russian Federation president's 26 December 1991 edict no. 328, Russian Federation president's 14 December 1994 edict no. 2178, and Russian Federation Government 19 February 1992 decree no. 121).

5. Federal Fund for Compulsory Medical Insurance (Russian Federation Supreme Soviet 24 February 1993 decree no. 4543-1).

6. Russian Technological Development Fund (Russian Federation president's 27 April 1992 edict no. 426 and Russian Federation Government 12 April decree no. 315).

Sectorial and Intersectorial Extrabudgetary Funds for Scientific Research and Experimental Design Work (Russian Federation Government 12 April 1994 decree no. 315)

7. Sectorial extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work of the Russian Federation federal forestry service (Russian Federation president's 22 October 1993 edict no. 2270 and Russian Federation Government 12 April 1994 decree no. 315).

8. Sectorial extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work of the Russian Federation Committee for Fisheries (Russian Federation Government 12 April 1994 decree no. 315)

9. Sectorial extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work of the Committee for Hydrometeorology and the Monitoring of the Environment (Russian Federation Government 24 December 1991 decree no. 60).

10. Sectorial extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work of the Roslesprom [expansion unknown] (Russian Federation Government 24 December 1991 decree no. 60 and 24 January 1993 decree no. 618).

11. Sectorial extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work of the Russian Federation Committee for Metallurgy.

12. Sectorial extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work of the "Gazprom" Russian joint-stock company.

13. Sectorial extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work of the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Energy (petroleum sector).

14. Sectorial extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work of the targeted fund for financial support for power engineering and electrification.

15. Sectorial extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work of the Russian Federation committee for machine building.

16. Sectorial extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work of the Roslesprom [expansion unknown].

17. Sectorial extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work of the Russian committee for the chemical and petrochemical industry.

18. Sectorial extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work of the Russian Federation federal service for geodesy and cartography (Russian Federation Government 27 January 1993 decree no. 67).

19. Sectorial extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work of the Russian Federation Ministry of Construction, the "Transstroy" corporation, the "Rosstrom" joint-stock company, the "Tsement" joint-stock company, and the "Rosyugstroy" joint-stock company..

20. Sectorial extrabudgetary fund for general transport scientific research and experimental design work of the Russian Federation Ministry of Transport (Russian Federation Government 24 April 1994 decree no. 315).

22. [as received] Extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work in river transport (Russian Federation Ministry of Transport) (Russian Federation Government 24 April 1994 decree no. 315).

23. Extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work in air transport (Russian Federation Ministry of Transport) (Russian Federation Government 24 April 1994 decree no. 315).

24. Extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work for the improvement of air traffic control (Russian Federation Ministry of Transport) (Russian Federation Government 24 April 1994 decree no. 315).

25. Extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work on automotive and urban electrical transport (Russian Federation Ministry of Transport).

26. Extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work of the Russian Federation Ministry of Communications.

27. Extrabudgetary fund for scientific research and experimental design work of the Russian Federation Ministry of Railroads.

28. Targeted fund for financial support for power engineering and electrification including investment and insurance fund (Russian Federation Government 16 September 1993 decree no. 924).

30.[as received] Targeted investment fund for financial regulation of the Russian Federation Ministry of railroads (Russian Federation Government 20 June 1992 decree no. 411).

31. Extrabudgetary fund "money from the sale of scientific and technical output" (Russian Federation Government 14 October 1994 decree no. 1170).

32. Extrabudgetary fund "money from the sale of military-technical property and other material assets" (Russian president's 20 November 1992 edict no. 1518 and State Committee for the Administration of State Property 26 January 1993 instruction).

33. Extrabudgetary fund for financial regulation of the Russian Federation Ministry of Fuel and Energy (oil industry) including investment and insurance fund (Russian Federation Government 29 January 1992 decree no. 48).

34. Extrabudgetary fund for financial regulation of investment activity of the metallurgical industry including investment and insurance fund (Russian Federation Government 12 May 1992 decree no. 306).

35. Unified fund for stabilization and development of the "Rosstroygazifikatsiya" Russian state enterprise for the organization of gasification and gas supplies (Russian Federation president's 2 November 1993 edict no. 1817).

36. Fund for the support of enterprise and the development of competition (Russian Federation Government 1 April 1993 edict no. 268).

37. Special monetary fund of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry (Russian Federation president's 30 November 1992 edict no. 1518 [as published]).

38. Unified fund for stabilization and development of the "Gazprom" Russian joint-stock company (Russian Federation Government 4 November 1993 decree no. 1116, fund's charter dated 4 November 1993).

40. [as received] Extrabudgetary money of the Russian Federation president's Federal Government Communications Agency (Russian Federation Government 6 May 1994 decree no. 480).

International Affairs

Moroz, OSCE Official Discuss Crimea, Repatriation

WS1909131795 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 18 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Max van der Stoel, high commissioner of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], has held consultations with Ukrainian Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz on certain legal relations between Kiev and Simferopol, particularly parliamentary ones. The guest expressed his satisfaction with the fact that the Crimean government is appointed with the Ukrainian president's and the Crimean parlaiment's consent. Mr. Van Der Stoel expressed his interest in the drafting of the new Crimean constitution. Oleksandr Moroz informed his interlocutor that legislators from both Ukraine and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea are takinge part in the drafting of the constitution, which has already started. The head of the Ukrainian Supreme Council expressed his desire that the OSCE assist in drawing other countries into the process of repatriation and settlement of the deported nations in order to tie it to a legal and civilized regime.

Kiev Expects Clarification of Russian CIS Strategy

LD1909194995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1838 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Sept 19 (INTERFAX-UKRAINE) — Ukraine expects to receive official clarification of the Russian CIS strategic policy approved by Russian President Boris Yeltsin last week, Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk told a briefing in the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Tuesday.

He would not comment on the contents of the document but said that "any international body or organization can only develop when taking into consideration the will of all its members."

"It is difficult to imagine integration regulated by decrees of the head of just one member state," said Tarasyuk.

He said that Ukraine is studying Russia's position presented in the document. However, our activities will be guided by our national interests, he said.

Tarasyuk also said that NATO stated Monday it was prepared to make concessions to Ukraine and Russia on the issue of flank limits set by the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. However, he would not elaborate on the new proposals of the alliance.

Dual Use of BSF Arms Seen as Problem for CFE Treaty

LD1909174795 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1515 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Control over those conventional arms subject to reduction that are under the joint command of Ukraine and the Russian Federation as part of the Black Sea Fleet [BSF], presents a certain problem for Ukraine to comply with the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty. This was a statement made by Borys Tarasyuk, Ukrainian first deputy foreign minister at a ministry briefing on 19 September. He said that negotiations on the subject were under way. He expressed the hope that the matter would be settled by 17 November 1995.

Tarasyuk announced that on 18 September NATO had informed Ukraine's Foreign Ministry that it was ready to accept Ukrainian and Russian proposals on the issue. A solution to this problem, in Tarasyuk's view, will enable the sides to avoid complications and prevent violations by one of the treaty's member states.

Marchuk Sees Problems With Russia Beyond BSF

LD1909205695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1919 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Sept 19 (INTERFAX-UKRAINE) — Ukrainian Prime Minister Yevheniy Marchuk believes that the current problems in the relations between Russia and Ukraine are, to a great degree, the legacy of the common Soviet past.

Both countries have to clear the mess left from the times of the USSR, he told INTERFAX-UKRAINE in Kiev Tuesday. Marchuk stressed that the problems cannot be reduced to the Black Sea Fleet [BSF] alone, they affect bilateral economic relations as well. He characterized the development of ties between the two countries as "complex."

However, Marchuk expressed his confidence that the problems would not result in a conflict resulting in the deterioration of relations.

The Ukrainian prime minister believes that the two countries have traditionally had close economic ties. Direct cooperation between Ukrainian and Russian enterprises positively affects the countries' political relations, he said.

Marchuk said Ukraine is interested in the creation of joint financial-industrial groups. Industrial cooperation must have a positive effect on the relations between our two countries, he said.

Official: Ukraine Abiding by Arms Reduction Treaty

LD1909165495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1525 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Sept 19 (INTERFAX-Ukraine) — Ukraine is abiding strictly by its obligations under the Treaty on Reduction of Conventional Arms in Europe, staffer at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's Department for Control over Arms and Disarmament Alexander Bolshevtsev told INTERFAX-UKRAINE Tuesday.

Together with a Ukrainian delegation, Bolshevtsev attended a meeting of the Commonwealth Joint Consultative Committee for Disarmament on September 12-13 in Minsk.

According to the diplomat, Ukraine will reduce 1,974 tanks, 1,545 APCs and 550 combat planes by November 16.

"Under the Tashkent agreement of May 15, 1992, on procedure and principles of fulfillment of the Treaty on Reduction of Conventional Arms in Europe, Ukraine took additional obligations to reduce 271 tanks, 749 APCs and 208 artillery systems stationed on its territory," added the diplomat. He said it will be the armaments of the 126th coastal guard division and the 810th separate marine brigade of the Black sea fleet of the former Soviet Union.

"During the Minsk meeting, the Ukrainian delegation voiced its official concern that the latter obligation may not be fulfilled because of the unresolved problem of the Black sea fleet division," he noted.

Kiev To Seek Reduction in UN Contributions

LD1909171595 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1530 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] New York, [no dateline as received] — Anatoliy Zlenko, Ukraine's permanent representative at the United Nations, held a briefing that focused on "Ukraine's participation in the 50th anniversary of the UN General Assembly." The work of the Ukrainian delegation at the session will be aimed at resolving the most pressing issues for our state: reducing the excessive size of Ukraine's contributions to the UN budget — in particular, on conducting peacekeeping operations, regulating the debt problem, and resolving the issue of economic aid to third states (among them Ukraine) that are suffering losses because of the imposition of UN sanctions against Yugoslavia. The activity of the Ukrainian delegation will be aimed at invigorating international cooperation to overcome the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station.

Ukraine expects that its share of the UN debt will be written off or at least that the repayments will be postponed and that its contributions will be reduced by 200-300 percent, a level that will suit our economic possibilities.

Report Details Tripartite Cooperation Talks

AU2009075295 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 14 Sep 95 p 6

[Report by Natalya Filipchuk: "An Old Story, But the Ending May Be Different" — first paragraph is HOLOS UKRAYINY introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is not without reason that, since time immemorial, the digit "3" has been invested with some magic power. Just recall fairy tales that we have inherited form our ancestors — a trinity always figures in them: Once upon a time there lived an old man and an old woman and they had three sons.... One was bright, one was handsome, and the third, as turned out later, was fortunate....

It is unlikely that the three countries — Iran, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine — had spent much time on in-depth study of folklore before they decided to unite in this kind of economic alliance. However, if all dreams come true, results of their negotiations may be viewed as fantastic indeed.

Let me recall that the tripartite meeting was first held in April 1995 in Tehran. The foreign ministers there signed a tripartite memorandum on cooperation in accordance with which Ukraine undertook to supply to Iran mineral fertilizers and machine building products and to modernize metallurgical combines. Iran, in turn, promised to pay Ukrainian debts for gas to Turkmenistan.

The sides discussed this idea at their second meeting that was held in Ashgabat on 9 and 10 September. This time, the ministers signed a protocol on issues of trade and economic and investment cooperation between the three countries in accordance with which Ukraine will supply Iran with rails worth $10 million; Turkmenistan will enter this sum to Ukraine's bill for the natural gas supplied to our country. Iran will pay to Turkmenistan by financing the building on Turkmenistan territory of a highway between Ashgabat and Gok-dape. In short, everybody is pleased. The main thing is that, in this manner, Ukraine will be able to somehow improve the situation with the supply of energy sources. According to Yevhen Dovzhok, chairman of the State Committee for Oil and Gas Industry, who took part in the negotiations, Ukraine has been regularly paying for all current deliveries of Turkmenian gas. However, Akmamed Nurmamedov, Turkmenistan's deputy minister for oil and gas, said that, as of 1 September, Ukraine's debt to his country amounted to $195 million of which $115 million is the debt for the year 1994 and $80 million — for the current year.

To go beyond "barter" exchange, the sides have created an intergovernmental committee for cooperation and development of the tripartite trade and economic cooperation and agreed to sign a tripartite interbank agreement at their next meeting in Kiev. With regard to the latter agreement, Ukraine's Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko pointed out: "At this stage, the foreign ministers of the three countries have fulfilled their task successfully — they laid the foundation for a tripartite cooperation"; it is now up to specialists to strengthen these relations with actual deeds.

Incidentally, not just heads of external political departments met in Ashgabat. Moreover, according to Yevhen Mykytenko, deputy chief of the Administration in Charge of the Asian and Pacific Region, Near and Middle East, and Africa, the Foreign Ministry does not know the content of all projects that were discussed during talks at the level of ministries of industry, external economic ties, and others whose representatives took part in the meeting. This may be quite natural: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is paving the road. Apart from this, Hennadiy Udovenko also had to meet with his counterparts tete-a-tete to discuss prospects for bilateral cooperation. He was also received by Turkmenistan President Saparmurad Niyazov.

Thus, our fairy tale may have a different ending: The "brothers" decided to coexist on a brotherly basis, and all of them became bright, handsome, and, what is most important, fortunate.

Defense Minister Shmarov Leaves for Latvia

*LD1909165395 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1525 GMT 19 Sep 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Sept 19 (INTERFAX-UKRAINE) — Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov left on Tuesday for an official visit to Latvia.

Shmarov, who departed at 1:15 P.M., had to take a reserve aircraft after his Tupolev-134 lost both of its front landing wheels during takeoff but managed to land safely, the Defense Ministry press service informed INTERFAX-UKRAINE.

National Affairs

Kuchma: Draft Constitution Ready for Parliament

*LD1909204695 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1823 GMT 19 Sep 95*

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy, and edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Leonid Kuchma said on Monday [18 September] a draft for a new constitution would be ready to go into parliament next month.

This was "unanimously" decided by the Constitutional Commission on Monday, Kuchma told the commissioner for national minorities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Max van der Stoel, in Kiev.

"The Constitutional Commission once again confirmed the necessity to intensify the process," the president said.

There were "certain disagreements" among commission members, he said, but he expressed confidence that "the goal that has been set will be achieved."

Going over to the problem of the Crimean Tatars, an ethnic group which the Stalin regime deported from its native Crimea during World War Two, accusing it of collaboration with the Nazis, Kuchma said that on its own Ukraine would be unable to solve it. He said Tatars' return to their homeland should not be allowed to slip from under state control.

Van der Stoel agreed there was a need for international assistance. He said delaying the solution of the problem was leading to "the radicalization of some young Crimean Tatars."

The Constitutional Commission on Monday approved the main points in the preamble and first section (General Propositions) of the draft constitution and adopted a plan for its future work.

President Leonid Kuchma's chief of staff, Dmitro Tabachnyk, talking to reporters after the commission meeting, quoted the preamble as saying, in part: "We, the Ukrainian people, citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities, shall be the only source of power."

Commenting on the draft, he said that in it "the sovereign will of the people is qualified as the vehicle of Ukrainian statehood." But Ukrainian statehood should be seen "not as the result of the disintegration of the USSR but as the result of the sovereign expression by the Ukrainian people of their will."

"There is a constructive majority in the Constitutional Commission, since the principal decisions were passed by an overwhelming majority of votes," Tabachnyk said.

Parliamentary speaker Oleksandr Moroz, speaking at the commission sitting, called for "ensuring that the new constitution does not become the victory of one political power over another."

Commission member Fedor Burchak, the president's legal advisor, told reporters the meeting had decided a national referendum would be needed if "disputable points" arose during the discussion of the draft in parliament.

The next commission meeting, scheduled for October, is expected to consider a section on Ukrainian citizens' rights and duties and sections four and five on the country's legislative and executive branches of government.

Interview With First Deputy Prime Minister

AU2009081695 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 14 Sep 95 p 3

[Interview with Pavlo Ivanovych Lazarenko, Ukraine's newly appointed first deputy prime minister, by Tetyana Khomych; place and date not given: "Everything Is Decided by the People"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Lazarenko] Among priority branches, I also see metallurgy, chemistry, and machine building, but I am perfectly aware of the fact that we cannot do without a serious reorientation, restructuring, and technological modernization of these industries, with concurrent increase in their export potential and enhancement of the flexibility of the industries proper. We must resist unrestricted expansion of foreign products import into our country, because such expansion actually means support for commodity producers in other countries. Thus, the priorities also include a complex of measures for supporting those who manufacture high-quality and much needed products at home, in Ukraine, so that such products would increase in quantity and would be able to increasingly compete with products of corresponding foreign firms. Knowing the potential for our economy, I am convinced that even though these tasks are far from being simple, they are realistic from the point of view of their positive resolution. Steps in this direction will be described more specifically after the program for the new government's activity is adopted in the course of practical work on resolving the entire complex of economic problems.

[Khomych] Not just economic matters will become object for your immediate attention in the capacity of first deputy prime minister. In particular, won't you change your views regarding powers of regions that you believe need to be granted on a large scale, including issues of financial and investment policy? On the other hand, what will be the determining priorities at the macrolevel? Also, will all those valuable achievements that you managed to accomplish in the Dnieper Region be raised to the level of state policy?

[Lazarenko] You forget one important detail: The talk of extensive powers for regions was only in the context of ensuring priority given to state interests in the activity of their executive structures. I do not think that my views on this will now change. In a state's economic nature, one can clearly discern a chain in which strong individual farmers make up a village and a rayon; strong rayons and towns constitute a region, and so on. However, there cannot be a reverse situation in which the state is strong, but everything else is collapsing.

In regard to my position on other issues that we will have to deal with, my convictions also remain stable. I will say straightaway: I am not an advocate of poor discipline and I am prepared to adopt decisions that will be able to fundamentally influence resolution of particular problems and after such decisions are adopted, I will strictly control their fulfillment. Who talks about reforms, if it is impossible to achieve proper coordination in the actions of the executive hierarchy? The factor of personal responsibility for the state of affairs in the given sphere is becoming the highest priority in our state's present situation. Besides, nobody demands that everybody blindly fulfill the state programs drafted at the top. No. There are things where no economic declarations can achieve what depends exclusively upon a person and his abilities and talent and upon how this chore appeals to his own heart, is seen in detail without any instructions from above, and is prompted by his conscience.

The major point is that nobody will do anything on our behalf. Nobody will transform Ukraine into a prosperous European country, and nobody will take care of veterans or disabled people who presently badly need social protection and attention on the part of the state and its local bodies of power. Let us, all of us, be specific and responsible in this work. As for problems at the macrolevel, they are at the surface — we need to find markets for exporting our national products and we need serious and long-term work with foreign investors, who will come to Ukraine, but on the condition that we prove by our actions, laws, and so on that we need this in the first place and that we are interested in this.

Nationalist Congress Convenes in Lvov

AU2009100895 Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU in Ukrainian 14 Sep 95 p 1

[Report by unidentified ZA VILNU UKRAYINU correspondent: "A New Periodical of Nationalists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last Tuesday [12 September], the leadership of the Lvov Oblast Organization of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists [KUN] held a news conference and presented the organization's newspaper NATSIYA I DERZHAVA [The Nation and the State] in the Lvov Palace for Festivities. Among the participants in the news conference, which dealt with the results of the KUN's second meeting in Kiev were Ivan Hubka, chairman of the KUN Lvov Oblast Organization; his deputy Myroslav Panchuk; head of the secretariat Yuriy Antonyak; and heads of sections — Mariya Bazelyuk from the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations and Yaroslav Yanchak — in charge of the social policy section.

The participants in the news conference learned in greater detail about the Ukrainian nationalists' new publication and about its tasks and plans for the future.

Socialists Oppose Cabinet Line, Urge Changes

WS2009101895 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 13 Sep 95 p 7

[Statement by the Ukrainian Supreme Council' Socialist Faction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The fourth session of the Ukrainian Supreme Council started on 5 September 1995. In terms of the number of issues submitted for discussion, as well as in terms of their importance and weight, the session will take a special place in the lawmaking process. It may take that place if the work of deputy factions and groups, Supreme Council commissions, and of the entire deputies' corps is constructive, goal-oriented, and painstaking.

Among the most important issues that require comprehensive drafting and urgent discussion is a package of economic issues, the problems of reforming the legal system, granting the most favored status to domestic producers, and eliminating the conditions for illegal profiteering of shadow economy dealers.

The complex of social issues awaits decisive and productive actions, including: legislation on pensions, which should be just, adequate with people's labor contribution, and commensurate with the actual costs of living; a system of additional allowances and subsidies, which should serve as a real system of protection against pricing banditry, and not as a fig leaf to cover the thievish nakedness of inefficient reformers; a system of benefits and compensation for the handicapped, orphans, and families that have many children; and a system for supporting the young generation, in particular students and pupils, as well as the intelligentsia, women, and war or labor veterans.

The supreme legislative and representative body cannot turn a deaf ear to the people's voice, given that it was elected by the entire nation and is comprised of deputies who currently have to withstand the storm of indignation on the part of their electorate — who blame the deputies for their miserable lives, which deteriorate on a daily basis. Although the adoption of the illegal Constitutional Agreement gave unlimited and virtually uncontrolled powers to the president and the populous army of bureaucrats, and at the same time fenced the Supreme Council from the real process of exerting influence on the activities of the executive power, we cannot behave passively in what concerns a further disastrous production decline, the catastrophic lowering of the living standards of an overwhelming majority of people, uncontrollable price increases, and the reign of profiteering, bribery, and thievery.

The Supreme Council's intentions to work constructively may be nullified if the activities of executive structures remain amorphous, non-systematic, and lack elementary professionalism. The point is that while urging the need for an expeditious adoption of, for instance, the package of economic laws, the Cabinet of Ministers has not submitted to this day more than half of the envisioned bills (162 out of 315 have not been submitted). In particular, we still do not have the program of the government's activities. The following bills have not been submitted for the Supreme Council's discussion: "On improving enterprises' situation," "On land lease," "On establishing special (free) economic zones," "On state-owned enterprises," "On managing the state-run economic sector," "On reprivatization (nationalization)," "On prices and pricing in the agro-industrial complex," "On Ukraine's national foreign debt," and many other legal acts which we badly need.

It should be pointed out that in accordance with the existing legislation and the budget resolution passed by the Supreme Council, as early as mid-September the president was to have submitted the draft budget for 1996 for the parliament's approval. This time frame has already been violated. Our faction has repeatedly declared its standpoint with regard to the budget, which was drafted in the past and is being drafted now exclusively to please the IMF. That kind of budget is destructive for Ukraine's economy and social sphere. It is another result of the fact that the government has failed to present the Supreme Council with its taxation policy concept.

Unfortunately, neglect of people's basic social rights continues. Taking advantage of the fact that the Supreme Council is currently devoid of its constitutional right to appoint the prime minister and seven ministers (this has been unilaterally done by the president), the government is hampering the enactment of the principal sections of Ukraine's Law "On Labor Remuneration." Sections 9, 33, and 34 have been excluded from the law, although they determine the minimum wages and regulate the issues of indexation or the compensations of losses caused by untimely payments of wages. In the same manner the government hampers the actual application of Ukraine's Law "On the Subsistence Level," given that the monetary expression of the subsistence level was not determined in accordance with consumption norms. The government has not submitted its social policy concept for the Supreme Council's discussion, nor the bills "On unemployment insurance for citizens" and "On indexation of citizens' deposits (in the Savings Bank and Ukraine's Insurance Company)."

Someone must find it advantageous to create gaps in the lawmaking process and put the blame on the Supreme Council. Was it not the absence of a law "On the system of hard currency regulation" which produced the recent currency boom — which had an evidently criminal implication? Within a day or so, the dollar exchange rate went up from 150,000 karbovantsi [K] to K230,000-240,000. At the same time, the National Bank pretends that nothing has happened, although in Russia a similar situation caused the removal of the chief banker and a number of ministers.

Meanwhile, according to certain estimates, the National Bank has thrown away around $400 million to buy more than K60 trillion. The question arises: Did the state not need that colossal sum in hard currency, and in whose pockets is that money now? This is one thing. If the Treasury has received such a great influx of karbovantsi purchased for dollars, where has this money been invested? How does it work for the sake of the economy and the national budget?

Unfortunately, under the current absence of state control, it is not easy to find answers to those questions. The Ukrainian Supreme Council's socialist faction demands that an investigation be conducted and persons guilty of the aforementioned antistate deeds be prosecuted. The same measures should be applied to those who caused an artificial hike in prices for oil products, or another increase of municipal rates.

All this occurs when entire regions do not have electric energy, when hot water has been cut off in many cities, when a number of oblasts and the Crimea have faced a serious disturbance in the schooling process during the winter. The sowing campaign, in fact, has been upset, too, and there is a danger of losing next year's harvest.

It should be pointed out that for those kinds of antipopular activities the Supreme Council expressed lack of confidence in the former government. Unfortunately, the president then appointed the same masters of destruction to the high ministerial posts — which probably is meant to demonstrate that those leaders are leading Ukraine along the right path.

Social and economic problems can only be resolved in close connection with political issues. The drafting of Ukraine's constitution should be accelerated, and its basic tenets should be approved at a Ukraine-wide referendum (which would abolish the illegal Constitutional Agreement). A new democratic electoral law should be passed which would facilitate the filling of vacant seats in the Supreme Council. We should also resolve the issue of those people's deputies who work in executive bodies.

Our faction has its own basic drafts and proposals on each one of these issues, as well as its own vision of the ways to overcome the crisis. We are ready for a fruitful cooperation with all the forces in Ukraine's legislature, with all the branches of power, given that work will be conducted within the legal framework and will be aimed at the Ukrainian people's well-being.

Socialist deputies believe that the following measures should be undertaken to overcome the crisis situation:

1. The Ukrainian president should rescind the Constitutional Agreement and, aware of the fact that he is the guarantor of the existing Constitution, should embark on the path of building a law- governed state, whose basic principle should be the supremacy of the law.

2. In accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution:

— the Constitutional Court should be established;
— the Supreme Council should approve candidates for prime minister and key governmental posts and discuss their programs;
— the 1996 budget should be submitted for discussion by the Supreme Council within a timeframe envisioned by the law and should include a taxation policy, which would stimulate the growth of domestic production and protect the interests of a majority of the population;
— the IMF's recommendations and credits should be rejected and the government, along with the Supreme Council, should pass a program of economic reform and economic management for the sake of national interests.

Socialists are ready for fruitful work in the Supreme Council and for constructive cooperation with the

Ukrainian president, given that they will be based on the aforementioned principles.

Signed by Socialist Faction Head Ivan Chyzh.

Faction Makes Proposals to Parliament

954F3395A Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 6 Sep 95 p 3

["Declaration of the Independence Deputy Group on the Opening of the Fourth Session of the Supreme Council of Ukraine"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dear colleagues, deputies!

Our dear voters!

The fourth session of the Supreme Council of Ukraine is beginning its work under conditions marked by a deepening crisis in the country and a catastrophic decline in the living standard of the people of Ukraine. Despite the recently ratified Constitutional Agreement, there is still no constructive collaboration between the legislative and executive authorities. Intercongregational differences are acquiring an explosive nature. We hope that the new state program will turn out to be understandable to every person of labor and, by contrast with the six previous ones, in the end will determine concrete ways of resolving the crisis in Ukraine.

On the sociopolitical and economic level, the autumn and winter period will be one of the decisive periods in the life of the government. Either we will find ourselves capable of ensuring radical changes in the reformation of the economy, or we will again lose precious time. In that case, the very existence and development of the Ukrainian state will be placed in jeopardy.

Proceeding from that, the constitutional process requires immediate acceleration, primarily development of a draft of the new constitution of Ukraine. Creation of the Constitutional Court, which is called upon to be the arbiter with regard to questions of state building, is being delayed.

The Independence [Nezalezhni] deputy group repeatedly focused the attention of people's deputies and the leadership of the Supreme Council of Ukraine on the need for radical changes in the style and methods of work by the highest state legislative organ. Today we are also insisting on rotation of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

The operation of permanent commissions also calls for radical reorganization. We have stood and now stand for their creation not in accordance with the branch, but the functional principle. First, this will allow organization of the work in accordance with lawmaking priorities, which is extremely important today. Secondly, such an approach will make it possible to get rid of lobbying in parliament, which only leads to an increase in the state budget deficit.

Objectively evaluating the distribution of political forces in the Supreme Council, our Independence deputy group is convinced that the only realistic alternative today, capable of unifying the corps of deputies and allowing its lawmaking work to be productive, is the creation of a centrist block on the basis of which it would be possible to form a parliamentary majority, so necessary within that higher legislative organ.

The first step in that direction has already been taken. The Independence and Interregional [Mizhregionalna] deputy groups and the Stability [Stabilnist] deputy association are evidence of the promising nature of such an initiative. We are once again calling on our colleagues in the Agrarians for Reform [Agrarnyky za reformi], Center [Tsentr], Agrarians of Ukraine [Agrarnyky Ukrainy], and Unity [Yednist] deputy groups as well as others, to unify their efforts in the name of constructive legislative work in parliament.

While evaluating our work in a critical manner, at the same time we cannot avoid expressing our indignation with the intentional compromising of the higher representative organ of the government by the mass media.

The Independence deputy group believes that under the conditions in which the powers of legislative and executive organs of power are determined by the Constitutional Agreement, the Supreme Council of Ukraine, along with its legislative activity, must intensify its monitoring functions, particularly in the exercise of constant control over progress in fulfillment of the budget and the adopted ruling decisions.

In connection with the fact that the fourth session of the Supreme Council of Ukraine is just starting its work, we are submitting for your consideration, esteemed deputies, a number of important points, implementation of which will determine the effectiveness of all of our work in the future.

First. Carry out a study of draft legislation prepared by the permanent commissions of the Supreme Council together with the government, and on a priority basis bring those draft laws to the attention of the session whose adoption will determine the rates of reform, while also not forgetting their social cost.

Second. Conduct a study of the feasibility of numerous permanent commissions of the Supreme Council with an eye to eliminating duplication and parallelism in their work, cutting down expenditures on their maintenance, and establishing that permanent commissions of parliament must be created on the basis not of the branch but the functional principle. Carry out radical rotation of commission chairmen, and, finally, create a Control Chamber of the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

Third. Increase the number of deputy chairmen of the Supreme Council, in accordance with the Constitutional Agreement, which will make it possible to include representatives of various political groups in the top echelon of leadership. This will promote the process of their consolidation. We propose a vote of confidence in the current composition of deputy chairmen of the Supreme Council.

Fourth. Make the final formation of the Constitutional Court a priority assignment of the Supreme Council of Ukraine. Submit the draft of the new Ukrainian constitution to the all-Ukraine referendum no later than April 1996.

Fifth. We are proposing that the president and the Supreme Council simultaneously repeal previously adopted decisions on the question of removal and appointment of the general procurator and, on the recommendation of the president, confirm a new general procurator of Ukraine.

Sixth. We recommend that before the adoption of the new constitution, political, religious and other issues, consideration of which may electrify the situation in the country and disrupt harmony in society, not be submitted for consideration at the Supreme Council session.

Finally. The Independence deputy group proposes the elimination of live radio and television broadcasting from the session hall of the Supreme Council, with the exception of individual questions which are echoed in public opinion. In each specific case this must be determined by special decision reached at a session of the Supreme Council.

Taking into account that proposals submitted by us affect group, faction, as well as the personal interests of those present in this hall to a varying degree, we insist on individual voting on each of these proposals.

For the Independence Deputy Group:

[Signed] V. Getman, V. Seminozhenko, V. Landyk, V. Pekhota
5 September 1995

Legislature Finds Prosecutor General Unfit for Post

AU2009075695 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 15 Sep 95 p 2

["Ukraine's Supreme Council Decree on Ukraine's Prosecutor General" issued in Kiev on 13 September]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukraine's Supreme Council, after it considered the results of work of a special deputies investigations commission on the activity of Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office, found V.V. Datsyuk's further tenure in the post of Ukraine's Prosecutor General impossible.

Proceeding from this, Ukraine's Supreme Council resolves as follows:

To suggest that the Ukrainian president submit for Ukraine's Supreme Council consideration his proposal regarding Ukraine's Prosecutor General in accordance with Paragraph 12 of Article 24 of Ukraine's law "On State Power and Local Self-Government in Ukraine."

[Signed] O. Moroz, chairman of Ukraine's Supreme Council
[Dated] Kiev, 13 September 1995

Article on Deep Space Communications Center

WS1909145695 Kiev URYADOVVY KURYER in Ukrainian 14 Sep 95 p 7

[Article by Academician Yaroslav Yatskiv, Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences: "A Glimpse Of Space From Yevpatoria"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Deep Space Communications Center [TsDKZ] is located near Yevpatoria and is part of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Main Center for Testing and Utilizing Space Systems [HTs VVKS]. This center is now called the "western" one. There are also the eastern (in Ussuriysk, Russia) and the central centers (in Shcholkovo, close to Moscow). On the one hand, the size of this facility and its electronic equipment produce an impression: The TsDKZ in Yevpatoria is equipped with antennas that have 70-meter and 32-meter mirrors; the equipment to receive and track signals from space apparatuses and measure trajectories; equipment to process command and program information; and other means of ground space infrastructure. On the other hand, before the collapse of the USSR it was clear that promising space programs required that Soviet centers for deep space communications, including the one in Yevpatoria, be considerably modernized.

Due to the current complicated economic situation in Ukraine, political and certain ambitious obstacles between Ukraine and Russia in jointly utilizing the

Yevpatoria center, its full modernization has become practically impossible, even though the interests of space require this. The point is that the center deals with particularly complex and crucial space activities which can be only performed by highly qualified experts. Several years of intense work and training are needed to train graduates of colleges and universities for this line of work.

Despite all our hardships, there are still experts in Yevpatoria. First of all, there are military scientific-technical staff of the HTs VVKS and other institutions of Ukraine; highly qualified experts of the Lavochkin Scientific Production Association and the Scientific Research Institute of Space Instrument Making [NDI KP] in Moscow. There are two Ukrainian-Russian joint ventures which make it possible to implement Russian and Ukrainian space programs and act as a kind of interface between the aforementioned organizations.

What makes one be on the alert?

Until now, it has not been finally specified to whom the HTs VVKS should be accountable. The planned 30-percent reduction in its staff could trigger unforeseen consequences. The categoric refusal by the Command of the Russian Military Space Forces to cooperate on a large scale with their Ukrainian colleagues affects the moral state of certain servicemen. There are no interstate acts to regulate relations between Ukraine and Russia in utilizing the Yevpatoria center (a kind of balance is being provided due to the friendly relations between researchers of various Ukrainian and Russian institutions).

Why does Russia need the western TsDKZ?

By declaring the concept of creating a self-sufficient space state, Russia is striving to create all elements of space infrastructure on its own territory. In Russia, however, they realize that the implementation of such international space programs as "Interball," "MARS-96," and "Spectrum" (Russia inherited this legacy of the former USSR) is impossible without the utilization of the Yevpatoria center. Ukraine also participates in these projects to a certain extent. This is what specifies the policy of the Russian Space Agency toward the TsDKZ in Yevpatoria and its wish to preserve its presence there (by the way, the current functioning of the TsDKZ in Yevpatoria at full scale is impossible without the Lavochkin Scientific Production Association and the NDI KP).

What does Ukraine want?

There are plans to establish a center to oversee flights, a ground complex to guide space apparatuses, and a center to collect and process scientific information provided by various space projects (interstate and national space research programs) based on the Ukrainian Defense Ministry HTs VVKS.

Preparations to guide the "Sich" satellite are currently taking place in Yevpatoria. The posters on the TsDKZ first site remind one about the fact that "Sich" is the first Ukrainian satellite." By the way, one of the tasks of launching the "Sich-1" lies precisely in creating a national space infrastructure and learning how space data is processed.

What are the prospects for this?

We are waiting for the government and researchers to answer this question. The issue is complicated and pressing. There are proposals to make the HTs VVKS accountable to the Ukrainian National Space Agency, which is responsible for the implementation of the Ukrainian space program; to grant the HTs VVKS the status of an international center by attracting other states — in addition to Russia — to its activities; and to utilize this center to carry out space and ground astronomic research. By the way, during my stay in Yevpatoria, French experts worked with their equipment on board the "Hranat" [as transliterated] satellite.

Official Justifies Selling Space Control Facilities

AU2009080195 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 16 Sep 95 p 5

[Unattributed report: "'Kosmonavt Gagarin' and 'Akademik Korolev' Will Be Sold by Auction"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The leadership of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense is planning to sell two marine command and survey space facilities — vessels 'Kosmonavt Gagarin' [Cosmonaut Gagarin] and 'Akademik Korolev' [Academician Korolev] that Ukraine received after the former USSR property was divided, the INTERFAX-UKRAYINA Agency was told by Major General Valeriy Lytvynov, head of the Administration for Space Missile Weapons at Ukraine's Defense Ministry during a recent briefing at the Press Service of Ukraine's Defense Ministry.

According to him, the country is unable to finance the maintenance of these facilities. Apart from this, pointed out the general, "the licenses for the vessels 'Kosmonavt Gagarin' and 'Akademik Korolev' have expired, and for that reason they cannot sail into the sea."

Repairs of the vessels would have cost Ukraine $8 million.

According to Lytvynov, Ukraine does not have groupings of space devices "that these vessels might be needed to service."

Proposals have been sent to potential buyers, and the Defense Ministry "already has information that these vessels may be purchased." V. Lytvynov stated that if these vessels are purchased for scrap, "Kosmonavt Gagarin" with the displacement tonnage of 45,000 metric tons may fetch $3 million and the "Akademik Korolev" with the displacement tonnage of 25,000 metric tons — $1.5 million. He also said that Russia is not interested in purchasing them, because it also plans to sell two out of the four such vessels that have remained after the disintegration of the USSR.

After the division of the former USSR property, the general said, Ukraine also received the main Center for Testing and Utilization of Equipment in Feodosiya that includes three surface command and survey facilities — in Yevpatoriya, Simferopol, and Dunayivtsi.

Economic Issues

Official on Monetary Reform, Says IMF Favors Kiev

AU1909123095 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 13 Sep 95 p 3

[Interview with Serhiy Teryokhin, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Fund for Promoting Reforms, by UNIAR correspondent Tetyana Yivzhenko from Moscow "specially for HOLOS UKRAYINY"; date not given: "Ukraine Is a Model for IMF Ideas" — first two paragraphs published in a box]

[FBIS Translated Text] A Ukrainian Supreme Council delegation paid a visit to the Russian Federation State Duma. Vice Premier Viktor Pynzenyk, head of the Ukrainian delegation, together with the organizers of the meeting — i.e. "Russia's Choice" faction headed by Yegor Gaydar — held a one-day conference on issues involving development of the economic and political situation in the two countries.

Your correspondent used this opportunity and turned to Serhiy Teryokhin, Ukrainian people's deputy and deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Fund for Promoting Reforms, with a request to comment upon the results of the meeting.

[Teryokhin] This is not our first meeting with "Russia's Choice" — we already met in Kiev in May 1995. The main goal of our meetings is to exchange information on laws that have been adopted and on the ideology of economic reforms in Russia and in Ukraine. We have drawn numerous useful and interesting conclusions from our initial meetings. As a result of our discussions, a bill has already been drafted in Russia concerning changes in the systems of agrarian purchases, in keeping with what we worked out in Ukraine. In our country, on the other hand, the ideas of Chubays [Russia's first deputy prime minister] concerning the registration of ownership rights to a part or a share of privatized enterprises have been incorporated in the new privatization concept that will, hopefully, be adopted as early as at the forthcoming session of the Ukrainian parliament, perhaps within a month.

[Yivzhenko] Could you make a comparison between the economic situation in the Russian Federation and in Ukraine?

[Teryokhin] From geoeconomic and geopolitical points of view, Russian reforms are very similar to Ukrainian reforms. However, it is difficult to compare the economic situations in the two states. A smaller country is easier to run. Consequently, in the course of the last six months, remarkably successful progress has been made in macroeconomic reforms in Ukraine, reforms that have left Russia far behind where budgetary and monetary discipline is concerned. In Russia, more progress has been made with regard to structural changes, privatization, civil code addressing protection of the rights of the owner, stock market, and so on.

[Yivzhenko] You assess the Ukrainian economic reform as highly positive, yet as we all know, Ukraine, unlike Russia, has problems with obtaining the next IMF credit installment.

[Teryokhin] A month ago I worked for one week with the International Monetary Fund, and one of the IMF directors told me that Ukraine is a model for ideas that the IMF wants to implement in Eastern European countries. They wanted to make Ukraine a shining example. The IMF attitude toward Russia is different. Should we, like Russians, say that we want to allow inflation to remain within seven to eight percent a month, the IMF would be against it, even though it does not object to such inflation in Russia. The IMF has never had any serious problems with Ukraine. I think that this first delay (which is perfectly justified) is due to the fact that there was a covert attempt to spend the credit money on financing individual branches of the economy.

[Yivzhenko] What, do you think, are the reasons for the recent drastic fall in the Ukrainian karbovanets exchange rate?

[Teryokhin] Unlike Russia, Ukraine did not have a "black Tuesday," but a "black week," as the exchange rate was gradually falling throughout that week. I do not agree with Vice Premier Viktor Pynzenyk, who believes that the "black week" was caused primarily by speculations around the monetary reform. Looking at the dynamics of daily growth of the money supply and following the issue of credits, one can see that precisely one week later, after the IMF issued two credit installments that were used to pay miners their salaries, inflation occurred on the ledger currency market. In my opinion this is due to the fact that the government lacks macroeconomic discipline.

With regard to the hryvnya, the following opinion has been expressed: Let us first stabilize the economy and only then introduce the hryvnya. Yet, if the economy has stabilized, why should a new currency be introduced? It may simply be possible to have a devaluation, the way it was done with the zloty in Poland. The idea of implementing the hryvnya-based reform is to change the central principles of currency and budgetary regulations, relations between the National Bank and the Ministry of Finance, as well as the methods of covering the budget deficit. The documents for this reform are ready.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize that we will oppose any attempts to carry out a monetary reform that will involve confiscation.

Delegation Discusses Investment Projects With UNIDO

WS1909130995 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 18 Sep 95

[Video report by P. Skrypin and O. Oliynyk]

[FBIS Translated Text] Active preparations are under way for holding in January 1996 under the United Nations' auspices the investment forum called "Investment Projects in Ukraine." International experts of the UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization] continue work in Ukraine's regions to draft investment projects, which will then be presented at the forum.

A Ukrainian governmental delegation led by Mykola Portnoy, first deputy minister of machine building, the military industrial complex, and conversion, recently visited Vienna. The Ukrainian delegation held a meeting with UNIDO General Director Mauricio de Maria Campas.

[Begin Campas recording in English with superimposed translation in Ukrainian] Polls recently conducted in the world by UNIDO indicate that interest in Ukraine has significantly increased, that is, in the immediate future we should anticipate expanding cooperation and new investments. [end recording]

The results of the meeting are more than pleasant for Ukraine. Mr. Campas will visit Kiev in the spring 1996 to discuss issues of attracting investments into Ukraine's economy.

[Begin Deputy Finance Minister Borys Sobolyev recording] The participation of Austrian investors, as well as investors from other states who act under UNIDO auspices will help us give another impetus to attracting investments in the development of Ukraine's economy. [end recording]

According to Serhiy Pachkovskyy, head of the Kiev-based Vienna Ukrainian-Austrian forum, a series of investment conferences are to be held in 1996 in six regions of Ukraine, and an office of the UNIDO Investments Service will open in Kiev.

[Begin Deputy Economy Minister Anatoliy Danylenko recording] To be a successful competitor in the international arena, the state must have the newest technologies. We need both time and money to achieve this. The Ministry of Economy has selected around 2,000 facilities that need foreign investment. The aggregate worth of those facilities exceeds $400 billion. [end recording]

There are all grounds to hope for the better, given that UNIDO's methodology for drafting investments projects is widely commended in the world, particularly by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

New Law Would Take All Foreign-Currency Earnings

MM2009092695 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Sep 95

[INTERFAX report: "Ukraine Wants to Introduce 100-Percent Mandatory Sale of Foreign Exchange By Exporters" — from the "Financial IZVESTIYA" section, p. i]

[FBIS Translated Text] The draft new law "On Foreign-Currency Regulation" envisages the 100-percent mandatory sale of foreign exchange received by Ukrainian exporters. It has become known that the draft envisages certain exceptions to this rule — particularly for banking, nontrade-related, and a number of other operations. Currently 50 percent of exporters' foreign-exchange earnings have to be compulsorily sold in accordance with the existing Cabinet of Ministers decree "On Foreign-Currency Regulation."

Introduction of New National Currency Postponed

LD1909141595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1345 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By Mikhail Melnik]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, September 19 (ITAR-TASS) — The introduction of a new new national currency, the hryvnya, which was planned for October has been adjourned for an unspecified time.

However, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk, who is chairman of the Pecuniary Reform Commission, assured the population that the time of the hryvnya's advent would be announced two months beforehand.

They said the pecuniary reform would not have a confiscating character, for which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is pressing.

ITAR-TASS was told in the Ukrainian parliament today that the question of the reform is likely to be raised after a new composition of the government is approved, presumably in the end of this week.

Experts say the delay in adopting the new tender by Ukraine is related to its inability to meet the IMF's terms for issuing a loan to Ukraine.

The Ukrainian leadership is not outspoken on the problem, although recent speeches by Kuchma and Marchuk are suggestive of it.

The IMF, on whose loan Ukraine is much dependent in its reforms, set as a condition that the pecuniary reform be parallelled by curbing inflation to a monthly one-two per cent and by financial stabilisation.

According to the government, Ukraine needs at least three billion U.S. dollars to set up a stabilisation fund. Two billion dollars are available. The IMF had promised but so far made no specific decision to lend Ukraine the third billion.

Experts reckon that the "reticence" of the IMF is related to the fact that Ukraine's August and September inflation rate was above 10 per cent, while the macroeconomic stabilisation programme, watched by the IMF, has been lagging far beyond schedule.

Economists say another snag might be the new course of market reforms which has been announced by Kuchma at a recent conference of Ukraine' economists.

Kuchma defined it as a state-regulated, socially oriented market economy.

Kuchma's views of the development model are shared by the left-wing parliamentary majority led by parliament chairman Aleksandr Moroz.

Their stance is the pecuniary reform is out of question until social welfare is adequately provided by the state.

Meanwhile, the construction of a money storage site is drawing nearer the end in Kiev's neighbourhood of Toryevshchina.

Hryvnyas are coming off the presses at a mint located nearby.

Program To Boost Gold Output Almost Ready

MM2009094295 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Sep 95

[EKOTASS report: "Ukraine Developing Program To Boost Gold Production" — from the "Financial IZVESTIYA" section p ii]

[FBIS Translated Text] The drawing up of the "Ukrainian Gold" program, which will be ratified by the Cabinet of Ministers in September, is virtually complete. Five promising fields have now been identified in the center of the country — two each in Dnipropetrovsk and Kirovohrad Oblasts, and one in Odessa Oblast. The Transcarpathian gold fields are considered the state's largest. According to specialists, Ukraine intends to increase gold production to 15 tonnes a year over the next 10-12 years. Implementation of this program will require funding of around $250 million.

Belarus

Belarusian, Russian Foreign Ministers on Military Blocs

WS1909123695 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian 15 Sep 95 pp 1,8

[Article by Valyantsin Zhdanko: "The Balkan War Echoed in Belarus"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Belarus has unintentionally gotten caught up in the political tension connected with the deterioration of the Yugoslav conflict and NATO's military operations against the Bosnian Serbs.**

[Belarusian] President Alyaksandr Lukashenka addressed this issue last week, on a visit to Moldova. This was followed by a harsh statement by our Foreign Ministry, condemning NATO's bombardment and calling for a peaceful settlement of the problem.

Finally, on 13 September, at the invitation of his Russian counterpart Andrey Kozyrev, Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Syanko paid a working visit to Moscow, where this issue is also being actively discussed.

Did President Lukashenka really call for the establishment of a new military-political bloc, which would again divide the world into two hostile camps, as the press reported? Here is how Uladzimir Syanko explained the president's statement during his Moscow visit:

I personally heard his statement at Chisinau Airport, and I can confirm that the media have distorted it. He said that events similar to those in Bosnia could not have taken place 10-15 years ago, since there was a different security configuration and a different correlation of forces. And, naturally, he regretted the bombardments, and supported the idea of resolving this conflict in a peaceful manner. We regret the fact that such rumors and false reports appear from time to time. I can confirm that there was no direct statement calling for the establishment of a new military- political bloc.

Has Belarus sensed the West's reaction to its course toward rapprochement with Russia, and how has this reaction been received in Belarus?

[Syanko] Yes, we have sensed a certain reaction by our Western partners. I would term it a very restrained reaction. I am convinced, however, that history will return everything to its place. We will display the required restraint and consistency in this regard. We expect that the level of our relations with Western countries is high enough. In the immediate future we are going to sign a temporary agreement with the EU after concluding a framework agreement. Still, a certain reaction has been sensed. [end Syanko]

In this regard, Andrey Kozyrev added the following:

"This is a recurrence of confrontational thinking. The rapprochement between Belarus and Russia, as well as the integration processes within the CIS in general, contribute to European stability and the security of the entire continent. Imagine what could happen if events in our countries proceeded according to the Yugoslav scenario — an "all out" war instead of rapprochement. There is a strange thing: The West is claiming that it wants to end the confrontation between the former Yugoslav republics, and at the same time certain forces are against the integration of former Soviet republics. The existence of the CIS and the rapprochement among former Soviet republics contributes to worldwide security."

Boris Yeltsin, too, recently addressed the possibility and threat of dividing the world into two camps. Seemingly, his warning urged the Belarusian president to make the corresponding statement. Nonetheless, the talk about a new Eastern bloc significantly alarmed the West. Here is how the Russian foreign minister commented on these rumors and talk:

"As everybody knows, an agreement on collective security was concluded within the CIS framework. At the latest 'summit,' we signed a hefty package of documents clarifying its construction — this refers to a concept, main principles, and structure. I can recall President Yeltsin's address, at the Budapest meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in which he clearly said that we do not want to set up a closed military bloc which would oppose the rest of the world. The sense of our military and political cooperation with CIS countries (with both those which are members of the Collective Security Council and those which are not) is to resolve common tasks aimed at strengthening the security of our states and realizing our interests. To put it another way, this cooperation is not against somebody, but for something. There is a positive attitude, and not a hostile one. President Yeltsin's warning, voiced during one of his latest news conferences, that if certain forces will direct European events along new division lines — closed military-political groupings — confrontation between blocs may resume, was another thing. This by no means is our goal or choice. This is a warning about a threat. This resembles the president's warning voiced in Budapest about the possibility of 'cold peace' — though it does not mean that we want it, but just the contrary, that we are against it.

"...Currently, we have the same situation. A new division into blocs must be prevented. Thus, both sides must correct their behavior and take into account the fact that they have a different task. Should we set up a new military-political bloc? But it would be simply ridiculous to give up the Warsaw Pact, which enveloped half of the world, to create a new grouping, when it is still unclear who would join it. The task is to create a new model of common security in Europe.... This model is currently being developed. In this regard, we are cooperating very closely with our Belarusian colleagues. During today's talks, we once again attached priority attention to the possibility of Russian and Belarusian diplomats contributing to the implementation of this choice."

In general, Uladzimir Syanko's visit to Moscow confirmed that there is a full mutual understanding between the two ministers. Andrey Kozyrev called the Belarusian minister his personal friend in front of journalists.

Uladzimir Syanko and Andrey Kozyrev did not talk at a negotiating table, but informally, even at a tennis court.

At the concluding news conference, the inefficient implementation of existing economic agreements was named as one of the difficulties of Belarusian-Russian relations. They also announced the beginning of preparations for the Belarusian president's visit to Moscow.

General Portnov Confirms Arms Destruction To Resume

WS2009101595 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0700 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belarus will resume in the immediate future destruction of its weapons as part of the CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Treaty which was suspended primarily because of lack of funds. This is what Major General Yuriy Portnov, assistant to the Belarusian defense minister, told a RIA-NOVOSTI correspondent. In the words of Portnov, the plants engaged in scrapping tanks, armored personnel carriers, and aircraft have received from abroad special equipment and materials for this purpose. The United States and Germany allocated substantial financial aid for the Republic. The deadline for the Belarusian side to fulfill its agreed upon commitments was set for 17 November 1995.

Premier Assures 'Balloon' Commission Full Access

WS2009085495 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0700 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A number of foreign publications have recently expressed doubts concerning the intentions of the Belarusian official authorities in holding a thorough and complete investigation into the circumstances that led to the tragic air accident over Belarusian territory on 12 September which claimed the lives of two U.S. citizens. In this connection, a BELINFARM correspondent turned to the Belarusian prime minister for explanations. Here is what Mikhail Chyhir said about this issue:

With the sincere intention of conducting a comprehensive investigation into all the circumstances surrounding the incident in the Belarusian airspace, the Belarusian leadership decided to urgently initiate work in conjunction with the state commission examining causes of the air accident and a relevant commission of international experts. The international commission comprises experienced and renowned specialists from the United States, Germany, and the CIS Inter-State Aviation Committee. An invitation to participate in the commission's work has been sent to Polish aviation experts. I want to emphasize that the Belarusian Government guarantees members of the international commission full access to all information on the air accident, and it is going to trust the findings of the international commission, Mr. Chyhir said.

Anti-Privilege Edicts, Consequences Viewed

WS1909130695 Minsk BELORUSKAYA DELOVAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Sep 95 p 3

[Commentary by Valyantsin Zhdanko: "Alone Against the 'Country of Benefits'" — first paragraph is BELORUSKAYA DELOVAYA GAZETA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] **September 7 became a rainy day for the almost 6-million army of Belarusian citizens who until recently took advantage of various kinds of social benefits. One should recollect that at first the president declared his intention to abolish the current system of benefits — from a pensioner to the head of the state. But later, under the pressure of the united corps of veterans, he made a compromise: Benefits were preserved for combatants and invalids and pensioners' benefits were only reduced by 50-percent.**

Nevertheless, this edict produced a much greater shock effect on several million people than, for example, did the April report about the deputies being beaten or the August strike in the subway being suppressed.

Political battles over the last few months — when the president allowed himself to exert strength without really considering the acting legislation — triggered, if not the approval, then at least the understanding lenience of the public. But now, taking advantage of the same methods (the abolishment of a variety of laws that the president has no power to enact), Mr. Lukashenka struck at the tangible material interests of those citizens which are far from being the most well-off. The majority of these people are precisely those who, a year ago, came to believe enthusiastically in the young director of a state farm who promised to bring order and justice, render help to the poor and needy, and take the nouveaux riches in hand. For many pensioners, the ruin of any last hopes and illusions is the sad fact that now it is not enough to show their pensioner certificates when entering the subway; one must also to pay 100 rubles. They have been beaten by this edict more violently than oppositionists by policemen. Many people will not forgive Aleksandr Hryhoryevich such disregard and humiliation and will not forget this for a long time.

The paradox lies in the fact that — doing away resolutely with the bulky and unjustified system of benefits, taking doubtful — from the legal viewpoint — steps for this end, Aleksandr Lukashenka took actions that were absolutely justified in terms of the logic of economic activities. The budget was suffocating from the unendurable weight of legal privileges. The generosity of previous authorities, who absolutely lost their orientation in their social support games, has led to a situation when entire sectors of the economy became paralyzed: city and suburban public transportation, the housing and municipal sectors. The people used to wait for "free" medicines from pharmacies for months.

It seemed, however, that there were no forces able to resolutely resolve this evil practice. The "old" Supreme Soviet? It was, however, precisely this body that gave birth to this system and it hardly would become its grave-digger. A "new" Supreme Soviet? It, however, will be even "more red" than the old one and will ardently protect socialist gains.

The resoluteness and determination of the president along these lines is impressive. Moreover, among those millions of voters whose sympathies he is running the risks of losing, there are not only disabled old people, but also the people with police shoulder straps, on whose rubber clubs the head of the state relied more than once, and perhaps will continue to rely.

In fact, Lukashenka declared war both to the nomenklatura and the wide segments of the population by the edict on benefits, working pensioners, and diplomatic passports. Alone against the "country of benefits" (in addition, against the "legitimate" country) — this image is inadvertently associated with the image of the de la Mancha knight who fought against windmills. However, it takes all sorts: There were times when Alyaksandr Lukashenka managed to get over even greater disasters.

There is no denying that the president is courageous and resolute. These praiseworthy qualities, however, are directed at the confrontation with other branches of power and do not at all fit the current legislation. The fact that the Constitutional Court, by its decision of 11 September, unanimously voted for instituting proceedings regarding three presidential edicts proves this vividly.

So, at present there are six recent Lukashenka edicts before the judges of the Constitutional Court. The court has been provided with work for the next few months. One can only hope that new presidential edicts with the magic phrase "to suspend the laws..." will not be born during this time.

Servicemen Discontent Over Annulment of Benefits

WS1909133095 Minsk BELORUSSKAYA DELOVAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Sep 95 p 2

[Report by Syarhey Kivel: "The President Lost a Part of His Electorate"] —

[FBIS Translated Text] **Edicts No. 349 and 350, which revoke virtually all benefits of the Defense Ministry, KGB, Interior Ministry servicemen and certain categories of pensioners — signed by [Belarusian President] Alyaksandr Lukashenka on 1 September — have not only triggered a negative reaction from the Supreme Soviet and the Constitutional Court, but also indignation among common citizens. Alyaksandr Ryhoravich [Lukashenka], who often repeats that he was "elected by kolkhoz workers, doctors, and servicemen," could not but presume that by signing these edicts he would simultaneously lose the support of a significant part of his following.**

Those who drafted the edicts did not take into account the negative reaction with which the documents were to be met by the power ministries. During the first couple of days after the publication of the edicts alone, around 650 requests for resignation were presented to the Interior Ministry personnel departments. The situation in the Defense Ministry institutions is catastrophic. The chief of the Central Military Hospital is perplexed by the massive influx of resignation requests sent in by doctors who are also reserve officers. They represented a significant part of the medical personnel. It will be impossible to replace them within the next few years, since the training of army doctors at the Minsk Medical Institute began just this year. A similar situation has developed at the Belarusian Military Academy, whose staff, including scientists known worldwide, is made up of reserve officers. It is interesting that at the 1 September ceremony opening the academy, the president stated that he would *"instruct the Security Council and the Cabinet of Ministers to provide assistance to servicemen to resolve their social problems."*

Judging by all appearances, only the staffers from [Belarusian Security Council Chairman] Viktar Sheyman's institution have responded to Alyaksandr Ryhoravich's instructions. It must be noted, however, that they have done so in a very particular way. Acting in accordance with the principle "everybody dies alone," they have attempted to avoid the consequences of Edicts No. 349 and 350. I must explain to uninitiated readers and all officers that many offices in the Security Council were occupied by "reservists," who, being informed about the provisions envisioned in the edicts, have attempted to return to the Armed Forces, meaning to automatically join the ranks of those to whom the annulment of benefits does not apply. According to available information, State Secretary Adviser Viktar Miklashevich and Department Chief Mikalay Parfenenka are again colonels. For some reason it is being kept silent that the "Resolution on Military Service," allowing a reserve officer to return to army ranks only before the age of 40, has thus been violated.

By the way, it has become known that the "power ministers" did not attend the protocol ceremony held at the airport before Alyaksandr Lukashenka's departure for Moldova. It is hard to say whether this was due to preoccupation with matters concerning the protection of our country's security, or a demonstration of solidarity with their subordinates.

Moldova

Communist Party Forms Group in Socialist Unity Faction

AU1909141395 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 2116 GMT 18 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, September 18 (INFOTAG) — The Moldovan Communist Party has formed a group of seven communists in the parliamentary Socialist Unity faction, party leader Vladimir Voronin told INFOTAG. The group is headed by deputy Dmitriy Prejmireanu [spelling as received].

Its first practical step has been an appeal to the Constitutional Court proposing to amend the Law on Elections in order to bring it into line with the Constitution. Voronin said, after appropriate amendments are made, the communist group will be insisting on parliament's taking a decision to announce new mayorship elections in those communities where the recent local elections were recognized null and void due to electorate non-attendance, and where mayors were appointed by the President.

The communists propose to lower the voting validity level from the current 51 percent to 25-30 percent of the registered electorate.

INFOTAG Comments on Emergence of PRCM

AU1909185395 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 2116 GMT 18 Sep 95

[INFOTAG commentary: "If the Morning Star Is Lit, Then Somebody Needs It"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, September 18 (INFOTAG) — The Moldovan political sea, which had been quiet since the local election of April 16, is rough again. The disturbance has been caused by the emergence of the Party of Revival and Conciliation (PRCM). And the point was not just the appearance of one more party, but the fact that the new force is headed by President Mircea Snegur, and the party's governing bodies include a big group of prominent politicians and public celebrities. The emergence of the presidential party is an extraordinary event, like it was extraordinary to learn about the departure of 11 members of parliament from the PDAM [Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova] parliamentary faction, although observers had been long predicting that the approaching presidential election would split the governing monolith and create rivalry in the Snegur-Lucinschi-Sangheli triangle. And though the agrarian democratic faction, supported by the Socialist Unity, have quickly eliminated the consequences of the "mutiny on board the ship" by having replaced the Deputy Speaker and two committee chairmen, it has become clear now: the flagship, which faced no particular problems till recently, has cracked. The problem now in not whether or not it will sink, because the agrarian democrats, possessing a powerful set of economic and psychological instruments, keep on controlling the biggest segment of the Moldovan electorate and remain the leading political force. While the PDAM faction used to enjoy an absolute majority before, after the split it will be forced to seek allies in other factions, and to agree on certain concessions — a particularly painful feeling for those who got used to rule individually. The PDAM faction could have found an ally in person of the Socialist Unity deputies, many of whom, as they say themselves, are close to the agrarians. But if till recently it was enough for the Socialist Unity to sit and repeat that "we are one thing, the agrarians are another, we simply vote in the same way," now the new situation will force to provide an answer to quite a natural question: is it possible to keep on being a political appendix, or we should form a ruling coalition? For they fully realize that their uncertain position in the Parliament took a high price to be paid at the latest local election, when they yielded much of their electorate to communists in many localities. Maybe, the agrarians will attempt to restore status-quo by depriving the runaways of their parliamentary mandates. The PDAM faction has a formal reason to do this, namely the decisions of the 2d extraordinary congress of the party which was held on September 2 and demanded to send all "these splitters and dissidents" out of the parliament. The agrarians proceed from a simple political logics: if a deputy was elected to the forum on a party's list, then he must lose his mandate upon quitting the party. It seems, this would be the least desirable variant for the Moldovan society. The unrest, caused by the PRCM emergence, applied to only the so-called "political establishment," and not to the broad public. But in case the 11 deputies, who moved to other parties, are deprived of their mandates, the conflict will rush already outside the parliament building. Realizing this, Petru Lucinschi tried to calm the passions down in his speech at the 2d PDAM congress. However, the party's political elite remained deaf to his arguments. It is quite possible to comprehend the reasons why the PDAM and Socialist factions are so irritated, and to understand the vibration the opposition camp (both in and out of the Parliament) is in. The opposition forces are even hinting at early election claiming that in February 1994 Moldovans elected only 4 parties, or blocs, to the Parliament, while by the present time its population has almost doubled. And it is easy to understand the present-day criticism against the PDAM and its chairman who remains one of the leading political figures in public opinion. It's fairly difficult to predict the outcome of the next parliamentary election, but the presidential one, if only they were held now, would be very successful for the new party. Happily, the event will take place only in more than a year, and there is no sense speaking about any election campaigns before next summer. But before the summer comes, however, Moldova has to pass through the winter with all its "beauties" — energy shortage and cool offices and homes. The social and economic situation, despite some enthusiastic speeches heard during the 2d PDAM congress, keeps on aggravating both at the macro and micro levels, the latter causing a particular discontent of the electorate. If to add to this that with each coming election his majesty the people is becoming more and more apathetic and irritated, then talks about anybody's chances on the voting day are not worth a penny. There is no point in getting upset or nervous about the new party's emergence. Political pluralism is as essential for democracy as economic, cultural or religious one. If stars appear in the skies every evening, hence somebody needs them. And if the Moldovan political horizon has come to have the Luceafar — the morning star symbolizing the revival of somebody's hopes and aspirations — then somebody has got tired of the dull Moldovan political reality, and seeks to actively oppose to a part of the society which imposes its dogmas to the rest of the population.

Talks Between Strikers, Officials at 'Standstill'

AU1909141095 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2012 GMT 18 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau 18/09/1995 (BASAPRESS) — The talks between strikers and Moldovan officials have come to a standstill, while the demands are not satisfied, Strike Committee representatives said at the talks with the presidential commission today. Oleg Cernei, Students League chairman, said the students are ready to take the streets again. In spite of the promises made earlier by authorities, they are still facing social and economic difficulties such as poor living conditions in dormitories and delayed payment of stipends. Strike Committee representatives declared that wage and pension arrears have not been paid off and keep on growing, the teachers in some districts haven't been paid since May. The lack of textbooks in schools impedes the process of study. Minister of Education Petru Gaugas said during the talks that according to the agreement on education concluded with Romania in 1995, the Romanian side will provide Moldovan schools with textbooks. According to Gaugas, the World Bank will grant the Chisinau Ministry of Education, under governmental guarantee, a 20-year credit for textbooks publishing. He said book supplies will be improved over the next 3-4 years. Valeriu Chitan, Finance Minister, said Germany would grant Moldova a DM 30m credit aimed at the recovery of the social sector. The Minister informed that starting January 1996 the minimum wage is to be increased and that will cause additional budget expenditures of 200m lei. Anatol Petrencu, chairman of the strike committee, told BASAPRESS that at the September 19 sitting the strike committee will compile the list of demands and will make a decision on further actions.

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev To Appeal For World Assistance on Aral Sea

LD1909123395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1145 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Almaty, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev flew to Nukus, capital of Karakalpakia in Uzbekistan, Tuesday for a summit conference of Central Asian countries on the Aral sea, organized with UN assistance.

According to his aides, Nazarbayev plans to address the conference on Wednesday and appeal to the world community for help in resolving the problem of the Aral, because "countries of the region cannot cope with it alone".

In 1994 a program was designed for the sea which shrank to one third of its initial size in Soviet times as a result of irrigation. The $41 million program involving the World Bank and UN agencies is to last until the year 2015.

According to the source, Nazarbayev finds the funds insufficient.

In his speech the Kazakh president is expected to suggest that the UN global environmental fund define the status of the environmentally most vulnerable states among countries with a transitional economy.

He should also suggest beneficial terms for donor assistance to the region and a most favored status for investors. The president is expected to urge Central Asian countries to build up their potential in this sphere, the source reported.

International Migration Figures Compared

954F3487A Almaty DELOVAYA NEDELYA in Russian 15 Sep 95 p 2

[Release from the Republic of Kazakhstan State Committee on Statistics: "Migration Flows in Kazakhstan: More Out Than In"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since the end of 1980's, the intensity of the migration flow of Kazakhstan residents out of the country has increased. The migration trend as of now is as follows: intense emigration of the population from the republic and, at the same time, decreased immigration. Compared to the same period of last year, the volume of loss in international migration has increased. While over nine months of last year the republic lost 247,100 residents, over nine months of this year it lost 362,800 residents, which comprises 60.5 percent of the entire migration flow (including intra-republic migration). In absolute figures, emigration to the far abroad increased over the same period by 11,700, and to near abroad states—by 104,000; respectively, the number of immigrants from the far abroad decreased by 1,200, and from the near abroad—by 29,200. The greatest flow of emigrants was registered from Karaganda (35,900), Kostanay (29,800), Pavlodar (26,800), and Akmola (26,000) Oblasts, which accounted for one-third of all emigration from the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The bulk of the emigration flow (70.3 percent) goes to the Russian Federation. Of that, 74.2 percent are ethnic Russians. The greater part of emigrants are urban populations (71 percent), and only 29 percent are from rural areas. People leaving Kazakhstan are mainly of the work-eligible age.

A survey of 5,700 respondents leaving the country showed that the main causes of emigration from the republic are economic difficulties (fast-rising prices)—45.9 percent; dissatisfaction with their pay (34.6 percent); and the poor supply of foodstuffs and consumer goods (19.7 percent).

Among other identifiable reasons: lack of career prospects (16.2 percent); the unfavorable ecological situation (12.3 percent); difficulties in finding a job (11.9 percent); and dissatisfaction with living conditions (11.3 percent).

Almost one-fifth of respondents (19 percent) have a higher education, 5 percent—incomplete higher education, 36 percent—vocational secondary education, and 36 percent—general high school or incomplete high school education; persons with elementary education or without it comprise 4 percent. About 80 percent of the respondents were leaving Kazakhstan with regret and a feeling of gratitude for the years lived in the republic. If certain conditions developed—namely, economic stabilization and a stable and sufficient income—they would not be leaving.

In intra-republic migration, the maximum value of the negative migration balance was registered in Kzyl-Orda (-5,000) and Semipalatinsk (-2,500) Oblasts, which is caused by poor ecological conditions on these territories. The republic capital remains the main migration attraction, with a positive balance of 4,700 in inter-oblast migration.

Edict on Banks, Banking Activity Analyzed

954F3426A Almaty AZIYA-EZH in Russian Sep 95 No 9, p 1

[AZIYA-EZH report: "All Bank Customers: Follow the Press Closely"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 6 August of this year, Nursultan Nazarbayev's Edict on Banks and Banking Activity in the Republic of Kazakhstan, with the status of law, entered into force. Thus, the country's banking system acquired long-awaited rules of the game that conform, in the concept of the authors of the document, to today's and tomorrow's realities of economic life.

Despite the fact that the new legislative act contains a great many fundamentally new provisions, it is hardly possible to discern in it anything unexpected, anything not already predicted. As anticipated, the National Bank acquired additional rights and strengthened its authoritative empowerment—from now on it is God and tsar of the state banking system in the legislative sense. At the same time, also as predicted, the edict significantly tightens the rules for establishment of new banks. Only managing entities with the most stable financial situation will be capable of abiding by these rules. Insofar as there are exceedingly few such entities in Kazakhstan, or anywhere else in the CIS, we need not expect to see the emergence of fundamentally new republic banks (without the participation of bank capital already available) in the foreseeable future.

Taking this circumstance and the international status of our weekly publication into account, it makes sense to delve in somewhat greater detail into the question of to what extent the new legislative act will facilitate the attraction of capital from outside the republic into Kazakhstan's banking system. This is a matter of still greater urgency by virtue of the fact that it merges with the problem of attraction of foreign investments, a matter of great interest to our republic.

On the one hand, the edict fully permits the participation of foreign capital in the republic banking system. A bank with foreign participation is classified by the document as "a second-level bank, where over 50 percent of the shares are in the possession, ownership, and/or control" of Republic of Kazakhstan nonresidents; a juridical person residing in the Republic of Kazakhstan, more than half of whose shares or contributions are in the possession, ownership, or control of Republic of Kazakhstan nonresidents; or a resident of the Republic of Kazakhstan acting as proxy for Republic of Kazakhstan nonresidents. In addition, the edict stipulates the possibility of establishing interstate banks, a provision implying the participation of foreign capital. But this is a special article that presupposes the contribution of state funds of two or more countries.

On the other hand, Article 18 of the edict enables us to note the success of the republic's banking lobby in protecting its interests through the hands of the state. In stipulating the particulars involved in the establishment of branch banks by nonresident banks of the republic, this article sets up two significant barriers. First of all, only a nonresident bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan that has been awarded a specific rating from one of the main rating agencies listed by the National Bank, a rating designated minimally acceptable by the National Bank, may constitute the parent bank of the branch bank in question. Secondly, even the all-powerful National Bank has the right to issue the authorization for opening a branch bank only after a representation of the bank in question has been operating in the republic for one year. But according to Point 6 of Article 29 of the edict, a "representation" is a subdivision of a bank that does not constitute a juridical person or carry out banking transactions. A very rigid norm indeed. Were it in effect previously, the bank branch of Russia's Alfabank, for example, would not have been able to open in Kazakhstan. As is presently obvious, Alfabank has managed to outpace the development of Kazakhstan's banking legislation and establish its branch bank in Almaty, already in possession of a general license from the Republic of Kazakhstan National Bank.

In the opinion of a number of banking specialists we managed to consult during the preparation of this commentary, the sum total of the above-enumerated provisions, like the document as a whole, secures a trend clearly manifest in recent months testifying to the inevitable reduction in numbers of banks in the CIS countries. With all the assurances of the official authorities and bankers themselves on the need to observe the interests of bank clients during this process, the clients cannot help but be alarmed. Any organizational transformation in the financial sphere entails a transformation of interests. Insofar as the banking sphere, with all its conservatism, is still throughout the world the sphere most closed off from the community, the alarm of bank customers is increasing in proportion to the soothing assurances given.

It is for this reason that we studied the edict with our particular bias, to try to find possible common links between the banking system and mass media which, from our point of view, could meld the consequences of transformation of the banking system in furtherance of its own interests and those of its clients. To the credit of those who drew up the act, such common links are to be found in the document. First of all, as indicated in Article 32 of the edict, overall conditions for the conduct of bank operations constitute open information and may not fall under the purview of commercial or banking secrets. Secondly, in addition to the traditional requirements on publication of annual reports and balance sheets, the edict establishes the norm according to which a reorganized bank is obligated to provide information on its impending transformation through announcements in at least two republic newspapers. A similar requirement is established for banks subject to temporary closure (reorganization), as well as those that have decided to self-liquidate and have received the "well wishes" of the National Bank in this regard. It would therefore make sense for all bank clients to read the newspapers more closely from now on.

But not everything is presented as might be expected, from our point of view. Thus, we assess one provision of a document—not the Edict on Banks and Banking Activity in the Republic of Kazakhstan, but one closely related to it—Nursultan Nazarbayev's Edict on the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts, adopted the same day as the edict on the banks, as a surprise. According to this document, the president has supplemented the Civil Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan with the following norm: "Relations dealing with the establishment, activity, reorganization, bankruptcy, and liquidation of banks, accounting and auditing of banking activity, and the licensing of individual varieties of banking operations are regulated by this code to the extent that they do not contradict existing banking legislation." This norm in fact enhances the status of banking legislation in the sphere of bank activity to a level above applicable provisions of the Civil Code, and points out the extreme audacity of the reformers of the Kazakhstan economy and representatives of the state banking sector of the republic. In acquiring such broad empowerment, the banking system (primarily the National Bank) is assuming a level of responsibility capable of being maintained, in our view, only by people with nerves of steel.

Kyrgyzstan

Prime Minister Holds Talks With Iran's Foruzesh

LD1909132695 Tehran IRNA in English
1253 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bishkek, Sept. 19, IRNA — Kyrgyz Prime Minister Apas Dzhumagulov on Monday [18 September] voiced his country's readiness to cede some units of Kyrgyzstan's animal husbandry, chicken and fish farming, to the Iranian Ministry of Construction Jihad.

The Kyrgyz prime minister speaking in a meeting with the visiting Iranian Minister of Construction Jihad Gholamreza Foruzesh also called for launching joint ventures with the Islamic Republic of Iran in these fields. He further announced willingness of the Kyrgyz president and government to promote Bishkek-Tehran relations.

Dzhumagulov pointed out that the economic cooperation organization (ECO) has provided appropriate grounds for expansion of regional cooperation. The Kyrgyz prime minister called for measures to speed up the formation of the joint economic commission and invited Construction Jihad ministry to cooperate with Kyrgyzstan in develompent projects in his country.

Foruzesh conveyed greetings of Iran's First Vice President Hasan Habibi to Prime Minister Dzhumagulov and said that his ministry is ready to cooperate with Kyrgyz oraganizations in dam building and water supply projects.

He added that the Construction Jihad Ministry has already signed an agreement to establish a cheese producing factory in Osh Province of Kyrgyzstan.

Foruzesh also held a separate meeting with Kyrgyz Deputy Prime Minister Dzhumgalbek Amanbayev. The Iranian minister who arrived here last Saturday has so far visited a number of production projects in Bishkek.

Bishkek Might Join CIS Military Bloc if Pressed

LD1909202095 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1851 GMT 19 Sep 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bishkek, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — Kyrgyzstan heavily depends on Russia, and if Russian President Boris Yeltsin strictly raises the question "Are you with us or not?", Bishkek will have no other option than to join the military block, a consultant of the international department of the Kyrgyz presidential administration, Marat Saralinov, told INTERFAX Tuesday.

At the same time, he remarked that "the situation in the CIS states and their relations between each other leave doubts as to the possibility for creating such a military bloc.

"At present, it is impossible to stand against all Europe," he explained.

According to Saralinov, Yeltsin's speech on his plans to create a new bloc was somewhat emotional and intended to scare Europe to make Russia count.

Saralinov was convinced that Kyrgyzstan "should never join any military blocs, because this may negatively affect the global attitude toward it."

Tajikistan

Russian Foreign Minister Visits Tajik-Afghan Border

LD1909190695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1804 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev Tuesday afternoon visited the second outpost of the Kalaikhumsk border troops unit on the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

Zafar Saidov, head of the Tajik Foreign Ministry public relations office, told Interfax that during the visit Kozyrev was accompanied by Tajik Foreign Minister Talbak Nazarov and Commander of Russian border troops in Tajikistan Pavel Tarasenko.

Speaking at Dushanbe airport Tuesday morning, Kozyrev told journalists that his visit is aimed at further strengthening ties between Russia and Tajikistan and implementing agreements signed during Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov's visit to Moscow in early September.

He also pointed out the need to support the "difficult stabilization process currently under way in Tajikistan."

According to Kozyrev, at their latest meeting Russian and Tajik leaders defined the two countries' general strategy which must begin to be implemented right away.

Kozyrev also expressed the need to support democratic and market reforms in Tajikistan and make everything possible to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict between the government and the opposition.

Saidov said that Kozyrev is expected to meet with Rakhmonov Tuesday evening to discuss a broad range of issues relating to bilateral cooperation and the settlement of the conflict in Tajikistan.

After the meeting, the sides are expected to sign a consular convention between Russia and Tajikistan and an intergovernmental agreement on cultural cooperation.

Kozyrev will leave Dushanbe Wednesday morning.

Russia's Kozyrev Satisfied With Visit

LD1909205595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2029 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe, September 19 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev expressed satisfaction with his one-day visit to Tajikistan.

He said in an interview with ITAR-TASS that his talk with Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov showed a great potential of political will of the Tajik leadership to stabilise the situation in Tajikistan through further dialogue with the Tajik opposition.

Kozyrev said the Tajik leaders are ready to pursue the Tajik conciliatory talks "to move them a big result in the nearest time".

Kozyrev discussed with the Tajik leadership political moves for integration of Russia and Tajikistan.

He visited a border post on the Tajik-Afghan border to meet its personnel and residents of a neighbouring state farms.

Kozyrev said he saw Russians and Tajiks to serve together, stressing that this "is forging a new brotherhood of Russian and Tajik peoples".

During his visit to Pamir, Kozyrev met representatives of Afghan border authorities.

Details of the meeting were not disclosed, but Kozyrev called it "interesting".

He stated with satisfaction that measures had been recently taken to reinforce the guarding of the Tajik-Afghan border.

Kozyrev returns to Moscow in early hours of Wednesday.

Tajik Opposition: Peace Talks Must Resume

LD1909124395 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0600 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The future existence of [Tajik President] Emomali Rakhmanov's regime and its remaining in power are inseparably connected with continuation of the fifth round of the Tajik peace talks, which was to have started yesterday according to the agreements. However, so far the time and place of the scheduled round has not been fixed. In particular, the Rakhmanov regime has not made up its mind on the venue for the talks.

Here is [commentator] Farhod Mu'min on the fifth round of the Tajik talks, and what it might bring the negotiating parties:

[Mu'min] One thing is obvious: the basis for any sort of negotiations during a state of war is the desire of the conflicting sides to settle the conflict by peaceful means. [passage omitted]

Today, inspired by the cease-fire agreements which are being continuously extended by the Tajik opposition, the Government has again begun to seek excuses and to avoid the political settlement issue. Now, the fifth round of talks, which will be the decisive one, has been postponed by the government side — it did not take place at the fixed date of 18 September.

The regime's media of the regime, quoting [Labor and Employment] Minister Shukurjon Zuhurov, claim that on 19 July, during the meeting between [Tajik opposition leader] Sayyed Abdullo Nuri and Emomali Rakhmanov it was decided that Ashgabat would be the venue for the fifth round, but a spokesman at the opposition's press office told us that this claim was completely unfounded. He added that Ashgabat was proposed by Rakhmanov alone, and that Professor Nuri did not give him a positive answer.

As is known, all the Central Asian countries except Turkmenistan have negative opinions about Rakhmonov's government, and that is why Rakhmonov wants to use Russia's influence to draw Turkmenistan to his side to form another block against Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. That is why the Tajik opposition will not accept Ashgabat as a venue for the fifth round, in order to avoid becoming a factor for conflict between the countries of the area. [passage omitted]

The government is insisting on Ashgabat and is thus delaying the talks. Actually, it wants to prolong the delay until the cold weather sets in, when Rakhmonov thinks he will be safe from opposition attacks until the spring.

It seems the government cannot analyze its position or the situation in the area on the whole correctly and draw a conclusion, or else its real aim and desire is to tear Tajikistan apart and to make its residents poor and miserable. The country is in such a state today that the government should be more diligent in negotiations and in bringing the country out of crisis.

The internal war in Kurgan-Tyube has shown the people of the world the instability of this regime. Now, after the victory of the local Uzbeks over the Kulyabis, the flight of the Kulyabis' leader, Usmon Murchayev, and the utter defeat of the Defense Ministry's well-known 11th Brigade, which was formed by Fayzali Saidov, Rakhmanov's government is facing a state of crisis. If he agrees to this coup and does nothing to reduce the influence of the local Uzbeks, led by Mahmud Khudoyberdiyev, this group may not be satisfied with taking Kurgan-Tyube, and may have its eyes on other areas as well. If the government gathers forces from Kulyab and, together with state forces, goes to war against Khudoyberdiyev, then Rakhmanov must be prepared for war with Uzbekistan. [passage omitted]

Another factor weakening Rakhmanov's regime is that the north [Leninabad region] is turning away from him, and the north can probably escape from subordination to the center. [passage omitted]

The opposition concession of accepting Rakhmanov as president of the republic until the proposed transitional stage and the establishment of a transitional government of national accord is a favorable chance for Rakhmanov to take this proposal and to save his government from future collapse, so that the country will be safe from collapse and internal wars. If this chance is not taken, then perhaps no one should consider even holding negotiations with Rakhmanov, because then the talks will be dealing with the complete fall of Rakhmanov and his entire administration.

Turkmenistan

Indian Prime Minister Arrives on Official Visit

LD1909140195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1325 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By Anna Kurbanova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ashgabat, September 19 (ITAR-TASS) — Indian Prime minister P.V. Narasimha Rao arrived in Turkmenistan on an official visit today. He was received at the Ashgabat airport by President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov. This is the second meeting between the leaders of the two countries. Their first meeting was held during the Turkmen president's visit to India in April 1992.

During Rao's visit to Turkmenistan bilateral talks on the prospects of economic and cultural cooperation, as well as tripartite talks on foreign minister-level between Turkmenia, India and Iran will be held.

In conformance with a memorandum of understanding on international road and railway transportation signed in New Delhi in April, an agreement on organizing supplies of Indian goods across Iran and Turkmenia to CIS countries is being prepared for signing in Ashgabat.

Within the framework of the bilateral talks, which are scheduled to begin this evening, the question related to laying a Pan-Asian gas pipeline for pumping natural gas produced in Turkmenistan, as being planned, will be supplied to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

The signing of the bilateral and tripartite documents will be held after talks between Rao and Niyazov on Wednesday.

Niyazov Discusses Trade Cooperation

BK1909153695 Delhi Doordarshan Television Network in English 1430 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] India and Turkmenistan today expressed the hope that the growing bilateral cooperation in trade and commerce between the two countries would bring them together. The prime minister, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao, who is on a three-day visit to this country, during talks with the Turkmenistan president, Mr. S.A. Niyazov, extended all help to strengthen the existing bilateral relations between the two historical countries of the Asian region. The two leaders also discussed regional issues and other matters of mutual interest during the talks at the Presidential Palace, which lasted an hour. Later, officials of both sides joined the talks.

Earlier, Mr. Rao was welcomed by the Turkmenistan president, Mr. S.A. Niyazov. The prime minister was presented a ceremonial guard of honor by special contingent of armed forces. [passage omitted]

Indian Premier Offers Credit, Training

LD1909200195 Ashgabat TURKMEN PRESS in Russian 1701 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ashgabat, 19 Sep — A meeting took place this afternoon between President Saparmurad Turkmenbashy [Niyazov] of Turkmenistan and Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao of India in the Presidential Palace. [passage omitted]

In front of a giant map of Turkmenistan, the country's President Saparmurad Turkmenbashy told the high-ranking guest about the existing transport infrastructure, the conditions of the roads and railways, and the natural resources of Turkmenistan. The head of the Indian Government and those accompanying him also had the opportunity to become familiar with the prospects for the reconstruction of old and construction of new main routes, and with the course of the construction of the Serakhs-Mashhad railway and the international gas pipeline.

During the conversation, President Saparmurad Turkmenbashy told Mr. Rao about the history of Turkmenistan, having aroused an interest in the period of its independence and in the main directions of internal and foreign policy. India has great potential in the sphere of small and medium-sized businesses, Rao noted at the meeting and within this framework India is ready to share its experience, particularly in the area of processing agricultural goods and light industry. We are ready to propose a long-term credit to support enterprise in Turkmenistan and to teach young Turkmen specialists from various professions, including also in the military, he said. Turkmenistan and India have boundless possibilities for developing trade and economic relations. The main thing is to be able to implement them. [passage omitted]

It was underlined during the course of the conversation that India is interested in the construction of the international gas pipeline. As an importer of Turkmen cotton, it intends to buy this valuable raw material from Turkmenistan in the future as well. The guarantee for India, for supporting strategic relations with Turkmenistan, is its stability and policy of positive neutrality.

The meeting was held in a spirit of mutual understanding and confidence. [passage omitted]

Having seen the high-ranking guest, President Saparmurad Turkmenbashy of Turkmenistan gave a short interview to Indian journalists in which he outlined the main topics of Turkmen-Indian negotiations.

Niyazov, Rao Sign Agreements

LD2009105895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1021 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Anna Kurbanova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ashgabat, September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — India opens a second tranche of credit to Turkemenistan worth 10 million U.S. dollars. For a period of ten years Turkmenistan will be provided with equipment for small industrial enterprises at the expense of the credit. An agreement to this effect was sealed in a number of documents signed today by the president of Turkmenistan Saparmurad Niyazov and the Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, who arrived on an official visit in Ashgabat on Tuesday.

The first tranche of credit worth 5.5 million U.S. Dollars allocated for the construction of a pharmaceutical plant in Turkmenistan was opened in March, 1995. Among documents signed during the current visit of the Indian Prime Minister is an intergovernment agreement on the encouragement and protection of investments and on the creation of a joint commission for trade and economic cooperation. A protocol on cooperation between the Turkmen and Indian foreign ministries signed today will promote the activation of a political dialogue between the two countries. An intention to broaden cultural contacts was reflected in an agreement on cooperation in the area of education, mass media and art.

Deputy Minister on Ukrainian Debt for Gas Supplies

LD1209131495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1057 GMT 12 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ashgabat, Sept 12 (INTERFAX-UKRAINE) — The Ukrainian debt for 1994-1995 Turkmen gas supplies has reached $195 million, Deputy Turkmen Oil and Gas Minister Akmamed Nurmamedov told INTERFAX-UKRAINE.

According to him, the Ukrainian debt for last year's supplies is estimated at $115 million, and it is $80 million for this year.

Chairman of the Ukrainian State Committee for Oil and Gas Industry Yevgeniy Dovzhok refuted the Turkmen statement and said "Ukraine regularly pays for delivery of Turkmen gas."

According to Nurmamedov, Ukraine received 7.648 billion cubic meters of gas from Turkmenistan in the eight months of this year, including 3.928 billion through inter-state channels. In the first and second quarters of this year Ukraine purchased gas at a price of $50 per 1,000 cubic meters, in the third quarter the price was $55 per 1,000 cubic meters, and the fourth quarter the price will go up to $60 per 1,000 cubic meters (on condition of delivery to the Russian-Kazakh border).

Under last year's agreement on Turkmen gas supplies to Ukraine, Turkmenistan is to deliver 20 billion cubic meters of gas to Ukraine in 1995, including 11 billion cubic meters through inter-state channels and 9 billion on direct agreements.

The natural gas share in the overall Ukrainian energy consumption exceeds 35 percent, and Ukraine satisfies approximately 15 percent of its domestic gas needs (95-100 billion cubic meters a year). The rest is supplied by Russia and Turkmenistan.

Uzbekistan

Karimov Wants To Intensify Cooperation With India

LD1809185195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1715 GMT 18 Sep 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Uzbek President Islam Karimov received Indian State Minister Salman Khurshid Saturday in Tashkent last Saturday. "India has always been a friendly country for the people of Uzbekistan; its culture, arts and traditions are very familiar to us and very loved," he said. The two statesmen paid much attention to the development of trade and economic cooperation and humanitarian exchange between the two countries.

Karimov remarked that Tashkent "will always seek to develop bilateral trade and economic relations" with friendly India. This Asian state has convenient seaports, considerable natural resources and up-to-date technology, he underlined. He said he was convinced that India was also interested in economic partnership with Tashkent. Karimov noted that several dozens of Uzbek-Indian joint ventures are operating in Uzbekistan.

Territorially, India is not within Central Asia, but is extremely interested in stability there, Khurshid emphasized at the meeting.

Uzbekistan plays "one of the leading parts" in this region, he added.

Khurshid attended an international seminar on security and cooperation in Central Asia in Tashkent last weekend.

Karimov, Kozyrev Settle Differences on Russian Population

LD1909161195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1524 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — A meeting of Uzbek President Islam Karimov and visiting Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev was held in Tashkent Tuesday to settle problems in bilateral relations, primarily the position of Russian-speaking residents of Uzbekistan, a staffer of the Russian embassy in Tashkent told INTERFAX over the telephone today.

In his words, the tete-a-tete meeting lasted for over two hours instead of the planned 60 minutes and was very constructive. The Uzbek President agreed to the opening of Russian consulates in Fergana and Samarkand, where the percentage of Russian-speaking residents is high and Russia has always had strong interests.

The sides agreed on the need for a simplified procedure for persons seeking a different citizenship or naturalization. It is primarily the matter of Russian citizenship, because migration from Uzbekistan to Russia goes on despite a certain decrease, said the diplomat.

"There was a certain misunderstanding in this sphere, but it seems to be eliminated," he noted.

The sides agreed to influence the local authorities, who sometimes hamper migration to Russia.

The President agreed to opening of a Military Attache's Office at the Russian embassy in Tashkent. In the words of the diplomat, "Russia has repeatedly requested the Uzbek side to open the Military Attache's Office but every time faced a polite refusal."

"It is rather a humanitarian than a military question. The majority of officers of the former Turkmen military district were Russian-speaking, and it has been difficult for them to decide on their further military service in Russia and Uzbekistan, and on naturalization," said the source.

"The sides have managed to agree that the Military Attache's Office will not only tackle the problems of purely military inter- state cooperation but also to ease humanitarian tension," he added.

Kazakh President Arrives, Meets Karimov

LD1909182995 Tashkent Uzbekistan Television in Russian 1430 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President Nursultan Nazarbayev of the Republic of Kazakhstan arrived in Tashkent today on a working visit. He was met at the airport by President Islam Karimov of the Republic of Uzbekistan and other leaders of our state.

Following this, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov headed for the Uzbek presidential office.

During a one-to-one conversation, the leaders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan discussed a broad range of issues concerning bilateral relations and world problems, about which they spoke at a briefing held for journalists. Concerning the goals and tasks of this and other similar meetings, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov were quite specific.

[Begin Karimov recording, in Russian, broadcast in progress] ...inasmuch as Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev is one of the initiators and organizers of these structures, in particular, as the president of the Aral Fund. A great deal has been done to attract the world community, international organizations of the United Nations, the attention of the leaders of great powers in this, this problem. If we talk about the formal part of the issue then tomorrow we are planning to go to Nukus, where the leaders of the other three states that are situated in this region — I mean Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan — will arrive. Here lies the meaning of our meeting in three words, not in two, but in three words [sentence as heard].

However, I repeat once again that the formal part is formal. I am always glad to greet and see Nursultan Nazarbayev in Uzbekistan. I repeat that this meeting — if even there were no formal reason for it — could in principle take place on other issues. Thank you. I am convinced that it has become clear to you why we are here today. [end recording]

[Begin Nazarbayev recording, in Russian] Islam Abduganiyevich Karimov has told you that the main aim of today's meeting is to take part in a large seminar tomorrow, which is taking place under the auspices of the United Nations. When the Aral Fund was being established by the five Central Asian states, we understood that we, on our own, would not be able to restore all that which was destroyed in the last 30-40 years. The task consisted of us collecting funds to help people to survive. For example, to purify water, to provide potable water, to help with hospitals and medicine — we cannot count on more today, maybe in future, but not now — to attract the attention of the world community, because the ecological calamity of the Aral Sea is not an issue for these five republics. It has become global. It was not known before how much salt has been carried by the wind and that this salt is being deposited not in our region, but also in the northern ice-covered Arctic ocean. This salt, falling at the height of these mountains, is the reason for the reduction in the glaciers that feed the Syrdarya and Amudarya Rivers, and all that which is oasis in this region. [end recording]

The presidents paid attention to the problems of saving the Aral Sea region, but the conversation also concerned the fact that two close states that have centuries-old roots, such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, must today advance jointly and actively in solving the tasks of economic integration, and cultural, scientific, and moral ties. Thanks to our republics' efforts, the Central Asian community, which has been recognized by leading international organizations, has been created and is developing. Economic projects financed by the Central Asian Bank are already being worked out and carried out.

The presidents spoke about mutual steps that are being taken to ensure security in the region and answered a number of questions put by journalists.

Report on Nazarbayev Visit

LD2009111195 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 0500 GMT 20 Sep 95

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev made an unscheduled visit to Tashkent on 19 September. Topics discussed at a meeting between Nazarbayev and Uzbek President Islam Karimov mainly concerned bilateral relations, economic integration, prospects for cooperation, and priorities in industry such as machine construction and the chemicals industry.

[Begin Nazarbayev recording] We agree on everything in the economic field — on all rapprochements, on all contacts. For us the main thing is to underpin our independence. We say that openly and honestly to everyone. [end recording]

[Unidentified correspondent] In the opinion of the presidents, the factories of Kazakhstan's military-industrial complex are capable of producing spare parts for cars assembled in Uzbekistan. The presidents visited the

Chkalov aircraft works, the largest in Central Asia. Cooperation on aircraft construction was discussed. Today, Kazakhstan produces aluminum and practically all the non-ferrous metals and incombustible chemical fibers needed to manufacture airplanes. President Nazarbayev expressed his firm intention of acquiring an Uzbek airliner.

The meeting between the two presidents took place on the day before the UN's international conference on dealing with the tragedy of the Aral Sea and Nazarbayev and Karimov flew to Nukus today to attend the conference.

Armenia

Agreement With Iran on Gas Line Construction

NC1909163595 Yerevan SNARK in English
1624 GMT 18 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, 18 September (SNARK) — Construction of a 200-km gas pipeline will start on September 22 at a border between Turkmenistan and Iran. Appearing at a press conference in Yerevan today, Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati said that the pipeline will link the gas deposit in western Turkmenistan with the Mazandaran region in northern Iran.

The latter will be a starting point for future gas transport to Armenia. Construction of Iran-Armenia gas-line has been discussed during today's meeting of Velayati with the Armenian Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan. Foreign Minister Vahan Papazyan said the corresponding agreement had already been signed. "The question is when we will be able to implement it", said Papazyan.

In his turn, the Turkmen Deputy Prime Minister Boris Shikhmuradov, also present at the briefing, said that within the framework of trilateral meeting in Yerevan, the Armenian and Turkmen specialists exchanged views on continued gas supply from Turkmenistan by the existing line. Supplies volume for 1996 will be determined soon, during the bilateral meeting, said Shikhmuradov. Armenia is the most reliable partner of Turkmenistan among its gas-consumers, he said.

Baku Journalist on Armenian-Turkish Links

954F3468A Baku ZERKALO in Russian 2 Sep 95
No 32, p 10

[NURANI report: "Rapprochement Between Turkey and Armenia—An Adjustment of Position or Just Another 'Canard'?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] People like sensations in our unpredictable times, and many have grown accustomed to unexpected shifts in politics. So we see Iran suddenly selling fuel to the Serbs, as was reported by MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, or signing a whole package of economic agreements with Armenia, as NOYAN TAPAN has been relentlessly reporting. And Andrey Nuykin, foaming at the mouth in defending "the right of the people to self-determination," suddenly turns into a no less zealous supporter of preservation of the territorial integrity of states when the matter deals with Russia and Chechnya. Then when the Russian and Armenian press begin the downright "bombing" of Azerbaijan's society, and not just Azerbaijan's, with reports of an alleged "rapprochement" between Ankara and Yerevan—although quite frankly the reports so disturbing to the community contain no abundance of concrete facts—the reaction turns out to be entirely predictable. And entirely emotional.

Mr. Vural Altay, Turkey's provisional charge d'affaires in the Azerbaijan Republic, responded to our request for commentary on the reports emerging on the alleged "rapprochement" between Turkey and Armenia, and stated the following:

"As we know, Turkey and Armenia have not established diplomatic relations. We recognized the independence of Armenia, just as we did that of all the 15 new independent states following the collapse of the USSR, but diplomatic relations with Armenia will be established only after its relationship with Azerbaijan is settled. So while there are no diplomatic relations, while there are no embassies or consulates, it is difficult to talk about any 'rapprochement.' But neither does this mean that all contacts in international forums have been rejected. There exist a great many organizations to which both Turkey and Armenia belong. There is nothing reprehensible in the fact itself of negotiations. Negotiations take place even between enemies. Israel and the Palestinians are today conducting negotiations, as are North and South Korea. But at no negotiations have any agreements been concluded and kept secret from Azerbaijan. Until the occupied Azerbaijani territories are liberated, diplomatic relations will not be established between Turkey and Armenia. And if Special Ambassador Kemal Aykhan has gone to Yerevan and conducted negotiations with Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, this does not constitute any basis for allegations of 'rapprochement.'"

Thus the Turkish diplomat is quite specific—without establishing diplomatic relations, it is entirely problematic to refer to any "rapprochement." Turkey is rigidly linking the establishment of diplomatic relations with Armenia to the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan and the withdrawal of troops from occupied Azerbaijani territories. Thus, no revision of Turkey's official position on the Karabakh question, as Armenian representatives put it, has taken place.

Assertions to this effect by the Armenian side have been repeatedly refuted by officials of both Azerbaijan and Turkey. Thus, during her recent visit to Azerbaijan, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller stated: "We cannot reconcile ourselves to the continued occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory by Armenia, and we will do our utmost to support Azerbaijan in its just cause." G. Aliyev stated categorically: "There are no changes in Turkey's position with respect to Armenia's aggression." Turkish President Suleyman Demirel was equally specific at the most recent "Black Sea Summit" in Bucharest, according to a KHABAR-SERVIS report: "Turkey will establish relations with Armenia when the latter establishes normal relations with Azerbaijan."

However, the statement of V. Guluzade, Azerbaijan Republic state adviser on foreign policy matters, is remarkable: "I am aware of attempts on the part of Armenia to establish relations with this state and 'take Azerbaijan out of the game.'"

I will stipulate here that "rapprochement" is a bilateral process, and Armenia's fervor in this issue, while Turkey maintains an attitude of complete indifference, can hardly be considered such. There can be no doubt, however, but that this gives rise to political speculation and fantasy.

Without any doubt, Armenia and those who stand behind Armenia would very much like to deprive Azerbaijan of its one and only true ally, by hook or by crook. If despite fairly open pressure, Turkey does not agree to review its position with respect to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, attempts may be made to convince Azerbaijan that Ankara is conducting negotiations with Armenia and signing something behind Baku's back—which would have an understandable effect on Azerbaijani-Turkish relations. In this sense, the propagandistic hullabaloo in which the hopes of one side are portrayed as an accomplished fact of "rapprochement" becomes quite an effective tool.

But there exists yet another factor which can in no way be ignored. An end to the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a question of time. And today the superpowers, struggling for influence in the region, are carrying out a notorious "policy with telescopic sight," which envisions the establishment of a system of universal security in the region. Not forgetting about their own interests, of course. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that American plans envisioning the easing of Armenian-Turkish relations do indeed exist. But it is another matter that their practical implementation **is rigidly tied to the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.** For the time being, a search is probably underway on the unofficial level for common areas, during which the Turkish side is taking advantage of the occasion to let its opponents know just what rosy prospects will open up for Armenia if that country rejects the tactics of torpedoing the negotiation process and establishes proper relations with Azerbaijan. Fulfillment of current promises will begin **after such relations are set up.** Therefore, these unofficial contacts are in no position to influence Armenia's chances for success in any way. It is another matter that they realistically enhance Armenia's interest in effecting a quickest possible settlement to the conflict. But after the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is fully settled, implementation of the above-mentioned designs will undoubtedly alter Armenia's economic potential. Yet at the same time it will place that country in very strong economic—and therefore political, as well—dependence on the West. Putting it more simply, following settlement of the Karabakh conflict, the West will buy up Armenia from Russia, and terms of agreement are being discussed right now as to the possible price. It would be naive at the very least to count on Armenia remaining true to its obligations as an ally, rejecting Western credits and investments, and maintaining its pro-Russian orientation. You get to select the tune if you are the one paying for the music. And if Azerbaijan and Armenia turn out to be integrated within the same geopolitical bloc, they will turn into something similar to Greece and Turkey—the United States has demonstrated many times its marvelous ability to reconcile its allies.

Thus, no one has "betrayed" anyone, and no one has conducted negotiations "behind another's back." It is another matter that there are those who would very much like to drive a wedge between Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Democratic Liberal Party Holds 5th Congress

NC1909203895 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 1227 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 19/09/95 NOYAN TAPAN — On September 19, Ramkavar Azatakan Party [Democratic Liberal Party] of Armenia held its fifth Congress. 113 out of 145 delegates elected in 29 out of 36 clubs (local party organizations) attended the Congress.

Having discussed a report by Chairman of Party's Board Ruben Mirzakhanyan, delegates adopted a final resolution. It is said in the document that Ramkavar-Azatakan Party of Armenia must concentrate its efforts on party's internal activities as well as on political issues, strengthen its ranks and structures, extend ties with those strata of the publicity, which may become Party's social basis. Participants of the Congress believe that political activities must be coupled with wide enlighting activities. Delegates consider that the Ramkavar-Azatakan Party of Armenia must remain committed to its centrist positions, the effectiveness of which must be confirmed by practical measures. Remaining in a "constructive opposition" to the current authorities, the Party intends to cooperate with the current Armenian leadership on certain issues.

Participants of the Congress blamed a number of Party's former members for attempts to split the Party.

The Congress elected new Party's Board, consisting of 15 members.

Chairman of the Board will be elected during the first session of the Board. It is expected that Ruben Mirzakhanyan will be re-elected Chairman of the Party's Board.

Azerbaijan

President Aliyev Receives NATO Delegation

NC1909202695 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We begin our program with a report by Ramiz Meshedihesenli from a meeting between Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev and a NATO delegation.

[Begin recording] [Meshedihesenli] Greeting the guests, President Aliyev noted that Azerbaijan is a member of the NATO Partnership For Peace and is ready to act within this framework.

NATO representative (?Angelo Areno) in turn stated that Azerbaijan's accession to the NATO Partnership For Peace program lays the foundation for the development of ties. Expressing satisfaction that Azerbaijan is acting like an independent state, the guest said it is vital to cooperate with Azerbaijan within the framework of international cooperation, for this country has chosen the path of democracy and favors the peaceful end to the protracted war.

In briefing the guests on the socio-political situation in Azerbaijan, our head of state said the republic, which has signed the NATO Partnership For Peace agreement, upholds all the international norms and is ready to wage a struggle for peace to the very end.

[Aliyev] This program aims at consolidating peace in the world, and we consider this a very important goal. We want peace everywhere in the world, including the restoration of the peace in the Caucasus and in our region. As you know, we have faced military aggression from Armenia. The Armenian Armed Forces occupied a part of our territory following this aggression. This shows that all states should work for peace and no state should be allowed to occupy the territory of another state, aggression and occupation should be condemned, the territorial integrity of all countries should be guaranteed, the inviolability of the borders of all countries should be guaranteed, and no state should support separatist movements in another country.

[Meshedihesenli] A number of problems of mutual interest were discussed next. [end recording]

Prime Minister Leaves For Brussels Economic Talks

NC2009061795 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A report from the Council of Ministers Press Service says a delegation headed by Prime Minister Fuad Guliyev left for Brussels today. Talks will be held with EU officials on the purchase and transport of grain and grain products, agricultural chemicals, and seeds from Europe to Azerbaijan. Talks are also envisaged on expanding economic ties between the EU and Azerbaijan.

Difficulties in Relations With Iran Viewed

954F3467A Baku ZERKALO in Russian 2 Sep 95 No 32, p 5

[Interview with Firdousi Alekperov, chairman of the Azerbaijan-Iran Friendship Society, by I. Umudlu; place and date not given: "'State Interests Should Not Have Too Great an Influence on Feelings'—So Believes the Chairman of the Azerbaijan-Iran Friendship Society"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In addition to everything else, the last week or so of August was marked by a clarification of the relationship between the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Baku and Azerbaijan's mass media. Open discussion was seen for the first time. We must state with a feeling of distress that the widely touted traditional closeness and spiritual unity between the peoples of Iran and Azerbaijan is in a state of barely masked crisis. At the request of ZERKALO, Firdousi Alekperov, chairman of the Azerbaijan-Iran Friendship Society, comments on the situation.

[Umudlu] The Tehran mass media are labeling Azerbaijan's journalists who criticize Iran's policy with respect to our country and the publications they work for as "chameleons," "traitors to the Motherland," "pro-American and pro-Zionist mass media," "hirelings of America," etc. The insults are accompanied by threats of physical reprisals against the journalists, and a certain "Baku Hezbollah" is mentioned in this regard. As a person who has accomplished a great deal to establish complete mutual understanding between the peoples of the two countries, how do you comment on this?

[Alekperov] The hostility that has unfortunately been observed in recent times between the Tehran mass media and certain Baku publications does not serve the interests of Azerbaijan or Iran. We must strive to bring peoples together, not alienate them. The latest events show that despite the good intentions of diplomats and officials, the traditional friendship between our fraternal peoples is not undergoing the best of times. We must do everything possible to set our relationship on a sound footing and avoid everything that runs counter to the interests of our two countries.

[Umudlu] This is fine, but in private conversations with Iranians we sometimes hear allegations to the effect that the Azerbaijanis are an ungrateful people, that here we are helping you to such a great extent, but in the matter of the 5-percent shared participation in the oil consortium you have cast us aside and are supporting the Americans. There is the sense that in recognizing this to be the case, our southern neighbors simply wonder as to how there can even be talk of friendly feelings.

[Alekperov] But many of our citizens use similar thinking to judge another situation. Iran talks of brotherhood and Islamic solidarity, but at the same time is trading happily with Armenia, supplying it with needed fuel and commodities, and not adopting, the way a brother should, Azerbaijan's definitive position as a party subjected to aggression. One thing is forgotten here—every country has its own economic interests. It is a country's own business to determine with whom it establishes close relations. Yes, Iran has close economic and political ties with Armenia. Over half of Armenia's foreign trade is attributable to Iran—major interests are at stake here. Just as Azerbaijan has its own interests in "the oil question," and certain accusations directed towards us are inappropriate. In conducting its trade with Azerbaijan, Iran has introduced restrictions on certain commodities proceeding from its own economic interests. In my view, you must strive for a situation where economic and political interests do not have too great an influence on the feelings of friendship people have towards one another.

[Umudlu] Then we have information that in occupied territory, at the Khudaferinskiy Bridge in Dzhebrailskiy Rayon, a border market is operating quite successfully where Armenians are engaged in the trade of property stolen from seized Azerbaijani lands.... This evokes understandable feelings, primarily among our refugee population, which totals about a million.

[Alekperov] I too have heard about this but cannot confirm it. The appropriate state organs are silent in this regard, neither confirming nor denying the existence of such trading on our border, even as it is under occupation. If this were actually the case, official Baku would undoubtedly have registered a protest. But newspapers do not always print the truth.

[Umudlu] Who is financing the activity of your society? Significant financial expenditures must be required here.

[Alekperov] The Azerbaijan-Iran Friendship Society was established a year ago at my own personal initiative. It has local branches in several regions of Azerbaijan. Its 200 or so members include not just citizens of our country, but subjects of Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan as well. I have believed, and continue to believe, that Iran is our great neighbor where about 30 million of our ethnic brothers reside. The 60 million people of Iran are our brothers through religious beliefs. A great deal links our two countries. Members of the society do not pay dues. As you know, I head a number of trade and economic structures in certain of the CIS countries. The Friendship Society is financed through my own personal allocations. I believe it is necessary to promote friendship between the peoples of Azerbaijan and Iran, and I am striving in this manner to be useful to my people and my country. We are thinking about opening a travel agency in Baku and planning to direct the profits of this organization towards the needs of the society.

[Umudlu] Forgive me for asking, but there are rumors to the effect that Iran is financing certain organizations in Azerbaijan....

[Alekperov] They are not without substantiation. I too have such information. Naturally, such actions serve to put our citizens on their guard with respect to Iran and have a negative effect on the building of mutual trust. In my view, however, financial support to organizations from another state may be effected within the framework of the law, and this may be done openly—if there is nothing reprehensible in such support. The law must have its say here. It seems to me there is no reason to be alarmed. Thank God everything has been placed under control in recent years, and so there simply cannot be anything unlawful in this sphere, in my view.

Aliyev on Liberation of Occupied Lands

NC1909181495

[FBIS Editorial Report] Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri at 1446 GMT on 18 September carries live coverage of a cultural ceremony in Baku marking the 110th birthday anniversary of Azerbaijani composer, scholar, and public figure Uzeyir Hajibeyov, 1885-1949.

Opening the ceremony at 1448 GMT, Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev delivers a 50-minute speech praising Hajibeyov's contributions to Azerbaijani culture.

Noting the fact that Hajibeyov attended a primary school in Shusha, Aliyev says: "Uzeyir Hajibeyov lived his early years in Shusha. Shusha is a holy and sacred city for each Azerbaijani. As I have said, Uzeyir Hajibeyov always struggled for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. In reading the articles written by Uzeyir Hajibeyov in 1918-1920 you realize how relevant his views are to modern times. The same situation has reemerged in the form of Armenia's aggression against Azerbaijan, its attempt to usurp Azerbaijani lands, and of Azerbaijani patriots defending Azerbaijan. A similar situation existed at the time of Uzeyir Hajibeyov, who also worked in defense of Azerbaijan. Regrettably history has ordained the present situation, and we, all together, are working to defend and protect Azerbaijan's independence and its territorial integrity by walking along the path laid by people like Uzeyir Hajibeyov."

Aliyev then adds that after the capture of Shusha by Armenia in May 1992, "the occupationists" vandalized the busts of the Azerbaijani intellectuals by firing at them, including that of Hajibeyov's and that these busts were eventually brought to Azerbaijan via Georgia. Aliyev adds: "This fact shows how savage people can become. There is no limit to fascism, savagery, and vandalism. This is evinced by the actions of the Armenian occupationists. But let not the Armenian ocuupationists think that those bullets could undermine the creativity of Uzeyir Hajibeyov, Bulbul, and Nahtavan, or undermine the Azerbaijan people's morale. The occupation of Shusha can not be perpetual. No it cannot be. In marking the 110th anniversary of Uzeyir Hajibeyov, we declare our certainty that the spirit of Uzeyir Hajibeyov will live on and all the places where he lived will be turned into places of pilgrimage. We are certain that the Azerbaijani lands will be liberated from the Armenian occupiers; we are certain that Shusha will be liberated; we are certain that the whole of Karabakh and all the occupied lands will be liberated and independent Azerbaijan will recover all its lands and borders. There is a solid basis for achieving this. The cease-fire in the Armenian-Azerbaijan war has been holding for the last 16 months. We are working to liberate our lands and ensure our territorial integrity by this means, by peaceful means. This is evidenced by the efforts undertaken, the activities of the international organizations, our activity within the international organizations, and our purposeful policy. The major world powers are also exerting efforts for the peaceful resolution of this problem; they are active within the international organizations and the Minsk Group. And I am sure that they will step up their activities henceforth, because no state should condone occupation, separatism, and aggression. If this is so, if there is justice and fairness, and if international norms are still going to be applied in this world, then our endeavor is just and we will achieve the solution of these problems with justice and peace. At the same time, Uzeyir Hajibeyov's creativity calls on people to be patriots. Even today his creativity calls on the Azerbaijani citizens to be patriots. If we are today commemorating Uzeyir Hajibeyov's memory and highly appraising his creativity, we must then amplify our patriotic feelings which were the apex of his creativity. We must prepare ourselves for the future with these feelings in our hearts. We must recover our own lands, we must solve problems by peaceful means, and Shusha, Karabakh, and all the occupied lands will be liberated at any cost and by any means by the will of the Azerbaijani people and by the bravery of the heroic sons of Azerbaijan, thus ensuring the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan."

Reception of Azerbaijan Television ended abruptly at 1640 GMT. The cultural program was still in progress.

Aliyev's Decree on Delegation to UNGA Reported

NC1809180095 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 16 Sep 95

[Text of President Geydar Aliyev's decree on the structure of Azerbaijan's delegation to the UN General Assembly [UNGA] on 16 September]

[FBIS Translated Text] The structure of Azerbaijan's delegation to the UN General Assembly, which will convene from 25 September to 14 October, is approved as follows:

Members:

1. Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov, head of the delegation.

2. Eldar Guliyev, deputy head of the delegation and member of the Azerbaijan permanent delegation to the United Nations.

3. Araz Azimov, deputy foreign minister and head of the Foreign Ministry International Affairs Department.

4. Yashar Aliyev, adviser to the Azerbaijan permanent delegation to the United Nations.

5. Rifat Nowruzov, adviser to the Azerbaijan permanent delegation to the United Nations.

Deputy Members:

1. Elmar Mamedyarov, deputy head of the Foreign Ministry International Affairs Department.

2. Ershad Nesirov, deputy head of the Foreign Ministry International Affairs Department.

3. Elchin Emirbayev, third secretary of the Azerbaijan permanent delegation to the United Nations.

[Signed] Geydar Aliyev, president of Azerbaijan.

Baku City. Date: 16 September 1995

Parliament Consents to Former Foreign Minister's Arrest

NC1909190695 Baku TURAN in English 1042 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Baku 19/09/95 (TURAN) — Today the Milli Mejlis consented for Tofig Gasimov's bringing to trial by the majority of votes.

Eldar Gasanov, General Prosecutor made a speech. He said that Tofig Gasimov together with the Deputy Interior Minister Rovshan Javadov and with Farman Demirkol, the Supreme Soviet official tied a criminal link and prepared to the coup d'etat. According to the Prosecutor they began this activity since January 14th. The shorthand records of the Strategical Investigation Centre witnesses that Gasimov said about the impossibility of legally coming to power in Azerbaijan and challenged the political and military opposition to unite for seizure of power, said the Prosecutor. He also offered that the delegates consented to Tofig Gasimov's bringing to trial according to the Article 57th of the Criminal Code of Azerbaijan (Coup d'etat attempt).

The opposition delegates opposed the offer and stated that Tofig Gasimov's accusation was ridiculous. The delegate Fattayev noted that due to the President's order the list of persons who may turn out to be of much threat to the current regime has been drawn up . "Gasimov's prosecution witnesses the beginning of the campaign and the upcoming elections will be non-democratic" said Fattayev.

Delegate Rustamkhanli called this accusation "unproved" and noted some special merrits of Tofig Gasimov in the democratic movement of Azerbaijan.

The Speaker of the Parliament Rasul Guliyev said that there were enough ground for the arrest of Tofig Gasimov and supported General Prosecutor's offer. [passage omitted]

Supreme Court Annuls Decision Banning Communist Party

NC1909194595 Baku TURAN in English 1012 GMT 19 Sep 95

[Supreme Court Presidium Declines Decision on Liquiadation of Communist Party of Azerbaijan—TURAN headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku 19/09/95 (TURAN) — The Presidium of the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan considered a question concerning the liquidation of the Communust Party of Azerbaijan on September 18.

The Presidium annuled a decision on Communist Party liquidation. Thereby the Communist Party of Azerbaijan will exist. Yesterday's session did not considered a question concerning the Islam Party and it can hardly be considered next week, according to source in the Supreme Council.

The decision on Communist Party's liquidation was adopted by the Supreme Court in early September. This decision was motivated by the contradiction in the party programme and in the constitution of the republic, calling to establishment of the USSR.

Now the Presidium of the Supreme Council declined the decision of subordinating instance. The decision of the Presidium notes that the statements that the Communist Party's goal was the restoration of the USSR was groundless. The Charter of the Party says that it stands for the social justice and democracy, notes the information of the Supreme Council.

Georgia

Chernomyrdin, Shevardnadze on Mutual Ties

MM1909154295 Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 Sep 95 pp 1,3

[Report by Olga Solomonova: "Military Bases, Bread, and Friendship Were Discussed Last Friday By the Russian Government Chairman and the Head of the Georgian State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi — The greeting for Viktor Chernomyrdin at Tbilisi airport and the farewell were ceremonial — flags, anthems, honor guard, red carpet.. It was an official visit and a very senior Russian delegation. Eduard Shevardnadze, head of the Georgian state, described the delegation membership as "unprecedented."

In fact, in recent years Georgia has not been graced with high-level visits by Russian leaders. As is known, in 1992-1993 relations between our countries had reached a virtual impasse for various reasons. The improvement was slow, but consistent. Last February the Russian president and the head of the Georgian Republic concluded a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and good-neighborliness.

One might say that the Russian premier's present visit has breathed life into the good intentions and words of that major treaty. The result was the signing of several important documents — treaties and agreements between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia: on mutual legal assistance in civil, criminal, and family cases; on Russian military bases on Georgian territory; on the coordination of the activities of railroad transport; on the legal status of Russian Federation citizens permanently resident on Georgian territory and

Georgian citizens on Russian territory; on cooperation in the sphere of currency and exports control, and so on.

Clearly, the conclusion of the treaty on military bases was the result of major efforts by the Russian side. The military bases in the Caucasus, particularly in Georgia, are of great strategic importance in the Russian Federation state security system. There were Russian military subunits (formerly Soviet) in Georgia before and they are there even now. But when the republic became an independent state, their presence here ceased to be legitimate and was in question. Now it is entirely legal. Moreover, as Eduard Shevardnadze said at the press conference, a protocol signed by the heads of the Russian Federation and Georgian defense ministries provides additional military camps for Russian military subunits.

For our state this treaty is the chief political result of Viktor Chernomyrdin's visit.

But by no means everyone in Georgia views it with a "sense of profound satisfaction." As Eduard Shevardnadze noted, "a great deal of explanatory work will be needed here." What lies behind these apparently insignificant, vague words are the complex political and economic problems of the Georgian state and its leader, who, judging by the recent attempt on his life, has many enemies. But friendship with Russia and its assistance are necessary not only and not so much to him — they are necessary to Georgian citizens, most of whom are currently without permanent work and without normal means of existence. Of course, the Russian economy is not exactly flourishing either, but the state of the Georgian economy can be described close to total paralysis.

The Russian Government chairman was frank about this: "I believe that questions of fuel, energy, transport, and food are the main component of the economic group of adopted documents."

There is no official statement in these documents of Russia's position on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. It was discussed during a private conversation between Viktor Chernomyrdin and Eduard Shevardnadze and indirectly reflected in the joint statement on the development and deepening of cooperation between the Russian Federation and Republic of Georgia.

It should be pointed out that it is in connection with the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict that the Russian leadership has been most often accused of lacking a clear and consistent policy on the Caucasus. It is no longer a secret that originally Russia tacitly supported Abkhazia's desire for sovereignty. Later it began to realize the disastrous nature of this shift, and following the events in Chechnya the danger of this position became even more obvious. Now it is absolutely clear, although not to everyone, unfortunately, that it is pointless for Russia to interfere in another state's internal conflicts — it should sort out its own. But Russian politicians are not in danger of assuming the role of neutral arbiter as yet; they are more likely to be attracted by the laurels of active peacemakers.

In Tbilisi, Viktor Chernomyrdin answered your TRUD correspondent's question, saying: "We want Georgia to be a single, integral state... We Russians will participate with it in the solution of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. By normal, civilized means. There will be a meeting with the leaders of Abkhazia in the very near future to that end..."

Russia's policy in the Caucasus is becoming increasingly clear and responsible and, as the prime minister's visit top Georgia showed, expresses our country's interests and contributed to the establishment of friendly relations with new independent states.

Chernomyrdin Gives Georgian News Conference

MM1909130895 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Sep 95 pp 1, 7

[Report by Aleksandr Krasulin: "Russian Flags on Rustaveli Avenue"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During Russian Federation Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's visit to Georgia a large package of documents was signed.

"Russian-Georgian relations have been developing quite well in recent years but I think that the present visit and the agreements which have been signed will lend them additional impetus, primarily in the economic field. It is the economic aspects today which most perturb Russians and the inhabitants of Georgia." Russian Federation Government Chairman Viktor Chernomyrdin stated this at a joint press conference with Eduard Shevardnadze, chairman of the Georgian parliament and head of state, summing up the results of his official one-day visit to the Republic of Georgia.

The visit ended with a mix-up to which, incidentally, no one attached special importance. On part of the route along which the government cortege was moving the Russian flags were hanging... upside down. I managed to ascertain later that the Georgian Foreign Ministry protocol department's mistake was discovered by a Russian diplomat on the way to the airport where the Russian head of government's aircraft was about to land.

A telephone call to the Georgian foreign policy department's protocol section caused commotion among its staffers. All the region's available trucks with hoists were immediately dispatched to the route the eminent guest was to follow. The emergency work was halted only when the cortege was leaving the airport....

The stay in Tbilisi of the representative Russian delegation which included two vice premiers and the defense minister took place with a view to developing and lending specific detail to the treaty on friendship, cooperation, and good-neighborliness between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia which was signed during Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to the Republic of Georgia. The sides discussed a broad range of political and economic issues and the prospects for cooperation in the field of science, technology, and culture.

Eduard Shevardnadze reported at the joint press conference that the sides had signed a big package of documents.

They also agreed to restructure Georgia's debt to Russia. Considering the complex food situation in Georgia, the Russian Federation is sending Tbilisi 150,000 tonnes of grain in humanitarian aid. In the period from November this year through March 1996 Russia will supply 400 million cubic meters of natural gas and 20,000 tonnes of compressed gas.

There was a discussion of the question of transporting oil from Azerbaijan, which will be resolved with a consideration for the two countries' interests. Agreement was also reached on the conclusion by 1 November of an intergovernmental agreement in the field of merchant shipping. The relevant document has already been prepared but the Russian side has rejected it since some issues have to be discussed with the Abkhazian leadership.

Naturally, the talks did not avoid the question of the settlement of the Abkhazian-Georgian and Ossetian-Georgian conflicts. The statement notes in particular that the sides resolutely denounced aggressive separatism and terrorism in any manifestations and advocated the inviolability of existing borders. They consider the most important task to be the acceleration of the process of the return of refugees to their permanent homes on the basis of a quadripartite agreement.

The sides noted with satisfaction the positive advances in the settlement of the Ossetian-Georgian conflict and confirmed their intention to promote the economic restoration of the afflicted regions.

"We Russians favor an integral, united Georgian state," Viktor Chernomyrdin stressed at the press conference. "We are in favor of taking a joint part in the conflict's solution. We shall meet in the very near future with representatives of Abkhazia and this problem will be solved gently or not but by normal, civilized means."

Answering your ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent's question about whether Abkhazia's demand for a confederative state with Georgia will be considered, a member of the Russian delegation noted that at the initial stage of the talks Vladislav Ardzinba agreed with the state's federative structure. But later he abandoned this position.

Late on Friday evening the Russian premier left Tbilisi for the city of Uralsk (Kazakhstan) where he had informal talks with Kazakhstan president Nursultan Nazarbayev on topical economic problems and questions of the intensification of integration.

Abkhazia Concerned Over Chernomyrdin Visit

MK1909124595 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 1

[Report by Yuriy Golotyuk: "Chernomyrdin's Visit to Tbilisi Could End in a War in Abkhazia. Causes: Russian Military Bases in Georgia and the Oil Pipeline"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's visit to Tbilisi unexpectedly greatly aggravated the situation in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian confrontation. As your SEGODNYA correspondent was advised at the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, by yesterday evening the situation on the border with Abkhazia was "serious" and continued to grow hotter: "Preparations for active combat operations continued on the Georgian and Abkhazian side."

Georgian head of state Eduard Shevardnadze said in an interview with national radio yesterday that during Chernomyrdin's visit Russia undertook the task of helping to organize and upgrade the Georgian armed forces. A treaty on Russian military bases in Georgia was signed: Three bases will be set up on the republic's territory — in Vaziani (30 km to the south of Tbilisi), Akhakalaki (south of Georgia), and Batumi (Adzharia). Furthermore, the document defines quotas for Russian tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery, and other types of weapons on Georgian territory. According to Shevardnadze, Georgia signed this document "based on its own national interest." Speaker of the Georgian parliament Vakhtang Goguadze directly linked the Russian bases with the "problem of Georgia's territorial integrity."

In any case, another question, also discussed in Tbilisi — the oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to the Black Sea — may prove more important, because during conflicts oil and oil revenues are usually of primary importance, while tanks and artillery come only second. The Georgian leader did not rule out that the pipeline can pass via two routes: through Georgia and through Russia. And although the Russian premier noted that "the final decision on the route for the future pipeline rests exclusively with an international consortium," Shevardnadze put special emphasis on the Russian premier's words that: "Russia will understand whatever decision it makes." No less important, the Georgian leader said, is Chernomyrdin's declaration, made during the course of negotiations, that the Russian leadership intends "to undertake decisive measures immediately" to settle the conflict in Georgia. Considering that the meeting adopted a "joint decision to open railway communications between Russia and Georgia via Abkhazian territory," this sounded sinister.

Sources in Sukhumi told your SEGODNYA correspondent that the Abkhazia Security Council is seriously concerned over reports from Tbilisi. According to an official statement, the Security Council has information that Georgia and Russia are preparing a joint military operation to "restore Georgia's territorial integrity." It is maintained that "to this end battleships and other vessels have been transferred to Georgia which will ensure the landing of a Georgian assault force on Abkhazia's territory. To cover their operation, the vessels can use Russian flags and land the assault force on the territory of the Russian Border Troops naval base in the town of Ochamchira." The Abkhazia Security Council also says that "concurrently with this landing, joint military actions are also planned by the Georgian armed forces already infiltrated in the Galskiy Rayon of Abkhazia via the Inguri River, and by some Russian peacekeeping forces."

The Russian Paratroopers Headquarters hastened to deny reports of the preparation of a paratrooper regiment based in Abkhazia for combat action "for the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity." The Paratroopers Press Service yesterday officially announced that "units of the guards paratroopers regiment stationed in the town of Gudauta are performing the same peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia's Galskiy Rayon as before." Nonetheless, a source in the Russian Defense Ministry confirmed to your SEGODNYA correspondent that Russian paratroopers and peacekeeping units in Abkhazia are on high alert (adding, however, that "they are constantly on high alert in this region"). Moreover, the source said that yesterday a formal casus belli occurred which could accelerate a tragic course of events: A peacekeeper stepped on an antipersonnel mine in the Russian battalion's zone of operations.

Ardzinba on Abkhazia Military Situation

MM1909143595 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Sep 95 p 7

[Interview with Vladislav Ardzinba, president of Abkhazia, by Yevgeniy Sheronov, in Sochi, September 1995: "Vladislav Ardzinba on the Situation in Abkhazia: Sights Set on the Republic" — first two paragraphs are introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] Things are quiet in Abkhazia. There are few vehicles or pedestrians in the cities. In Sukhumi the cafes are open and newspapers are on sale in the newsstands. The hot sun is beating down on the asphalt. There are cobwebs floating in the air. It is fall. The beaches are empty — it is the start of the fall vacation but there are no vacationers. At the end of September there will be a great festival — the second anniversary of the end of the war. There will be a military parade and the traditional horse races. People will remember the grim fighting and raise their glasses in memory of those who fell. Then life will return to normal and it will be tough. There is no work or money and little food. Pensions are not being paid. The republic is in a state of suspended animation....

That was how Sochi journalist Yevgeniy Sheronov saw Sukhumi last week. Just a few days later gunshots rang out there again. Yuriy Voronov, vice premier of the Abkhazian Government, was killed. But from an interview the president of the republic gave shortly before that incident it is easy to see that people have their sights trained on Abkhazia constantly and won't let it live and develop peacefully.

Sochi, September 1995 — [Sheronov] Vladislav Grigoryevich, what is Abkhazia's political status now?

[Ardzinba] The political situation in our country is determined by the adoption of the Constitution of Abkhazia on 6 November 1994 which spells everything out. According to the verdict of the international specialists our Constitution meets the world standards. Our Fundamental Law could be the constitution of any small European state.

Equipped with this Constitution we are looking for a way to settle our mutual relations with Georgia. That is the purpose of the talks which have been going on for over two years between the Abkhazian and Georgian sides through the mediation of the Russian Federation and under the United Nations' auspices. A number of important, positive results have been achieved. For example, the Moscow statement of 4 April 1995 has been adopted. The corresponding document on refugees has been signed. It is a matter of great regret that the Russian Foreign Ministry has begun backing down from this document, trying to pretend that it does not exist. This is highly dangerous. If we back down from that document the quadripartite agreement on refugees will lose force too. Everything will have to start from the beginning again. We are not changing our position, but to our great regret we are the ones on whom they are trying to impose the principles of a settlement that we have never recognized and never signed with anyone.

The so-called "new proposals" mean that Georgia will become a federal state. This is being presented as a great breakthrough. In the first place the principles of federalism that Georgia is talking about do not actually exist. This is a question of the provincial division of a state's territories. But a province is not a component of a federation.

On the other hand, I am sorry to say that there is nothing new in the idea of federalism for Georgia. We proposed that idea before the war. Furthermore, Soviet Georgia emerged and existed as a federal state. Under the 1927 Georgian Constitution Abkhazia and Georgia had treaty-based relations with one another. Even under the last Soviet Constitution, when Abkhazia formed part of Georgia with the rights of an autonomous formation, this was a federation. Thus there is nothing new in the new idea.

Today we favor the relations of equal components. Relations of territorial integrity can emerge from that framework. This does not mean that Abkhazia forms part of Georgia but that Georgia and Abkhazia conclude an equitable treaty between themselves. These are fundamentally different things. But in Georgia they refuse to even hear about this. They refuse even to take on board the word "federation." And they are proposing something quite different. And enigmatic. They say that Abkhazia will be given a special status. We have not yet heard what that means. Perhaps by this special status Mr. Shevardnadze is thinking of some kind of chair so that we can sit next to him?.. We take a different attitude to the problem.

Russia's stance plays an important role here. For me Russia means a great state and a great people. But in this great Russia there is a company called the Foreign Ministry which has been pursuing an extremely inept foreign policy — if it can be called a foreign policy. There are those people who think that you can resolve questions without having even the slightest knowledge of Caucasian history and that you only have to eat a little satsivi and drink a little Kinzmarauli or Tsinandali wine or a mixture of the two and you are qualified to resolve Abkhazia's problems and make statements about the country. Such a "policy" was appropriate several decades ago, perhaps, but it is a very sensitive issue today.

[Sheronov] Shevardnadze calls you a separatist. Could you sit at the negotiating table together?

[Ardzinba] I have been through all that. As you know, Shevardnadze came to Abkhazia, to Gudauta to be precise. We had talks with Grachev as mediator. We have already been through all that before. We had a very understanding talk. That was last year. I am fully prepared for dialogue at any time, even today. Just suggest a place outside Abkhazia or Georgia. We have to meet in a calm atmosphere. And discuss all the problems, many of which would have been resolved. But unfortunately I have the feeling that Shevardnadze is trying to cobble together certain forces and he still has not fully realized the significance of what has happened recently. Beginning with the war.

[Sheronov] The Georgian parliament has refused to adopt the articles of the new Constitution on the territorial and administrative organization of its state before the settlement of relations with Abkhazia....

[Ardzinba] No, that is not how they worded it: Not before the normalization of mutual relations with Abkhazia but before the restoration of Georgian jurisdiction over Abkhazia. Such a formulation of the question shows precisely that the Georgian approach is unrealistic. This is highly regrettable.

[Sheronov] The Russian blockade is continuing. What is the economic situation in the republic today?

[Ardzinba] It is important for us to resolve the problem of the normal import and export of goods and the normal functioning of the border. The way that it functions in relations with other neighbors. We are in a difficult situation, and the sections of the population suffering most from this are those who are dependent on wages and pensions. A certain number of enterprises cannot function normally because of the blockade. This means that people are not getting their pay.

To make matters worse the republic has suffered tremendous damage from the elements. In Abkhazian there is a saying: "He fell out of the tree and was bitten by a snake." Something similar happened with us. We have survived a very difficult war, we are trying to get back on our feet, and then we are hit a great flood. No one can remember such rainfall, not even the very oldest people. There has been much devastation on our republic's territory. A lot of food was lost. But while this was going on Shevardnadze urged Russia not to give us any help. How can you negotiate with a state with people like that who simply want us to starve to death? Is this what they call the "normalization of relations"?

We were very grateful for the decision of the Russian Government, which was the first to come to Abkhazia's aid at that difficult time. Admittedly, so far we have only received a meager quantity of that humanitarian aid. There have been several obstacles to the movement of humanitarian freight. This aid will be received and distributed with the participation of a public commission so that not a single kilo goes missing.

Meanwhile, Georgia has received aid worth several hundred million dollars. Incidentally, its debt currently stands at about $1 billion. Abkhazia has virtually no debt.

[Sheronov] What is being done to lift the economic blockade?

[Ardzinba] We weren't the ones who imposed the blockade on 19 December 1994. This regime was introduced at Georgia's request. I have the relevant documents — they show who asked what. The pretext, as you know, was provided by the events in Chechnya. It was and remains purely a Foreign Ministry initiative. There is absolutely no doubt about that. Generally speaking all the intrigues against Abkhazia originate there because Mr. Shevardnadze is still perceived there as leader of the Foreign Ministry. They are ready to take him straight back.... He has important protectors in Russia. You understand that dividing a great state into pieces and selling it off — people do not forget that kind of stunt. That is why whenever things get difficult for him he kicks up a fuss. And his friends say: Look, they are insulting our pal. I have information to suggest that the West has grown really tired of his outbursts. In principle, he has already shown that he has nothing in common with democracy.

[Sheronov] The military threat to Abkhazia has still not been lifted. And hotheads in Georgia are calling for a new war....

[Ardzinba] After the victory the population was left with a large quantity of weapons on its hands. Bearing in mind the threat that exists we adopted a special provision whereby weapons are not removed from the population but are registered and permits are issued. A citizen has the right to keep a weapon. That is an important point: Not to bear arms but to keep them. Only those services which directly perform law enforcement and other special tasks are authorized to bear arms. That is the first thing that we did. In view of the fact that the population is fairly well armed and has the necessary means for defense, subunits were set up across the whole of Abkhazia's territory and the republic's inhabitants were enlisted into them. There are battalions, regiments, and brigades. In addition, we have regular subunits — tanks, artillery, air defense, and much else. Young draftees serve there. So we have a combination of reservists who stay at home but have weapons and youngsters who are undergoing military training. As soon as the signal is given the whole population can be called to arms. From the military viewpoint I would not advise anyone to send tanks into Abkhazia or land an assault force here right now because they would be met by well-armed people. The most important thing is that our people have experience of war. But we do not want a resumption of war. Furthermore, if we manage to reach agreement with Georgia with, for example, great Russia and the international organizations standing as guarantors of it we would be prepared to declare Abkhazia a weapon-free zone — and then melt those weapons down.

[Sheronov] What is the current situation on the border along the Psou River?

[Ardzinba] The air border is essentially still closed despite the fact that our airfield is operational and all the landing and takeoff systems and the relevant services are still working — and all to a high standard. Several times when we were allowed to land planes we showed that all the services are working normally. But the airfield is not functioning now. This creates tremendous problems for the population. As for seaports, the Georgian ports of Batumi and Poti are open to Russian ships. The Abkhazian port of Sukhumi remains closed for some reason.

[Sheronov] Who is controlling the port of Sukhumi?

[Ardzinba] Russian border troops. They receive all the ships arriving in Sukhumi from Turkey and inspect them. Consequently all the talk that we are importing things that we shouldn't is groundless — everything is checked.

[Sheronov] Border guards are protecting the border. Order within the republic is being maintained by the police. What about the crime situation?

[Ardzinba] To be honest, people want order. Such as existed before perestroyka. Previously 70 percent of Abkhazia's law enforcement organs' personnel were Georgians, but now we have a large shortage of skilled personnel. But compared with last year the most serious crimes — armed robbery, theft, and murder — have fallen by 30-35 percent even though we are a territory which has known war and which still has a large quantity of arms on it. If those arms were in another part of Russia I believe that the consequences there would be far more serious than they are in our country. People are firmly insisting that order be constantly tightened here.

[Sheronov] A girl came in today with an artificial limb. She was returning home after treatment in Sochi. She had stepped on a mine. How is the mine clearance program proceeding now?

[Ardzinba] Let me talk about limb replacements first. After the war around 300 people were fitted with artificial limbs. Most of them had stepped on mines. Initially we made artificial limbs in Moscow, Leningrad, and elsewhere. Then at our request the International Red Cross established a center in Gagra. Now our fighters are able to have replacement limbs fitted here. But the mine threat remains. There have been offers to help us with mine clearance but nothing has happened and the threat is great, especially in Ochamchirskiy Rayon where the plantations were mined. We cannot work the land at the moment and there are frequent explosions — with children the victims in particular. There is also a threat in the Gumista region where the front line used to run. On a single kilometer of the territory of the water intake along the Gumista River 1,000 mines were removed — around 300 were antitank mines, the rest were antipersonnel — arranged in layers of two or three. The former Soviet Army transferred a huge amount of arms and ammunition to Georgia — they brought it all here.

The aim was that the Gumista River would form the border of an ethnically pure Abkhazia cleansed of Russians, Armenians, Greeks, and Abkhazians. Everyone else expelled from this ethnically pure territory was supposed to live on the land between the Gumista and the Psou. During the war we obtained information on a conversation between Western envoys accredited in Georgia. One of them has already been replaced, the other is still working. They were discussing with UN representatives the question that ethnic cleansing is a factor in the stabilization of the situation. Top democrats were openly discussing ethnic cleansing! This is effectively what has happened. Jews were deported from Georgian-occupied territory and sent to Israel, the Greeks were deported to Greece, the Armenians fled of their own accord, and the Abkhazians were simply wiped out.

We have not deported a single person. We were simply on the offensive. People who feared the consequences of fighting against us were forced to flee as the troops approached. I am sorry but these are different things.

[Sheronov] How many Georgians are living in Abkhazia now?

[Ardzinba] We have signed a document which makes a binding commitment to organize the return home of those people who did not fight, rape, or plunder. As a result of our rapid offensive in the fall of 1993 we got hold of lists of all the military subunits which existed on Abkhazian territory. We have the daily field reports of the Interior Ministry, which operated on the territory of occupied Sukhumi. We know what crimes were committed here, we know who was robbed and killed. These lists have been amalgamated and we know many of the people who committed crimes. These people are automatically excluded from the repatriation program. People who did not take part in the military actions have the right to return home in accordance with the quadripartite agreement.

We began this process last year. In the space of six weeks 1,126 people were given permission to return to Galskiy Rayon. But only 386 wanted to return. The rest refused to go back. Killings began in Galskiy Rayon and groups of saboteurs appeared there. That is why the repatriation process was temporarily suspended.

The Abkhazian side took the initiative again and we said: Let us register everyone who has returned independently to Galskiy Rayon — there are around 40,000 such people now. At the same time we thought that around 200 people a week would apply to return across the bridge over the Inguri River. Officially. But the Georgian side turned that down. They want the refugees to return several thousand at a time. They want them to get on the bus and go. Without any checks being made. But we had information that among the refugees there would be people who had been involved in military organizations. Their weapons were hidden on our territory and they could create a situation that would threaten war in Galskiy Rayon. Of course we could not agree to that. We were forced to begin registration on our own. We have registered around 6,000 of the 40,000 people in Galskiy Rayon today. But if the Georgian side starts sending refugees across the Inguri River bridge again we are ready for that.

In addition to these people there are several thousand Svanetians living in the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia. In all there are more than 70,000 Georgians living in Abkhazia today. There have been no excesses or clashes. Go to Sukhumi market and you will see many Georgians, especially Mingrelians, speaking Mingrelian....

Voronov Murder Designed To Destabilize Abkhazia

MM1909150095 Moscow TRUD in Russian
16 Sep 95 pp 1, 5

[Report by Igor Chernov: "Why Was Voronov Taken Out?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sukhumi-Sochi — Yuriy Voronov, vice premier of the Republic of Abkhazia

Government, was buried in Sukhumi yesterday. He was shot at point-blank range with an assault rifle late on the evening of 11 September right outside his own apartment. Thousands of people went to bid farewell to Yuriy Nikolayev, and a whole sea of flowers was left on the roads along which the funeral procession passed.

It is already known who killed Voronov. Three suspects have been arrested and a fourth is being sought. According to Anri Dzhergeniya, Republic of Abkhazia general prosecutor, the investigation team has irrefutable proof that one of those arrested was the direct perpetrator of the terrorist act. When he was firing his Kalashnikov he was wounded by a bullet which ricocheted off a wall. The suspect's blood was discovered on the landing in front of the deceased's apartment. Nobody in Abkhazia doubts that the only Russian in the republic government was the victim of hit men. The killers were dressed in police uniform and, knowing that nobody except Yuriy Nikolayevich would be at home, they knocked on his door. They said that the vice premier was urgently needed at work and that they had been ordered to accompany him along the unlit streets. The criminals intended to use only knives but Voronov resisted, which is when they opened fire with the assault rifle.

Maybe the hit men will tell investigators their client's name and then we will get an answer to the question: Why was Voronov murdered?

Most people in Abkhazia are sure that the vice premier's murder is connected with recent events in the talks on a peaceful settlement to the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. After all, it is well known that Voronov, an outstanding scholar, doctor of historical sciences, and professor, did not simply advocate Abkhazia's independence but also put the idea of independence on a scientific basis founded on specific historical facts. It was Voronov who was responsible for the thesis on the thousand years of Abkhazian statehood.

The latest round of talks between the Georgian and Abkhazian delegations, which took place in Moscow at the end of August, showed that the sides have practically exhausted the entire stock of compromises and that the process of settling the conflict peacefully is deadlocked. Georgia is offering Abkhazia merely the role of a federation component with wide-ranging rights. This idea is supported by Russia, which is taking a mediator's role in the talks. But the Abkhazians are sticking firmly to their guns, saying that a treaty between Abkhazia and Georgia is possible only if it is between equal states, and are insisting on a confederation.

The Abkhazian side's intransigence served as the reason for the strong accusations made against it by Russian and Georgian representatives. Currently people in Abkhazia believe that Voronov's murder is nothing but a warning to local leaders: If you are stubborn you will get a bullet.

Of course, Sukhumi is saying that the trail of the crime leads back to the opposite bank of the Inguri River dividing Georgia and Abkhazia and that Voronov was murdered in order to sow discord between Russians and Abkhazians. It cannot be ruled out that the Republic of Abkhazia vice premier's murder is also connected with the events now taking place in Abkhazia's Galskiy Rayon, which borders Georgia. Bandit formations which are infiltrating the rayon's territory from the Georgian side are again becoming active there. Abkhazian Foreign Minister Leonid Lakerbaya sent the CIS peacekeeping forces headquarters and the U.N. observer mission letters saying, in particular, that according to the information available to Abkhazian special services certain Georgian forces will attempt to capture Galskiy Rayon 16-17 September.

At the moment one thing is clear: The assassination of Voronov certainly had the aim of destabilizing the situation in Abkhazia and sowing nervousness and panic. To some extent it has succeeded.

Parliament Debates Terrorism, Corruption, Monetary Reform

LD1909120395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1036 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tbilisi, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — Georgia will soon declare war against corruption and step up efforts to combat terrorism, the Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze told parliament in Tbilisi Tuesday.

He spoke against including terrorism in the agenda of the session on which deputies insisted. Shevardnadze added that whatever had been said about acts of terrorism must not be repeated at this stage in the interests of the investigation. [as received]

The leader of Mkhedrioni organization Jaba Ioseliani, several of whose close associates are in custody as suspects involved in the attempt on the life of Shevardnadze, demanded the formation of a parliamentary commission to investigate the acts of terrorism. He accounted for the need for such a commission by the abuses of the official investigation.

Deputy chief of the Georgian Security Service Temir Khachishvili and Chairman of the Rescue Corps Giga Gelashvili, both Mkhedrioni leaders, have been named among the organizers of the acts of terrorism in which Deputy Interior Minister Giya Gulua, the leader of the National Democratic Party Georgy Chanturia and the

Chairman of the Democracy and Revival Fund Soliko Khabeishvili were killed.

After a long debate deputies got down to the discussion on monetary reform.

"I think that after the adoption of the constitution, the decision to introduce a proper national currency is an important step bringing us closer to a strong state," Shevardnadze declared. He urged parliament to support the reform decision.

Tbilisi Police Reinforce Against 'Terrorist Acts'

LD1909120895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1036 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tbilisi, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — All the police posts in Tbilisi and its outskirts have been reinforced with special troops because of plans laid by a group, connected to terrorists who have committed several murders and made an attempt upon the life of Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze, to destabilize the local situation, sources at the Georgian Interior Ministry's press center told INTERFAX Tuesday.

Terrorist acts staged in the past year and a half in Tbilisi have resulted in the death of Deputy Georgian Interior Minister Giya Gulua, leader of the National-Democratic Party Georgy Chanturia and Chairman of the Fund for Democracy and Revival Soliko Khabeishvili. An attempt to assassinate Shevardnadze was made on August 29.

According to the sources, an investigation into the terrorist acts is continuing. "More names of the terrorists will be made public soon," they added.

Organizers of terrorist acts whose names have been made public are deputy head of the Georgian Security Service Temur Khachishvili and Chairman of the Rescuer Corps Giga Gelashvili. According to Georgian Interior Minister Shota Kviraya, both of them have pleaded guilty.

Khachishvili and Gelashvili headed the Mkhedrioni paramilitary organization (leader Dzhaba Ioseliani). Mkhedrioni members were directly involved in the aforesaid crimes.

Police Arrest 300 Since Attempt on Shevardnadze

LD2009110695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1049 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Tengiz Pachkoriya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tbilisi, September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Georgian law enforcement bodies detained and arrested 300 people over the past three weeks (after an abortive attempt on the life of Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze) who are suspected of committing grave crimes: brigandage, robberies murders, physical assaults on people, extortion of money from citizens, embezzlement of state and personnal property, ITAR-TASS learned on Wednesday at the press centre of the Georgian Interior Ministry.

Police Colonel Valerian Gogolashvili, head of the ministry's press centre, flatly denied allegations by some people in an interview with ITAR-TASS that republican law enforcement bodies allegedly launched a campaign of persecutions against members of the Mkhedrioni paramilitary organisation.

Law enforcement bodies detain and arrest only those who are suspected and accused of committing various grave crimes and who have illegal unregistered firearms and submachine guns, he said.

Only 45 people are Mkhedrioni members out of 300 citizens detained over the past three weeks who are accused of committing earlier crimes. The colonel added that some 40 people out of these 300 detainees are criminals who were earlier members of illegal armed detachments who supported Georgian ex-president Zviad Gamsakhurdia and who committed specific crimes in Georgia over the past three years.

Commentary: Shevardnadze's Election Prospects Good

AU2009102595 Tbilisi AKHALI TAOBA in Georgian 15 Sep 95 p 4

[Commentary by Soso Zaalishvili: "Everyone Is Preparing for the Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Election fever in Georgia had begun even before the elections were scheduled. However, the view existed at the time that the elections could be postponed until the spring. Now that Parliament has already set a date for the elections [5 November] in Georgia, all political forces are living by this alone.

As expected, certain forces in Georgia will be boycotting the elections, but this will probably not alter the electoral life to any large or significant degree, as one part of ex-President Gamsakhurdia's supporters, who, quite recently, were calling on the population to boycott the elections, have changed their minds and are now actively supporting the elections.

The Konstantine Gamsakhurdia Society, Irakli Gotsiridze [chairman of the "United Georgia" coalition], and several other parties have held this position for quite some time now. In their view, it is necessary to participate in the elections, as this will change the current political spectrum in the Georgian Government. The leadership of the Konstantine Gamsakhurdia Society believe that the name of their party is enough to make electors realize for whom they should vote in the elections. At the moment, they do not intend to unite within any electoral bloc. "Whoever wants to participate in the elections along with them should join the Gamsakhurdia Society." It is possible that, after a certain time, they will change their position again and will form a bloc with a particular force.

Of all the parliamentary forces, it is Shevardnadze's supporters who have begun their election campaign most actively. The Union of [Georgia's] Citizens and the Socialist Party are already campaigning in the regions and organizing pre-election rallies, although, as we have learned from reliable sources, the mayor of one town summoned the rayon heads and said that, if Shevardnadze wins 98 percent of the vote, they will all leave their posts.

A few days ago, the head of state visited Svaneti. He promised the local population everything. It seems that the criminal bands were the reason for the lack of attention given to Svaneti for a long time and, now that they have been just about dealt with, there will be everything: Electricity, flour... and very soon they will embrace communism.

Proceeding from the fact that the head of state's positions are very firm, his party's chances in the elections to executive power and even his own are fairly good. Of the other presidential candidates, Akaki Bakradze and Jumber Patiashvili are able to offer a challenge, although it is also possible that Shevardnadze himself played the Patiashvili card and Patiashvili will withdraw his candidature on the eve of the elections in favor of Shevardnadze. The other candidates will have some kind of chance provided that they can muster the 50,000 signatures required.

The Union of Traditionalists does not plan to form a bloc with any other party. It has formed a coordinating council with the Liberal-Conservative Party. Proceeding from the fact that the Traditionalists view themselves as being right of center, they are pursuing a prudent policy and do not deem it necessary to exacerbate the situation as this could plunge the country into an abyss from which we would not be able to emerge for a very long time. In Asatiani's [chairman of the Union of Traditionalists] view, it is better for us if Shevardnadze remains in his position rather than such forces come to power that are consumed by an unconcealed nostalgia for the Bolshevik regime. According to the leader of the Traditionalists, Shevardnadze should be given the chance to maintain the temporary stability in the country and, in this way, resolve the fate of the oil pipeline in Georgia's favor. However, if Shevardnadze, according to his custom, deviates from the policy of maintaining a "balance" between the West and Russia and accedes to the will of the latter, the Traditionalists are ready to use all their authority to oppose such a decision.

Nor are the National Democrats and the Republicans hurrying to unite with someone. The National Democrats have maintained their position. They alone are fighting the "monster" and trying to defeat it. Unlike the Traditionalists, they are more radical, although this can be explained in various ways. They say that the National Democrats have been unable to get what they were expecting although, in spite of this, they increased their rating among the population to a fair degree after refusing to vote for the Constitution. As for the Republicans themselves, they are more a bloc than one party. They have done everything to get a good electoral law and Constitution and, according to analysts, it is precisely to their credit that we have a comparatively democratic Constitution. However, the Republicans' bloc thinking manifested itself during the adoption of Article 6 of the Constitution when three Republicans did not vote for presidential rule in Georgia.

The fragmentation and unprincipled nature of the political spectrum leaves Shevardnadze with a big chance to lead Georgia for a further five years. The existing political forces have ostensibly become reconciled to being unable to change anything. They are being slowly carried along by the current and being caught in the fisherman's net that he has casually cast and it is only then that they recall that Georgia is in a most serious situation. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are lost. We are the only country in the former Soviet Union without its own currency that is being introduced as a pre-election ploy. Russia's forces of occupation are illegally stationed here, forces that mercilessly slaughtered our fighters and the civilian population in Abkhazia. Only a few organizations have adhered to their principles during the last few months. These include the Ilia Chavchavadze Society and the Conservative- Monarchist Party.

The regrouping of forces will continue in the pre-election period. One hopes that the forthcoming elections will bring the Georgian population a certain measure of stability.

Estonia

NATO Commander Postpones Visit to Tallinn

LD1909152595 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1400 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General George Joulwan postponed his visit to Estonia for at least two days. The visit, which should have started today, is aimed at examining the progress of Estonia's defense affairs and Estonia's participation in the region's defense system.

Gen Joulwan telephoned Lieutenant-General Aleksander Einseln, commander of the Estonian armed forces, today to inform him that he must postpone his visit to Estonia due to the situation in the former Yugoslavia. Gen Joulwan has to take an urgent trip to Brussels in order to brief the NATO leadership about the situation in Bosnia.

According to preliminary information, Gen Joulwan will probably arrive in Tallinn on 22 or 23 September.

Minister on Efforts To Normalize Ties With Moscow

LD1909202495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1851 GMT 19 Sep 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igoro Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TALLINN, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — Estonia is striving to normalize relations and continue a dialogue with Russia despite the threatening statements of Moscow made in connection with Estonian plans to join NATO, Estonian Foreign Minister Riivo Sinijarv told INTERFAX Tuesday.

The Estonian stand on Russia remains unchanged, he said.

"Tallinn counts on further dialogue with Moscow to discuss the border problem. But it depends on Russia," said the minister.

Following a recent round of negotiations in July 1995, the sides agreed to have their next meeting in Moscow. Russia, being the host, is to inform Estonia on the meeting date in the second ten days of September.

Estonia hopes that Russia will give an answer in the remaining two days, he said.

According to the minister, drafting of the border treaty is complicated, but the document has been partly elaborated.

Estonia has elaborated its stand on the treaty, but it is still early to speak about it, said Sinijarv.

Foreign Minister, Danish Counterpart on EU, NATO

LD1909142095 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1200 GMT 19 Sep 95

[Report by correspondent Mall Malberg on Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen's talks in Tallinn; portions enclosed within quotation marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen is continuing his visit to Estonia. Today he and his Estonian counterpart gave a news conference. Mall Malberg reports:

[Malberg] [passage omitted] At the news conference Estonian Foreign Minister Riivo Sinijarv emphasized that the two-day talks with Petersen were productive. Sinijarv mentioned five subjects, the first of which was relations with the European Union.

[Sinijarv] "We discussed the possible development of the EU, also in the context of the EU intergovernmental conference which is due next year. We totally agreed with the view of the Danish foreign minister that Estonia should definitely submit its application for full [EU] membership before the intergovernmental conference begins."

Sinijarv said Estonia wishes very much that the negotiations with the EU should begin no later than with Malta.

The second subject was NATO.

[Sinijarv] "We found that we had an absolutely identical view that NATO expansion must not take place in a way that would create areas with different levels of security in Europe, or so-called grey zones. A study or a white paper on NATO expansion is expected to reach some stage of completion by the end of this month and then a discussion on it will begin."

Estonian-Russian relations were also an important subject of the discussions. Sinijarv mentioned Baltic cooperation as the fourth subject of the discussion and Estonian-Danish economic relations as the fifth. He expressed satisfaction over the fact that Petersen is accompanied by a large delegation of businessmen.

[Sinijarv] "Yesterday we both had the pleasant opportunity of opening a Danish-Estonian business conference. This is a way which allows us to develop our trade and economic relations and attract investment."

The Danish foreign minister also mentioned the issues of the EU and NATO first.

[Petersen in English with superimposed Estonian translation] "The signing of European [association] agreements brought the Baltic states in line with the other central and eastern European countries regarding EU membership." [passage omitted]

With regard to NATO's expansion, Petersen emphasized Denmark's position:

[Petersen in English with superimposed Estonian translation] ["Denmark's position is that] the Baltic countries should be given the same opportunities as other central and eastern European countries. This is the decision of the Danish parliament, adopted by a large majority of votes a year ago."

At today's news conference the Danish and Estonian foreign ministers signed an agreement according to which the Estonian Government agrees to sell the Danish Government a site for building an embassy. The site is in Tallinn at 5 Vismari Street. Petersen said the embassy building should be completed by the end of 1996 or the beginning of 1997.

Latvia

Ukraine Defense Minister Arrives for Visit

WS1909115195 Riga LETA in English
1013 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, September 19 (LETA) — The Minister of Defense of Ukraine Valeriy Shmarov arrived in Latvia this morning. He will spend two days in Latvia and today Mr. Shmarov will be received by Guntis Ulmanis, Latvia's President, and Prime Minister Maris Gailis who is also Latvia's Minister of Defense. The Defense Minister of Ukraine will visit the Latvian Defense Academy and the Latvian Voluntary Guard training company. At 12:3O Mr. Shmarov will hold a press conference in the Cabinet building.

On Wednesday meetings have been planned with the leaders of Latvia's defense forces and the Foreign Affairs Minister of Latvia Valdis Birkavs. A trip to the Baltic Battalion and the mobile regiment training base will take place.

Baltic Assembly Presidium Approves Closer Cooperation

LD1809154595 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1500 GMT 18 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Saeima news service reports that today the presidium of the Baltic Assembly agreed on closer cooperation between the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian parliaments. The presidium also approved the statement issued on 5 September by the Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee on the participation of the Baltic countries in the NATO, and specified that the seventh session of the Baltic Assembly will take place in December in Tallinn. They also discussed reinforcing cooperation with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union, and the work of the Baltic Council of Ministers. The previous session of the Baltic Assembly took place in April this year in Riga.

Explosion Destroys Interior Ministry Van, Other Property

WS2009085195 Tallinn BNS in English
1645 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Sep 19, BNS — A van owned by the Latvian Interior Ministry was blasted Monday night in the yard of a police station.

The explosion caused damage to 11 vehicles, the station building and nearby houses.

The police is investigating into the case.

Lithuania

President, Official Delegation Arrive in Turkey

President Meets Turkish Counterpart

LD1909140895 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] I would like to start this news bulletin with a report about the foreign visit of Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas. Algirdas Usas is on the phone from Ankara.

[Usas] Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas and a delegation accompanying him arrived to Ankara today from Bucharest for a three-day visit. Immediately after entering Turkish airspace, the Lithuanian presidential airplane was escorted to Esenbog Airport by Air Force fighter planes. This is a sign of very special respect.

Algirdas Brazauskas began by visiting the mausoleum of the first president of Turkey, Ataturk, where he laid a wreath, observed a minute of silence, and signed a visitors' book. The official meeting ceremony took place in the palace of the Turkish president. After the ceremony, both presidents delivered short speeches.

Turkey has never recognized the occupation of the Baltic countries, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel said. We see those 50 years as lost years and now want to catch up. The Turkish Embassy was opened in Vilnius as early as 1992, and a treaty on friendship and cooperation, together with other bilateral agreements, was signed in 1994. I hope that this visit will be beneficial for both countries, Suleyman Demirel said.

Algirdas Brazauskas expressed his gratitude for the warm welcome extended to him and said that relations between the two countries have a long history: a treaty of friendship and cooperation was first signed in 1931. Now we have an opportunity to continue the cooperation of both countries and nations, Algirdas Brazauskas said.

After a tete-a-tete conversation three agreements were signed: on legal assistance, military cooperation, and cultural cooperation. This afternoon the Lithuanian president will also be meeting Husamettin Cindoruk, speaker of the Grand National Assembly, and Prime Minister Tansu Ciller. An official dinner will be hosted by the Turkish president.

Defense Minister Signs Treaty

WS2009085295 Tallinn BNS in English
1645 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ankara, September 19, BNS — A treaty on military cooperation between Lithuania and Turkey was signed in Ankara on Tuesday. The treaty provides for contacts in the areas of military training and supply of technical equipment.

Turkey is the seventh NATO country with which Lithuania has agreed to cooperate militarily.

Linas Linkevicius, Lithuanian defense minister, who is visiting Turkey as part of an official government delegation headed by president Algirdas Brazauskas, signed the treaty on behalf of Lithuania.

Slezevicius Praises Relations With Poland

LD2009102095

[FBIS Editorial Report] Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian at 0730 GMT on 20 September broadcasts a 25-minute live interview with Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfos Slevicius by an unidentified correspondent.

During the interview, Slezevicius very positively assesses his country's present relations with Poland. Slezevicius describes the recent visit to Vilnius by his Polish counterpart Jozef Oleksy as a very important event. Jozef Oleksy visited Lithuania on 15 and 16 September.

"I would like to stress that it was the first official visit by a head of the Polish Government to Lithuania," Slevicius says. He adds: "I am pleased to say that relations between our countries are now better than at any other point this century, and this fact has also been noticed by outside observers. It brings about a great deal of optimism in the development of our relations with Poland, including very important agreements which will be drafted and signed.

"In addition, Poland acts as a very good mediator in our dialogue with other central European countries — the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia. We are planning to sign free trade agreements with these countries, and on this basis we will be able to eventually consider participation in the bloc of these countries. It would be very beneficial to us, as an intermediate stage of our integration to the European Union."

Adolfas Slezevicius, who is in the studio with Police Commissar Liaudanskas, also speaks about the criminal situation in the country and answers questions from radio listeners about crime-related problems of everyday life.

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